On 26 July 1956, the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, nationalises the Suez Canal Company. France and the United Kingdom, the principal shareholders of the company, send troops to Egypt. On 6 November, they begin their military operation, but withdraw the following day in the face of threats from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Diese Karte zeigt den Weg der britischen und französischen Kolonien im Mittleren Osten zur Unabhängigkeit.

View of great Temple of Abu Simbel, threatened by the building of the Aswan Dam first proposed by the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 to facilitate navigation on the River Nile, to generate electricity and to supply water for the irrigation of new farmland.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, Chairman of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council from 14 November 1954 to 23 June 1956, than President of the Arab Republic of Egypt from 23 June 1956 to 28 September 1970.

On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser delivers a speech in Alexandria in which he announces the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

On 26 July 1956, the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, officially announces the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

On 26 July 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, President and Prime Minister of Egypt, is cheered by the crowd following his address in which he announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

On 27 July 1956, the French Foreign Ministry officially denounces the unilateral decision taken by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to nationalise the Suez Canal Company.

On 27 July 1956, Jean Chauvel, French Ambassador to London, informs Christian Pineau, French Foreign Minister, of the British reaction to the unilateral nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

On 27 July 1956, Christian Pineau, French Foreign Minister, informs Jean Chauvel, French Ambassador to London, of the decisions taken by France following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.

Am 27. Juli 1956 berichtet die belgische kommunistische Tageszeitung Le Drapeau rouge über die Entscheidung des ägyptischen Präsidenten Gamal Abdel Nasser, die Gesellschaft Compagnie du canal de Suez zu verstaatlichen.

On 28 July 1956, the British Embassy in Cairo sends a telegram to the British Foreign Office in which it outlines the positive reactions in the Arab countries following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. They welcome the action taken by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and express their support to Egypt.

On 28 July 1956, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera analyses the reasons why the Egyptian President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal.

Am 28. Juli 1956 hinterfragt die französische Tageszeitung Le Monde die Reaktion der westlichen Großmächte auf die Verstaatlichung des Suezkanals durch den ägyptischen Präsident Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In a telegram dated 29 July 1956, the British Embassy in Cairo informs the British Foreign Office of the press reactions to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The press particularly reports on the address given on 26 July by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the initial British reactions and the attitude of the United States and the Commonwealth countries.

On 29 July 1956, the Egyptian Embassy in London issues a communiqué stating the reasons for Gamal Abdel Nasser’s unilateral decision to nationalise the Suez Canal Company.

From 29 July to 2 August 1956, tripartite talks are held in London to establish a common position on the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. At the first session on 29 July, the Americans, British and French agree on the need for a conference at which the countries with an interest in the canal can give their views on the matter. But on most of the major points for discussion there is disagreement between the United States and the European countries, particularly on questions regarding responsibility, the economic sanctions that should be imposed on Egypt and the preparation of potential military action.

From 29 July to 2 August 1956, tripartite talks are held in London to establish a common position on the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. At the second session on 29 July, the US, British and French delegations focus more specifically on the question of Israel’s role in the Suez Crisis and the attitude of the Soviet Union and the Commonwealth countries. They also discuss the adoption of practical measures, such as the freezing of Egyptian assets.

From 29 July to 2 August 1956, the French, British and US delegations meet in London for tripartite talks to establish a common position on the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. At the third session on 30 July, the talks focus on drawing up a list of participants for the forthcoming maritime conference on the Suez Canal.

To establish a common position following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by Gamal Abdel Nasser, delegations from the United States, the United Kingdom and France meet in London from 29 July to 2 August 1956 for tripartite talks. At the fourth session on 30 July 1956, the talks focus on what should be included in the final communiqué of the conference.

On 31 July 1956, the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and his advisers refer to the Suez Crisis, which, they fear, will lead to unrest in the Arab world, should the United Kingdom take military action.

On 31 July 1956, the British cartoonist, David Low, illustrates the decision taken by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to nationalise the Suez Canal Company (on the left is Dimitri Chepilov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union).

In a telegram dated 31 July 1956, the British Embassy in Brussels informs the British Foreign Office of the Belgian reactions to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. While the Belgian press supports the United Kingdom and France, the Belgian Government seems reluctant to take a stance and refuses to comment on possible measures to be adopted.

On 31 July 1956, the British Embassy in Rome sends a telegram to the British Foreign Office in which it outlines the reactions in Italy to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The Italian Government expresses its deep concern for its economy and its maritime transport companies.

On 1 August 1956, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles (left), the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden (right), and the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau (centre), meet in London to discuss the Suez Crisis.

On 2 August 1956, the USA, the United Kingdom and France issue a joint statement condemning the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian Government.

On 2 August 1956, the French weekly publication France Observateur deplores the comparison, which has become commonplace in the West, between the Egyptian Colonel, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Adolf Hitler.

In a television broadcast on 3 August 1956, the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, deplore the decision taken by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to nationalise the Suez Canal.

On 4 August 1956, the London weekly political magazine The New Statesman and Nation analyses the geopolitical implications of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, given the strategic interests of the United Kingdom in the Middle East.

In a telegram dated 6 August 1956, the British Embassy in The Hague informs the British Foreign Office of the measures that the Netherlands Government is intending to take following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The Government will suspend transfers of arms and ammunitions to Egypt and will no longer grant credit facilities. However, it emphasises that it is unable to freeze all Egyptian assets in the Netherlands.

In his diary entry for 8 August 1956, the American President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, refers to causes of the Suez crisis.

On 8 August 1956, French cartoonist Pol Ferjac uses the hieroglyphs on the Obelisk in Paris to illustrate the plan to nationalise the Suez Canal by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and paints an ironic picture of the different stages of the resulting Suez Crisis. In the fountains on Place de la Concorde, which commemorate inland and maritime navigation and stand opposite the National Assembly, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, a faint smile on his face, is depicted as an allegorical statue holding a crocodile in his arms and seems to be taunting the French authorities.

‘The mummy awakes. Down!’ On 26 July 1956, Colonel Nasser, President of Egypt, nationalises the Suez Canal Company. On 8 August 1956, French cartoonist Pol Ferjac illustrates how Guy Mollet (centre), President of the French Council of Ministers, and Anthony Eden (on the right), British Prime Minister, are endeavouring to contain the awakening of Egyptian nationalism, symbolised here by a mummy coming back to life.

‘Father Nile … and Father Suez.’ In August 1956, the German cartoonist, Oesterle, uses the image of the statue of the Roman god Nilus with the characteristic features of prosperity — an old man lying down, surrounded by symbols of abundance and prosperity such as the horn of plenty, wheat, food offerings and the 16 cherubim, an allegory of the flooding of the Nile — to illustrate the political intentions of the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and places particular emphasis on the role of the Soviet Union during the Suez Crisis.

On 22 August 1956, the governments participating in the London Maritime Conference adopt a resolution on the future management of the Suez Canal.

On 25 August 1956, the Italian daily newspaper Il nuovo Corriere della Sera speculates on the reasons for the Suez Canal crisis and emphasises the strategic importance of the canal for the supply of oil to Western countries.

On 27 August 1956, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden sends the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower a letter in which he welcomes the results of the London Maritime Conference on the Suez Crisis. However, he is concerned at the foreign policy of the USSR, particularly the establishment of closer relations between Moscow and Cairo. He also outlines the measures he would like to take if Nasser refuses to negotiate, and explains that the United Kingdom and France are continuing their military preparations.

On 30 August 1956, the Soviet satirical magazine Krokodil illustrates the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company by Gamal Abdel Nasser, President and Prime Minister of Egypt.

On 1 October 1956, the French Government asks the member States of the Council of Europe to show solidarity by condemning the unilateral decision taken by Egypt to nationalise the Suez Canal Company.

On 2 October 1956, in a statement to the Italian Parliament, Gaetano Martino, Italian Foreign Minister, expresses his hopes for a diplomatic and peaceful solution to the international crisis brought about by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal.

Twenty years after the event, Christian Pineau, former French Foreign Minister, recalls the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the surprise in French political circles at the unilateral decision taken by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Am 26. Juli 1956 hält der ägyptische Präsident Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria ein Rede, in der er die Verstaatlichung des Suezkanals ankündigt. Franzosen und Briten sind gegen diese Entscheidung, da sie um ihre Erdölversorgung fürchten, und beschließen einen Militäreinsatz, um die Besetzung der Anlage zu beenden.

On 13 October 1956, in response to an initiative by Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, and his British counterpart, Lord Selwyn Lloyd, the United Nations Security Council adopts a resolution of principle with the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, in order to solve the Suez crisis in a peaceful fashion.

Diese Karte zeigt die israelischen Offensiven und den französisch-britischen Gegenschlag während der Suezkrise von 1956.

In his Memoirs, Anthony Eden, British Prime Minister from 1955 to 1957, recalls the need to take immediate measures in November 1956 following the invasion of the Sinai Peninsula by Israeli troops on 29 October 1956.

On 30 October 1956, the day after the Israeli military invasion of Egyptian territory, the President of the French Council, Guy Mollet, issues an ultimatum calling on the warring parties to bring about an immediate end to the hostilities.

In an address to the House of Commons on 31 October 1956, the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, comments on the events taking place in the Suez region.

On 31 October 1956, the French Communist daily newspaper L’Humanité criticises the military intervention of France, the United Kingdom and Israel in Egyptian territory and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

On 2 November 1956, the Italian daily newspaper Il nuovo Corriere della Sera gives an initial analysis of the military intervention by France, the United Kingdom and Israel in Egypt.

In October 1956, members of the French Second Regiment of Colonial Parachutists (2nd RCP) are on patrol in Port Said, Egypt. In the near distance, stores of fuel are on fire.

In November 1956, soldiers from the British 36 Engineer Regiment carry out a mine clearance operation on the coastal road from El Gamil to Port Said in Egypt.

Aerial view of two of the vessels scuttled by the Egyptians in Port Said at the entrance to the Suez Canal in order to prevent any shipping movements. On the right, a British vessel specially equipped for refloating operations.

On 4 November 1956, Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations gives a speech to the General Assembly calling for all warring parties to respect the ceasefire immediately.

On 4 November 1956, the Soviet Government strongly condemns French and British military intervention in the Suez Canal region.

In seinen Memoiren beschreibt Nikita Chruschtschow, ehemaliger Generalsekretär der Kommunistischen Partei Russlands, die Haltung, die die Sowjetunion während der Suezkrise im Jahr 1956 eingenommen hat.

Twenty years after the event, Christian Pineau, former French Foreign Minister, recalls exactly the attitude of the United States and the Soviet Union on the eve of Franco-British military intervention in the Suez Canal Region.

On 5 November 1956 the Soviet Marshal, Nikolai Bulganin, notifies the French, British and Israeli Governments that the Soviet Union is prepared to employ all modern forms of destructive weaponry to halt Western military intervention in Egypt.

On 5 November 1956, Nikolai Bulganin, President of the Soviet Union Council of Ministers, sends a letter to the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in which he calls for the United States to form an alliance with Moscow in order to put an end, even by military means, to the armed attacks to which Egypt is being subject.

‘The man at the tap.’ In August 1956, shortly after the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the cartoonist Fritz Behrendt portrays the threat hanging over the Western nations’ oil supplies.

On 7 November 1956, against the backdrop of the Suez crisis, the British Ministry of Fuel and Power announces measures to reduce oil consumption.

Am 8. November 1956 zieht die französische Wochenzeitschrift France Observateur ein Fazit der Militäroperation und analysiert die Konsequenzen des diplomatischen Fiaskos des französisch-britischen Feldzugs von Suez.

‘Tourist season in Egypt. Hey, Tommy, don’t you think the Egyptians look a bit odd this year?’ On 14 November 1956, French cartoonist Pol Ferjac takes an ironic look at Moscow’s involvement and role in the events of the Suez Crisis. The two French and British soldiers keeping guard around the Suez Canal and safeguarding the interests of France and the United Kingdom in the region are speculating on the strange appearance of the Egyptians, who all seem to look identical to Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

On 20 November 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld, UN Secretary-General, presents his report on the establishment of an international military force to oversee the cessation of conflict in the Suez Canal area.

In his memoirs, Anthony Eden recalls the pressure exerted by the United Nations and the United States in order to speed up the withdrawal of French and British troops from the Suez region.

On 23 November 1956, the British cartoonist, Michael Cummings, illustrates the political and military imbroglio which is characteristic of the conclusion of the Suez Crisis.

On 30 November 1956, British and French delegations meet secretly in London to discuss the speedy withdrawal of French and British forces from Port Said.

On 3 December 1956, the French and British Governments send two statements to the United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, the first concerning the evacuation of French and British forces and the second the resolution of the Suez problem.

On 3 December 1956, the US State Department announced the withdrawal of French and British forces from Egypt and stressed the importance of action taken by the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of the Suez crisis.

In January 1957, an agreement between the United Nations and Egypt provides for the clearance of the Suez Canal. Under the auspices of the United Nations, a fleet of tugs begins the salvage of some 40 vessels sunk by the Egyptian authorities to block traffic in the canal. The canal was finally reopened in April 1957.

On 2 January 1957, as part of the United Nations' clearance operations in the Suez Canal, the wreck of the Egyptian tug Ardent, one of the six tugs sunk to block the canal, is refloated.

On 13 January 1957, Fernand Baudhuin, Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, analyses in the Belgian Conservative daily newspaper La Libre Belgique the political and economic impact of the Suez crisis on Europe.

Twenty years after the event, Christian Pineau, former French Foreign Minister, summarises the implications of the Suez Crisis for the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States.

‘Russian supply pipeline. Small oil lamp. Vase. Canal water. Overheated atmosphere. Delivery of boiling water. Translation into French of English splutterings. Cooling tank. US elections. Tepid saliva. Residue of Western solidarity. End of the crisis. Diagram illustrating the Suez Crisis.’ The French cartoonist, Pinatel, illustrates the complexity of the Suez issue and takes an ironic look at an international crisis which is coming to an abrupt end.