‘The NATO circus — A dangerous act’. In 1958, the Soviet satirical weekly magazine Krokodil deplores the submissive attitude of the United Kingdom (depicted as a lion, the symbol on the royal coat of arms) and France (shown as a rooster) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which is portrayed as a US soldier. Under the eye of their American trainer, the two animals juggle with nuclear weapons, causing panic among the crowd. Soviet cartoonist Ganf also highlights the nuclear threat represented by the Atlantic Alliance and its allies. While the United Kingdom has had nuclear weapons since 3 October 1952, it is not until 13 February 1960 that France explodes its first atomic bomb.

On 17 September 1958, General de Gaulle sends a letter to Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister, in which he calls for the French memorandum on the reform of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to be the subject of lengthy discussions between France, the United States and the United Kingdom.

On 17 September 1958, General de Gaulle sends a memorandum to the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and to the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in which he sets out the need for a reform of the integrated structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

‘Charles the Avenger. NATO’s new building becomes operational …’ In December 1959, Opland, Dutch cartoonist, sheds light on the tempestuous relations between General de Gaulle and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

On 5 September 1960, President de Gaulle holds a press conference at the Élysée Palace during which he sets out his views on the reform of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and on the role that France might play in such a reform.

During an interview in March 1961, the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, outlines France's policy towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In an address delivered to the US Atlantic Council in Washington on 14 January 1963, US General Lauris Norstad, a former Supreme Allied Commander, refers to the question of authority and control over the nuclear potential within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In 1964, the cartoonist Behrendt illustrates how ‘Twenty years after’ the Allied landings on the Normandy Beaches, General de Gaulle is calling for the withdrawal of US troops from French soil.

During the 1965 ‘NATO appeal’, General de Gaulle clearly underlines the separate role that France expects to play within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

‘Icarus de Gaulle’. On 30 April 1965, Ernst Maria Lang, German cartoonist, takes an ironic view of the desire for national sovereignty harboured by General de Gaulle who wants to stay away from NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and ‘fly by himself’.

On 21 February 1966, General de Gaulle holds a press conference at the Élysée Palace during which he announces France’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

On 7 March 1966, General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, sends a letter to the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, to inform him of France’s decision to resume total control of sovereignty within its national territory and of its intention to withdraw its forces from the integrated command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

On 11 March 1966, the French Government sends an aide-mémoire to its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in which it announces its decision to withdraw its ground and air forces from the Alliance’s integrated command.

Diese Karte zeigt die Stationierung der Luft-, See- und Landstreitkräfte der Nordatlantikpakt-Organisation (NATO) in Frankreich im Jahre 1966.

Am 10. März 1966 kündigt General de Gaulle offiziell die Absicht Frankreichs an, sich aus der integrierten militärischen Kommandostruktur der Atlantischen Allianz zurückzuziehen. Der ehemalige französische Verteidigungsminister, ehemalige Regierungschef und Vater des gescheiterten Plans der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft René Pleven gehört zu den Gegnern dieser Entscheidung und unterzeichnet die öffentliche Petition als Zeichen des Protests.

In an address to the French National Assembly on 13 April 1966, Georges Pompidou, French Prime Minister, explains the reasons behind the unilateral withdrawal of French troops from the integrated military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In an address to the French National Assembly on 14 April 1966, René Pleven, former French Defence Minister, criticises President de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw French troops from NATO’s integrated military command and indicates the dangers of this unilateral decision for the security of Europe.

On 14 March 1967, the American General Lyman Lemnitzer, who holds joint command of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and the US forces stationed in Europe, presides over the departure of US troops from the Saint-Germain-en-Laye base. At 4 p.m., the French and American flags are lowered before detachments of soldiers from both countries, and a group of US soldiers folds the Stars and Stripes which flew over the base.

Die Ankündigung Frankreichs vom 10. März 1966, die integrierte militärische Kommandostruktur der Atlantischen Allianz zu verlassen, führt im März 1967 zur Verlegung des Hauptquartiers der Alliierten Mächte Europa (SHAPE für Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) vom Stützpunkt in Marly-le-Roi (Frankreich), wo es sich seit 1951 befindet, nach Brüssel und Casteau (Belgien).

On 31 March 1967, the new Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is officially opened in Casteau, near Mons, Belgium.

Am 10. März 1966 kündigt General de Gaulle offiziell die Absicht Frankreichs an, sich aus der integrierten militärischen Kommandostruktur der Atlantischen Allianz zurückzuziehen. Da sie das Hauptquartier an ihrem bisherigen Standort in Marly-le-Roi (Frankreich) verlassen muss, verlegt die Allianz ihre Einrichtungen nach Brüssel und Casteau (Belgien). Der Umzug erfolgt gemäß einem Abkommen, das der belgische Außenminister Pierre Harmel und der Oberste Alliierte Befehlshaber Europa (SACEUR), der amerikanische General Lyman Lemnitzer, am 13. Mai 1967 in Brüssel unterzeichnet haben.

On 18 December 1964, the French daily newspaper Le Monde considers the likelihood and the implications of French military neutrality vis-à-vis the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

On 25 February 1966, the Italian daily newspaper Corriere della Sera considers the causes and possible consequences of a withdrawal of French military forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's command structure.

Am 25. Februar 1966 informiert Peter Limbourg, Gesandter und Vertreter des Botschafters der BRD in Paris, das Auswärtige Amt über die Politik der französischen Regierung gegenüber der NATO.

Am 17. März 1966 kommentiert der deutsche Außenminister Gerhard Schröder vor dem Bundestag die unilaterale Entscheidung General de Gaulles, die französischen Truppen aus der Nato abzuziehen und unterstreicht die Bedeutung des europäischen Verteidigungssystems der nordatlantischen Allianz.

On 22 March 1966, the US President, Lyndon B. Johnson, sends a letter to General de Gaulle in which he expresses concern over France’s decision to withdraw from the integrated military structures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

In March 1966, France took the unilateral decision to withdraw from NATO integrated command. Having drawn conclusions from this withdrawal, on 12 April 1966, the United States sends a memorandum to the French Government with regard to France’s position within NATO.

In June 1966, during its 12th ordinary session in Paris, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) considers a report submitted by Duncan Sandys, rapporteur for the Committee on issues relating to defence and arms, on the implications of the withdrawal of French troops from the integrated military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Dans ses Mémoires, le général de Gaulle évoque la politique de désengagement de la France vis-à-vis des structures militaires intégrées de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) et décrit le mémorandum dans lequel la France a plaidé en septembre 1958 pour la création d'un directoire tripartite - États-Unis, Grande-Bretagne et France - pour assumer la direction de l'OTAN.

Du 2 au 4 septembre 1959, le général de Gaulle reçoit dans sa maison de Colombey-les-deux-Églises le président américain Dwight D. Eisenhower et lui expose les préoccupations de la France en ce qui concerne l'usage des armes atomiques et la participation du pays aux structures intégrées de commandement de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN).

In his memoirs, Alain Peyrefitte, former French Information Minister, explains why, already in late 1964, General de Gaulle wanted US troops seconded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to leave French territory.

In his memoirs, Alain Peyrefitte, former French Information Minister, recalls how General de Gaulle revealed to him the underlying aims of the memorandum which France sent to its allies on 17 September 1958 with a view to establishing a Directorate whereby France, the United Kingdom and the United States would be at the head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Der deutsche Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer erinnert sich, wie, am 30. Juli 1960, der französische Staatspräsident Charles de Gaulle ihn informiert über seine Pläne zur Reform der NATO und der Reorganisation der Institutionen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften.