On 27 March 1958, the British Ministry of Defence issues a note for Frank William Mottershead, senior official in the Ministry of Defence, for the Minister’s meeting with the British Conservative MP Sir James Hutchinson on the control of nuclear weapons. The brief outlines the circumstances under which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would resort to nuclear war and who would decide when those circumstances arrive. Concerns are raised that a possible rapid Soviet attack of a NATO member would not leave enough time for proper consultation on a nuclear retaliation. The note summarises the issues surrounding the definition of guidelines for the possible use of nuclear weapons under NATO control and outlines the capabilities of US nuclear forces. The danger of establishing overly precise guidelines is that it would show any potential aggressor the limits within which it could operate before being threatened by a nuclear response from NATO and therefore reduce the effectiveness of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence. The brief concludes that, for the time being at least, there will be no changes to the existing doctrine prescribed after the NATO Ministerial Meeting of December 1954, which states that the military is responsible for drawing up plans for the possible use of nuclear weapons and the civilian authorities are responsible for deciding whether or not to put them into action.