Diagram showing the forms of action brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities: direct actions, references for a preliminary ruling and appeals.

Simplified diagram showing the procedure for direct actions brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

It emerges from the judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 June 1990, in Case C-213/89, Factortame I, that it is for the national courts, by applying the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 10 of the EC Treaty), to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from being fully effective.

In its judgment of 20 September 2001, in Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, the Court of Justice emphasises that, in accordance with settled case-law, the national courts whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law in areas within their jurisdiction must ensure that those rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer on individuals.

In its judgment of 12 July 2005, in Case C-304/02, Commission v France, in response to an action for failure to fulfil obligations, the Court of Justice orders the Member State at fault to pay the Commission both a daily penalty payment and a lump sum, in light of the fact that the failure to fulfil obligations has persisted for a long period since the judgment which initially established it and of the public and private interests at issue.

In its judgment of 11 July, in case 101/84, Commission v Italy, the Court of Justice declares that although it is true that a bomb attack on the data processing centre of the Italian Ministry for Transport, which took place before 18 January 1979, may have constituted a case of force majeure and created insurmountable difficulties, its effect could only have lasted a certain time, namely the time which would in fact be necessary for an administration showing a normal degree of diligence to replace the equipment destroyed and to collect and prepare the data. The Italian Government cannot therefore rely on that event to justify its continuing failure to comply with its obligations years later.

According to the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 11 November 1981, in Case 60-81, IBM/Commission, any measure the legal effects of which are binding on, and capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position is an act or decision which may be the subject of an action under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 230 of the EC Treaty) for a declaration that it is void.

In its judgment of 30 September 2003, in Case C-76/01 P, Eurocoton and others v Council, the Court of Justice points out that the Council's failure to adopt the proposal for a regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty submitted by the Commission has all the characteristics of a reviewable act within the meaning of Article 173 of the EC Treaty (now Article 230), in that it produced binding legal effects capable of affecting the appellants' interests.

Excerpt from the Plaumann judgment relating to the admissibility of action for annulment. The Court interprets the fourth paragraph of Article 230 of the EC Treaty (former Article 173) according to which any natural or legal person may bring an action for annulment 'against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former'.

In its judgment of 1 April 2004, in Case C-263/02 P, Commission v Jégo-Quéré, the Court of Justice points out that it is not appropriate for an action for annulment before the Community Court to be available to an individual who contests the validity of a measure of general application, such as a regulation, which does not distinguish him individually in the same way as an addressee, even if it could be shown, following an examination by that Court of the particular national procedural rules, that those rules do not allow the individual to bring proceedings to contest the validity of the Community measure at issue.

In its judgment of 25 July 2002, in Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, the Court of Justice points out that, under the Community system of legal remedies and procedures, where natural or legal persons cannot, by reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty (now Article 230), directly challenge Community measures of general application, they are able, depending on the case, either indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts before the Community Courts under Article 184 of the Treaty (now Article 241) or to do so before the national courts and to ask them, since they have no jurisdiction themselves to declare those measures invalid, to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity.

By its judgement of 22 October 2002, in case T-310/01, Schneider Electric/Commission, the Court of First Instance annuls a Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market and the EEA Agreement for the reason that it is vitiated by an infringement of the rights of defence. The statement of objections addressed by the Commission to the undertaking has not explained with sufficient clarity the competition problems raised by the proposed merger, in order to give the notifying parties the chance to suggest properly and in good time corrective measures.

It emerges from the judgment of the Court of Justice of 18 May 1994, in Case C-309/89, Codorniu/Council, that the Spanish company Codorniu, which manufactures and markets sparkling wines under the graphic trade mark ‘Gran Cremant de Cordoniu’, registered in Spain in 1924, is individually concerned by the Council Regulation which lays down special provisions relating to quality wines produced in specified regions and which, in reserving the right to use the term ‘crémant’ to French and Luxembourg producers, prevents Codorniu from using its graphic trade mark.

According to the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 6 October 1981, in Case 246/80, C. Broekmeulen v Huisarts Registratie Commissie, in the absence, in practice, of any right of appeal to the ordinary courts, an Appeals Committee set up by a professional body, which operates with the consent of the public authorities and with their cooperation, and which, after an adversarial procedure, delivers decisions which are in fact recognized as final, must, in a matter involving the application of Community law, be considered as a court or tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 234 of the EC Treaty).

According to the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 27 March 1963, in Joined Cases 28, 29, 30/62, Da Costa en Schaake NV and Others/Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, the obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty (now Article 234 of the EC Treaty) upon national courts or tribunals of last instance may be deprived of its purpose by reason of the authority of an interpretation already given by the Court under the said Article in those cases in which the question raised is materially identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary ruling in a similar case.

Il ressort de l’arrêt de la Cour de justice du 6 octobre 1962, dans l’affaire 283/81, Srl CILFIT et Lanificio di Gavardo SpA/Ministère de la santé, que l'autorité de l'interprétation donnée par la Cour en vertu de l'article 177 du traité CEE (devenu article 234 du traité CE) peut priver l’obligation de renvoi de sa cause et la vider ainsi de son contenu notamment quand la question soulevée est matériellement identique à une question ayant déjà fait l'objet d'une décision à titre préjudiciel dans une espèce analogue ou que le point de droit en cause a été résolu par une jurisprudence établie de la Cour, quelle que soit la nature des procédures qui ont donné lieu à cette jurisprudence, même à défaut d'une stricte identité des questions en litige.

According to the Nold judgment, the Court of Justice, with a view to safeguarding fundamental rights, draws its inspiration not only from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but also from international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories. Furthermore, the Court considers that certain rights, in this instance the right of ownership and the freedom to engage in trade or profession, may be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Community.

It emerges from the Hauer judgment that the right to property forms an integral part of the general principles of Community law, the observance of which is ensured by the Court. In safeguarding the fundamental rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the international Treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories (in this case, the First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights).

In its judgment of 21 September 1989, in joined Cases C-46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v Commission, the Court of Justice points out that a provision of Community law may not be interpreted in such a way as to give rise to results which are incompatible with the general principles of Community law and, in particular, with fundamental rights.

For the first time, the European Court of Justice states that it ensures the respect of fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law.

In its judgment of 7 January 2004, in Case C-117/01, K. B., the Court of Justice points out that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings which, in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, prevents a couple from fulfilling the marriage requirement which must be met for one of them to be able to benefit from a part of the salary of the other must be regarded as being, in principle, incompatible with the requirements of Article 141 of the EC Treaty concerning the principle of equal pay for men and women.

According to the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 18 June 1991, in Case C-260/89, ERT/DEP, where a Member State relies on the combined provisions of Articles 56 and 66 of the EEC Treaty (now Articles 46 and 55 of the EC Treaty) in order to justify, on grounds relating to public policy, public security and public health, rules which are likely to obstruct the exercise of the freedom to provide services, such justification, provided for by Community law, must be interpreted in the light of the general principles of law and, in particular, of fundamental rights.