Map showing the details of the Euromissile crisis, a tense diplomatic battle over the installation by the United States of Pershing II cruise missiles and rockets in Europe as a counterbalance to the threat posed by the Soviet deployment of SS-20 nuclear missiles.

On 12 December 1979, at a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) special meeting of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers, a press communiqué is issued outlining the security threat posed by the Warsaw Pact military build-up and the recent deployment of the SS-20 missile. In order to maintain the credibility of its strategy of flexible response in light of the quantitative and qualitative improvements to Soviet long-range nuclear capability brought about by the modernisation and expansion of Soviet theatre nuclear forces (TNF), the Alliance decides to pursue two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernisation and arms control (known as the ‘Double-Track’ Decision on TNF). The Ministers decide to modernise NATO’s long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers. The communiqué also emphasises the need for negotiations on arms limitations regarding LRTNF in order to contribute to a more stable military relationship between East and West and advance the process of détente.

On 12 December 1982, in front of the entrance to the Rhein-Main US Air Base in Frankfurt, more than 300 people demonstrate against the installation of new nuclear weapons in Western Europe and particularly criticise the prospective deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles.

On 7 May 1980, the United States conduct a test launch of a Pershing missile at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. Pershing II missiles were designed to be deployed in the European theatre of operations. These intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missiles, an improved version of the Pershing I system from the 1960s, had a range of 1 800 km and an accuracy of a few dozen metres.

On 6 August 1980, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply by the WEU Council, prepared by the United Kingdom delegation, to Assembly Recommendation 345 on new weapons and defence strategy — modernisation of theatre nuclear forces. The text is reproduced almost in its entirety in the final reply to the Recommendation (C (80) 149).

In an address given on 14 September 1981 at the opening meeting of the 34th session of the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN), new French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy outlines the broad thrust of his government’s defence policy. He confirms the strategic options adopted by his predecessors and emphasises how important it is for France to have an independent deterrent force, since the country refutes the concept of a bipolar world. On the balance of forces, the Prime Minister states that the mass deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles and the permanent development of nuclear weapons, particularly by the United States and the USSR, are forcing France to modernise its own potential on an ongoing basis. In this connection, France will particularly continue its development of the neutron bomb.

On 23 September 1981, at the 582nd meeting of the Council of Western European Union (WEU), Sir Ewen Fergusson, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, discusses the recent visit to Moscow by a British delegation. On the matter of the reduction in long-range Soviet missiles deployed in the western regions of the USSR, the British Government continues to hold the view that the Soviet offers should be rejected. The latest proposal, made in December 1979, required that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) drop its plans for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles but excluded Soviet SS-20 missiles, which could be targeted on Western Europe from the east of the USSR. On the question of the geographical zone of application of a future conference on disarmament in Europe, the USSR has proposed extending the zone to the air space and the sea and ocean regions adjacent to Europe. French ambassador Emmanuel de Margerie welcomes this exchange on major topical issues which he believes demonstrates WEU’s usefulness and vitality.

On 30 September 1981, the journal Nouvelles atlantiques reports on the first press conference held on 24 September by the new French President François Mitterrand. With regard to security, he is particularly concerned at the mass deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles. In this context, the President states that France’s security relies firstly on its ability to defend itself and only secondly on the quality and swiftness of its alliances. France will therefore continue to adopt its own deterrent strategy and will pursue its development of the neutron bomb.

On 1 December 1981, Georges Lemoine, State Secretary to the French Defence Minister, gives an address to the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU). He particularly discusses the Euromissiles crisis and expresses concern at the shift in the balance of forces in favour of the Soviet Union. He also mentions the French deterrent force, his country’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the role of WEU, particularly through the Standing Armaments Committee.

On 2 December 1981, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 374 on the reappraisal of global dangers to western peace and security. It notes that peace is seriously jeopardised by the accumulation in Europe of Soviet conventional and nuclear arms which the Atlantic Alliance does not have the means of countering. It recommends that the Council promote by all means at its disposal the re-establishment of the balance of military forces between East and West. It also calls for an examination of the action to be taken on the study conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee concerning European armaments industries, with a view to optimising military investment expenditure in the member countries. Finally, the Assembly recommends that the Council should urge the North Atlantic Council to hold consultations in the event of a crisis outside Europe.

On 21 December 1981, Reginald Hibbert, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to France, sends a letter to Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), in response to a question by the FCO on France’s relative immunity to the anti-nuclear weapons protests which have spread throughout Europe and Britain. During the Euromissiles crisis, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a British organisation, holds massive demonstrations calling for unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United Kingdom, international nuclear disarmament and tighter international arms regulation. The British Ambassador analyses the background of France’s nuclear deterrent policy and explains the fundamental principles on which this policy is based.

On 26 January 1982, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply from the WEU Council, prepared by the United Kingdom delegation, to Assembly Recommendation 375 on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces. The text is taken up almost in its entirety in the final reply to the Recommendation (C (82) 47).

On 5 February 1982, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply prepared by the French delegation to WEU Assembly Recommendation 374 on the reappraisal of global dangers to western peace and security. The WEU Council emphasises that it is paying particular attention to the development of relations between East and West and notes that the WEU Member States are in favour of any political consultation mechanisms that would enable a common assessment to be made of crisis situations endangering international peace. The Council believes that it is impossible to dissociate the security of the areas covered by the North Atlantic Treaty from that of other parts of the world. The Council’s final reply reproduces the French proposal in its entirety (C (82) 46).

On 16 June 1982, as the Euromissiles crisis unfolds, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 383 on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. Noting that the Soviet Union has a disturbing superiority in heavy intercontinental missiles and intermediate-range forces, the Assembly recommends that the WEU Council should call on the North Atlantic Council to press for an agreement on the zero option in the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) talks. But it advises continuing with preparations for the possible deployment from 1983 of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.

On 31 August 1982, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates a draft reply from the WEU Council, prepared by the British delegation, to Assembly Recommendation 383 on the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. The WEU Council shares many of the Assembly’s views, particularly on the importance of the signing of the SALT II Agreement (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) in 1979, the opening of the START negotiations (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and the continuing discussions on intermediate nuclear forces (INF). The Council also believes that arms control and defence measures should complement each other in a balanced security policy. Furthermore, the Council agrees with the Assembly that preparations should be continued for the possible deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.

On 2 January 1983, French President François Mitterrand is invited to speak about the Euromissiles crisis during the news broadcast on French television channel Antenne 2. He discusses the French deterrent force and outlines France’s position on the plan by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to deploy Pershing II missiles in Western Europe so as to restore the balance of forces following the installation of Soviet SS-20 missiles in the western USSR.

On 8 June 1983, as the Euromissiles crisis unfolds, British daily newspaper The Guardian reports on the announcement by the French Government that it is renewing its support for the installation of American missiles in Europe.

On 16 August 1983, as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks continue, British daily newspaper The Guardian reports on the disagreement concerning the exclusion of British and French weapons from the talks, which are aimed at the dismantling of intermediate-range nuclear weapons by the US and the USSR.

On 16 November 1983, French President François Mitterrand speaks about the Euromissiles crisis on the television programme L’heure de vérité broadcast on French channel Antenne 2. Following the first deployments of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom to restore the balance of forces after the installation of Soviet SS-20 missiles in the western USSR, François Mitterrand analyses power relations between the various nuclear powers. He particularly refers to France’s deterrent force and the country’s absence from the Geneva negotiations on strategic arms reduction.

In an address given on 20 September 1983 at the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies (IHEDN), French Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy outlines the broad thrust of his government’s defence policy. He particularly speaks about the French nuclear deterrent force, France’s relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Western European Union (WEU), and the French position on the Euromissiles crisis.

In this interview excerpt, Francis Gutmann, an official in the French Foreign Ministry from 1951 to 1957 and Secretary-General of the External Relations Ministry from 1981 to 1985, discusses the origins of François Mitterrand’s address on 20 January 1983 to the Bundestag in Bonn. In his address, the French President confirmed his support of the installation by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) of Pershing II missiles in the NATO Member States in response to the installation by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) of SS-20 missiles. President Mitterrand also emphasised that France reserved the right to intervene with its own nuclear capabilities in the event of a Soviet attack on Germany.

On 22 March 1979, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply by the WEU Council to question 192 put by a member of the Assembly on the consequences of the SALT II Agreement. Since the agreement has not yet been signed, the Council explains that many of the details remain confidential, but it refers to a US publication dating from 1978 on cruise missiles which confirms that the United States Government has been careful to preserve the most important options for its defence needs. On the matter of consequences for the European governments, the Council notes that SALT II is a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union and will therefore not be legally binding on third countries when it comes to the development of military techniques. The Council also points out that NATO’s deterrent strategy of flexible response is based on keeping open a series of options to tackle possible aggression, but that this does not mean that NATO must match the arms systems used by the Warsaw Pact with specific systems of its own.

On 21 June 1979, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 334 on various aspects of cooperation between Europe and the United States. The Assembly notes that European security, which is based on the Atlantic Alliance, requires improved consultations between European Member States and the United States and an analysis of the implications of the Soviet Union’s deployment of new weapons. It also calls for the adoption of joint positions by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and asserts that Western Europe should ensure the organisation of European cooperation in armaments production.

On 30 October 1979, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the WEU Council’s draft reply to Recommendation 334 of the Assembly on various aspects of cooperation between Europe and the United States. The document presents the original Italian proposal and a series of amendments from other delegations, including the French and British delegations, most of which are subsequently taken up in the final version (C (79) 148). The delegations emphasise that regular consultations take place between the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and consequently between the WEU member countries, which all belong to NATO apart from France. On the matter of the deployment of new nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, the delegations note that NATO is following this question closely. They also emphasise that the bilateral agreements signed between various WEU members and the United States do not conflict with the achievement of European cooperation in armaments production.

On 22 November 1979, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the WEU Council’s reply to Recommendation 334 of the Assembly on various aspects of cooperation between Europe and the United States. The Council notes that regular consultations take place between the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and consequently between the WEU member countries, and welcomes the exchanges that have taken place in the Alliance in connection with the SALT negotiations. The WEU Council also emphasises that the bilateral agreements signed between various WEU Member States and the United States do not conflict with the organisation of European cooperation in armaments production.

On 2 June 1980, as the Euromissiles crisis unfolds, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 345 on new weapons and defence strategy — modernisation of theatre nuclear forces. The Assembly deplores the increased nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union’s deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, including the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber, and recommends that the WEU Council should call on the North Atlantic Council to seek to redress the balance between the forces of the Warsaw Pact and those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). To counter the Soviet threat, the North Atlantic Council should rely on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea and in the United States. But the Assembly also advises that efforts should be pursued to reach agreement on the limitation and the mutual and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons.

On 12 November 1980, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 345 on new weapons and defence strategy — modernisation of theatre nuclear forces. The Council shares the Assembly’s view that it is essential for the Atlantic Alliance to maintain sufficient forces to ensure adequate deterrence in the face of the steady build-up of Soviet military forces. But the Council notes that the current long-range systems of the Alliance are ageing and that the allies therefore decided on 12 December 1979 to modernise the long-range theatre nuclear forces stationed in Europe and to deploy US ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles from the end of 1983. The Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are also continuing to support negotiations with the Soviet Union for an agreement on the limitation and reduction of nuclear forces. The WEU Council emphasises the efforts made by the Alliance to stimulate the arms control process in Europe, particularly the control of theatre nuclear forces.

On 16 May 1981, following the deployment of SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 367 on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. The Assembly recommends that the WEU Council should urge the North Atlantic Council to ensure that the negotiations on strategic arms limitation are resumed and to call for the continued respect of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements and the ABM (anti-ballistic missile) Treaty. The Assembly would also like an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance.

On 22 October 1981, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 367 on talks on long-range theatre nuclear force reductions in Europe. The WEU Council welcomes the intention by the United States and the Soviet Union to start TNF (Theatre Nuclear Forces) negotiations. It emphasises that these negotiations should take place in the wider framework of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) process and that they should proceed step by step, the first step focusing on the most immediate threat, namely the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles. The Council also announces its continued support for the French proposal to organise a conference on disarmament in Europe and welcomes the recent publication by the United States of an analysis on the Soviet nuclear threat.

On the 2 December 1981, as the Euromissiles crisis unfolds, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 375 on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces. Noting the growing number of land-based theatre nuclear forces deployed by the Soviet Union in Europe, the Assembly recommends that the WEU Council should urge the North Atlantic Council to continue to rely on the dual-track decision of 12 December 1979 on long-range theatre nuclear forces — the NATO decision to install missiles in Western Europe in response to Soviet SS-20 missiles and at the same time to begin talks to secure their withdrawal — as a realistic basis for future negotiations. The Assembly also asks the Council to make every effort to ensure that the public acquires a better understanding of the situation, particularly of the balance of forces.

On 24 March 1982, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the final reply to Recommendation 374 of the Assembly on the reappraisal of global dangers to western peace and security, which reproduces the draft reply submitted by France on 5 February 1982 (WPM (82) 4) in its entirety.

On 24 March 1982, the Secretary-General of Western European Union (WEU) circulates the reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 375 on negotiations on theatre nuclear forces. The Council shares the Assembly’s concerns on the growing number of Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear systems. Regarding the Assembly’s recommendation on the double-track decision of 12 December 1979, the Council notes that the allies intend to implement the two tracks of the decision, namely intermediate-range nuclear force modernisation and arms control, and that their determination to do so has also convinced the Soviet Union to negotiate without preconditions. On the question of public opinion, the Council emphasises the importance of keeping the public informed, particularly in the light of the Soviet propaganda campaign.

In this interview, Charles Goerens, former member of the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) and its President from 1987 to 1990, emphasises the role of the Assembly concerning the question of disarmament in Europe in the context of the Euromissiles issue in the 1980s.