On 10 December 1953, the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, refers in his diary to all the reasons which led him to give an address, two days earlier, before the United Nations concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
On 27 May 1955, Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador to the United States, informs the French Foreign Minister, Antoine Pinay, of the US reactions to the changes taking place in Soviet foreign policy.
On 14 June 1955, Jean Chauvel, French Ambassador in London, writes a letter to Antoine Pinay, French Foreign Minister, in which he sets out his opinion on the reasons for the developments in Soviet policy and the abandonment of Stalinist opposition to change.
In September 1955, Konrad Adenauer, German Federal Chancellor, makes an official visit to Moscow. The discussions with Nikolai Bulganin, Soviet representative (front left), and Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (front right), lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany.
On 18 February 1956, the Italian newspaper Il nuovo Corriere della Sera speculates on the genuine desire for de-Stalinisation shown by Nikita Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, on the occasion of his submission of the report on Stalin’s crimes to the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow.
On 18 July 1955, at the opening of the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, the US President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, gives an address in which he stresses the importance of rapprochement between East and West.
During the Geneva Conference held from 18 to 23 July 1955 and attended by delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR, the Soviet delegation proposes a Treaty on rapprochement between East and West with a view to maintaining peace on the European continent.
On 23 July 1955, the Soviet representative, Nikolai Bulganin, gives the closing address at the Geneva Conference and welcomes the spirit of cooperation which has prevailed between the Soviet and Western delegations.
On 23 July 1955, at the end of the Four-Power Conference held in Geneva, the German daily newspaper Die Welt comments on the new dialogue established between East and West and reports on the progress of the negotiations.
‘There are some problems that are difficult to put into the fridge’. Following the Geneva Conference, the cartoonist Behrendt illustrates the efforts of the Heads of Government of the four great powers (United States, United Kingdom, France and the USSR) to find a solution to the German question.
On 25 July 1955, the French High Commissioner in Austria, François Seydoux, informs the French Foreign Minister, Antoine Pinay, of the Austrian Government’s satisfaction at the positive outcome of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on East-West relations.
On 25 July 1955, commenting on the Geneva Conference, held from 18 to 21 July, the French daily newspaper Le Figaro analyses the signs of détente that have become apparent between the United States and the Soviet Union.
On 28 July 1955, Maurice Couve de Murville, French Ambassador to the United States, informs Antoine Pinay, French Foreign Minister, of the US leaders’ reservations regarding the Soviet attitude and the outcome of the Geneva Conference on East-West relations.
On 28 October 1955, the Italian daily newspaper Corriere della Sera ponders on the reality of the new political orientation of Moscow’s leaders which became apparent during the Geneva Conference, held in July 1955, which was attended by representatives from the United States and the USSR.
On 4 August 1955, Jean Le Roy, French chargé d’affaires in Moscow, informs Antoine Pinay, French Foreign Minister, of the optimism with which the Soviet Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, reported on the outcome of the Geneva Conference to the Supreme Soviet.
‘... Air raid warning.' On 20 September 1955, the Soviet satirical publication Krokodil deplores the sabotage, by Cold War supporters, of ‘the Spirit of Geneva' and of the new climate of dialogue symbolised by the Geneva Conference which, from 18 to 21 July 1955, was attended by the Four Powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR).
‘The spirit that is about to give up the ghost.' In cartoonist Fritz Behrendt's view, ‘the spirit of dialogue' reigning between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, is in a bad way four months after the Geneva Conference in July 1955.
On 12 July 1957, Paul-Henri Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO, speaks to eminent figures at the Municipal Theatre of Luxembourg and presents the Atlantic Alliance as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.
On 26 October 1955, as the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France is held in Geneva, the Dutch daily newspaper Het Parool analyses the state of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.
On 16 November 1955, the German weekly Der Spiegel questions whether the direction in which the negotiations on German unification between the Western powers and the Soviet Union are going is in the interests of the German people.
‘Roadworks.’ On 20 August 1955, the Soviet publication Krokodil illustrates the progress of the steamroller of international cooperation, in favour of peaceful coexistence, as it crushes the symbols of the Cold War in its path.
On 14 February 1956, addressing the 20th Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, assesses the purges ordered by Stalin and deplores the Soviet leader’s overall policy.
On 15 September 1959, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party, responds to the welcome address given in his honour by the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (first on the right) to mark his three-day visit to the United States.
On 15 September 1959, following the visit to the United States by the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, the US Senator, John F. Kennedy, gives an address in which he stresses the importance of normalising relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
In October 1959, Nikita S. Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, publishes a reverberant article about the state of East-West relations in the US geopolitical magazine Foreign Affairs.
In January 1960, responding to an article published by Nikita Khrushchev in September 1959, the US diplomat, George F. Kennan, writes an article in the US geopolitical magazine Foreign Affairs in which he harshly criticises the Soviet Union’s policy and accuses its leaders of lacking sincerity.
This document, taken from US archives, sets out the position and the attitude to be adopted by the US President, John F. Kennedy, during his meeting with Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in Vienna on 3 and 4 June 1961.
On 3 and 4 June 1961, in Vienna, the US President, John F. Kennedy, meets Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), although this meeting does not end the tension between the two blocs.
On 3 and 4 June 1961, US President John F. Kennedy and First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Nikita Khrushchev meet in Vienna in an attempt to ease the tension between the two superpowers.
On 25 November 1961, US President, John F. Kennedy, gives an interview to the editor-in-chief of the Soviet newspaper Izvestia. In this interview, the President gives his views on relations between the Soviet Union and the USA, and the crises of the Cold War.
'Khrushchev: the door to negotiations remains open'. In 1962, the cartoonist Fritz Behrendt takes an ironical look at the real will of the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, to establish dialogue between East and West.
The US memorandum of action for national security n°255 describes the conditions for use of the famous 'red telephone', the direct and secure line between the White House in Washington and the Kremlin in Moscow, which would have been used, in the context of the Cold War, to warn of any nuclear attack between the two superpowers.