

# Spero S.Z. Paravantes, The Relationship between the WEU and NATO

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## The relationship between WEU and NATO

The Western European Union (WEU) originates in the Treaty of Brussels of March 17<sup>th</sup> 1948. It was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom and established the precursor to the WEU, the Western Union (WU) and to create a common defence framework for Western Europe. In October 1950, France proposed to include Germany in this framework through the creation of a European Army. The initiative failed when, in August 1954, the French national assembly refused to ratify the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty. Therefore, the need to integrate West Germany into the defensive framework of the West had to be satisfied through another method; the modification of the Brussels Treaty.

In September 1954 in London, modifications to the Brussels Treaty of 1948 were proposed. After agreeing to the changes, the Brussels treaty signatories met again in Paris in October 1954 to sign the 'modified' Brussels Treaty, thereby forming the Western European Union (WEU).<sup>[1]</sup> It was then that West Germany (officially the Federal Republic of Germany) and Italy joined the five original signatories as members of WEU. The three principle objectives of the modified Brussels Treaty were to establish a base in Western Europe upon which to base European economic recovery, to provide mutual assistance in response to aggression, and to promote unity and integration in Europe.<sup>[2]</sup> Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty stated that if any of the members of the WEU should be attacked in Europe, the other members would provide 'all the military and other assistance in their power 'in accordance with the provisions of article 51 of the Charter of the UN. Though the United States was invited to join WEU, the US congress considered the Modified Brussels Treaty article V to be too restrictive in terms of the assistance signatories were required to give each other in the event of an attack (i.e. troops on the ground), and refused to sign it.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in Washington on 4 April 1949, when twelve foreign ministers signed the treaty. The five original signatories of the Brussels Treaty, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the UK and France, were joined by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. The Atlantic Alliance, as NATO was also known, entered into effect on 23 August 1949, and integrated Western-European defence into a transatlantic framework, whose main objective was collective security.<sup>[3]</sup> The Soviet Union's detonation of a nuclear weapon in September 1949, followed by the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950, accelerated the inception of NATO's integrated military command, and in December 1950, the Western Union transferred its military responsibilities to NATO.<sup>[4]</sup>

Article 5 of the NATO treaty allowed for a more flexible definition of the aid signatories were required to provide than Article V of the Brussels Treaty, while still guaranteeing mutual defence for all members in the event of an attack on one, anywhere in Europe or North America. Though a response was obligatory, each signatory retained the freedom to choose the method by which they would do so. The Washington Treaty also obligated NATO to report such assistance to the United Nations' Security Council and to terminate it, once the Security Council had acted to address the situation. With the USA as a member, NATO therefore represented the guarantee of US support against possible future Soviet aggression that was desired by West European countries, while preserving more freedom of action for each signatory.

Despite having transferred its military responsibilities to NATO, WEU maintained responsibilities in the field of European defence, namely in regulating maximum levels of force and the control of arms.<sup>[5]</sup> In order to be able to perform its functions in this area, WEU was partially dependent on NATO for information about members' armament levels. However, non-WEU members of NATO had concerns over sharing such information with WEU.<sup>[6]</sup> This further contributed to difficulties acquiring the

information that was necessary for WEU organs, such as the Arms Control Agency (ACA), to perform their duties. One initial solution was to establish contact between the Secretary Generals of WEU and NATO, and that when it deemed it appropriate, the WEU Council could invite a NATO observer to its meetings.<sup>[7]</sup> However, NATO informed the WEU Council that it could not allow its secretary general to share information with the WEU secretary General.<sup>[8]</sup> In response to the difficulties in establishing close formal links with NATO, in 1960, the WEU Council approved the idea of developing close unofficial links between NATO's and WEU's secretariats.<sup>[9]</sup> Eventually however, the reluctance to share information with WEU was partially overcome and certain links were developed through which information could officially be shared.

Information relating to military decisions was shared through a direct link between the WEU Council and the Supreme Allied Commander Forces in Europe (SACEUR), NATO's military command in Europe. There was also a link between the Arms Control Agency (ACA) of WEU, and NATO's Annual Review Committee, to share information about armed force levels in both organizations. Additionally, NATO's Defence Production Committee had a link with WEU's Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) to share information about the defence needs and production plans of members.<sup>[10]</sup>

The NATO -WEU relationship was also affected by their different decision-making processes. The WEU Assembly would initiate discussion of various issues and then submit recommendations for action to the WEU Council, which would then draft a response. Usually, the WEU Council met before the NATO council, and a response from the WEU Council meant that there had been a debate on that particular issue in the WEU. As a result, this process allowed the Assembly to participate in the discussion and debate of issues and to play a role placing them on the agenda, not only for the WEU Council, but at times for NATO as well. Therefore, while not taking operational decisions, WEU did provide a framework for the discussion of issues, the sharing of information, and WEU could establish consensus for the development of unified policy in relation to certain issues among its members, encouraging them to adopt common positions.<sup>[11]</sup>

In contrast, NATO would take decisions and pursue a course of action. These decisions were reached through consensus; a decision mutually accepted by all NATO member states. Opposed to unanimity which requires a clear expression of the will of all members through a vote (required only for the admission of new members to the alliance as outlined in Article 10), consensus in NATO was (and still is) reached through a process of consultation and discussion driven by the expressed national interests of the member states and is intended to produce a mutually acceptable result. NATO therefore relies on customs / practices developed over time.<sup>[12]</sup> Therefore, NATO, with voting procedures, could decide to intervene militarily should the membership vote in favour of action, and therefore it was an institution, capable of and intended for direct intervention, either in the military sphere, or, after the Harmel Report of 1967, officially in the political sphere.

While both Britain and France agreed on the WEU's roles of regulating maximum levels of force and arms control,<sup>[13]</sup> they disagreed on how closely it should be linked with NATO and how active a role it should play. The British wanted WEU to act as a forum to discuss policy and to deal with defence issues, while maintaining close links with NATO, either officially or unofficially.<sup>[14]</sup> The French foresaw a more active role for WEU, desiring to see it as the framework through which European defence issues would be the focus, independent of NATO and the Atlantic.<sup>[15]</sup>

Notwithstanding the links that were established between NATO and WEU, the decision of France to leave the integrated military command of NATO in 1966, complicated the relationship between the two organisations. The disagreement between France and United Kingdom over the WEU/NATO relationship revolved around the issue of WEU's competencies and dependence on NATO militarily. For the British, the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command would weaken not

only NATO, but also the WEU. In the minutes of a WEU Council meeting in March 1966, the British foreign secretary raised the issue of France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, stating that he doubted France's commitment to WEU, and that the French decision may have been illegal, which could undermine NATO's existence. The French Secretary for foreign affairs responded by stating that France's decision was that the NATO of 1949 no longer corresponded to the realities of 1966. Their decision therefore was made in an attempt to change NATO, not to endanger its existence. [\[16\]](#)

In the 1970s, the NATO/WEU relationship, though shaken by the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966, continued to maintain the links described above. Furthermore, having a partially shared membership with NATO permitted the WEU Council to inform the WEU Assembly about the actions that its members had taken as part of other international organisations. [\[17\]](#) The shared membership also contributed to the development of an *ad hoc* procedure which provided for the sharing of information with the Assembly relating to force levels of the WEU members of NATO. [\[18\]](#) The WEU also supported the expansion of NATO's mandate, discussing the issues that arose as a result of conflicts, and ways to influence members in a certain direction (for example, a greater French role in the Mediterranean). [\[19\]](#)

In December 1979, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan the WEU Assembly sent a recommendation to the WEU Council which called for the European members of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) to consult regularly about their policies outside NATO's area of responsibility. [\[20\]](#) Additionally, WEU members believed that the relationship with NATO was vital to support their interests in issues such as energy and military security. As a result these actions, the WEU Assembly passed recommendations either calling for the Council to request the North Atlantic Council to act, or to state the WEU assembly's support for NATO's response to a certain crisis. [\[21\]](#)

Regardless of British plans for WEU to be a forum through which economic, political and defence issue of interest to the members could be discussed, or the French desire to have WEU play a more active role in European defence, independently of NATO, WEU ended up forging a relationship with NATO combining elements of both. It maintained responsibilities in the field of defence, namely regulating maximum levels of force and controlling armaments, and provided a forum where Western-European governments could express their collective will, if not physically, then at least politically on the pressing issues of the day.

### **Complementarity or Dependence?**

After the Western Union's (WU) operational military responsibilities were transferred to NATO on 20 December 1950 [\[22\]](#), the WU nonetheless retained military responsibilities in terms of arms control and the regulation of the maximum levels of force among its members. [\[23\]](#) It could therefore play a complementary role to NATO, without competing with, or duplicating its efforts. This was beneficial for the British since they felt that they were bearing a disproportionate burden of defence spending in Europe, and wished to provide forces solely to NATO for collective defence, rather than funding military units under separate frameworks. [\[24\]](#) In 1957, feeling that NATO should have command over joint forces in Europe, the British advised the WEU Council of their intentions to reduce their conventional force levels on the continent, specifically the British forces stationed in Germany. The French expressed reservations about the British reduction, stating that they feared it could endanger collective defence by encouraging other members to reduce their force levels on the continent. [\[25\]](#) This they believed would lead to an increased dependence on NATO in military matters, a development that the French hoped to avoid. The British representative reassured the other representatives in the WEU Council that the British had no intention of withdrawing from the continent, and that the British military role in Germany would still be significant, though not at the

level of their forces already assigned to NATO command.<sup>[26]</sup> This disagreement illustrated the difference in opinion between the French and British over the developing role of WEU. The British were planning on increasing the integration of their forces allocated to collective defence with NATO, whereas the French desired to keep forces in Europe independent of NATO.

In terms of the control and production of arms, WEU played a complementary role to NATO, with the Atlantic Council being appraised of the actions of the Arms Control Agency (ACA) and the Standing Armament Committee (SAC) having a link with NATO's Defence Production Committee (DPC).<sup>[27]</sup> However, by 1960, the French and British positions on this aspect of WEU's role were diverging. For the UK, NATO was the forum for making decisions on collective action, and WEU should be limited to the discussion of issues of mutual importance.<sup>[28]</sup> The French position was that WEU should be used to help establish a European common market and to support European defence.<sup>[29]</sup> The rift between the British and French objectives for the roles of WEU and NATO grew with the withdrawal of France from the integrated military command of NATO.<sup>[30]</sup>

In the minutes of a WEU Council meeting in March 1966, the British foreign secretary raised the issue of France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, stating that he doubted France's commitment to WEU, and that the French decision may have been illegal, undermining NATO's existence. The French Secretary for foreign affairs stated that France's decision was that the NATO of 1949 no longer corresponded to the realities of 1966, and the French decision was made in an attempt to change NATO.<sup>[31]</sup> While both United Kingdom and France agreed on the WEU's complementary roles of regulating maximum levels of force and arms control,<sup>[32]</sup> they disagreed on how closely it should be linked with NATO and how active a role it should play. The British wanted WEU to act as a forum to discuss policy and to deal with defence issues, while maintaining close links with NATO, either officially or unofficially.<sup>[33]</sup> The French foresaw a more active role for WEU, desiring to see it as the framework through which European defence issues would be the focus, independent of NATO and the Atlantic.<sup>[34]</sup>

From the perspective of the WEU, the issue of complementarity or dependence between WEU and NATO depends upon the event examined. As the disruption caused by France's withdrawal from NATO integrated military command subsided, WEU and NATO assumed more complementary roles in arms control and production, sharing information and production plans.

In the 1970s, with numerous crises in the Middle East, WEU supported the expansion of NATO's mandate and discussed the issues that arose as a result of crises, particularly in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, in order to establish a collective policy.<sup>[35]</sup> Both the Assembly and Council discussed the impact that these crises had, and issued statements that their member states were committed to working on finding solutions to them.<sup>[36]</sup> WEU therefore played a complementary role to NATO by providing a European forum in which national concerns could be shared, and common solutions and policies could be discussed. However, lacking a military body with which it could physically protect its strategic interests, WEU members were still dependent on NATO. In 1979, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and deployed ss-20 nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, the WEU Assembly sent a recommendation to the WEU Council which called for the European members of NATO to act collectively in response to the USSR's actions.<sup>[37]</sup> The Assembly recommendations showed how WEU depended on NATO and its military potential for leverage to deal with the Warsaw Pact or issues of energy or European security.

### **Political consultation on matters of defence after France left the integrated command of NATO**

Shortly after returning to power in May 1958, French President De Gaulle officially protested the



United States' strong role in NATO, and the 'special relationship' he perceived between the US and UK. On 17 September 1958, he sent a memorandum to US President Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that argued for the creation of NATO directorate that would put France on an equal footing with the UK and US.<sup>[38]</sup> When the US-UK response was received and deemed unsatisfactory, De Gaulle began constructing a defence policy for France, independent of NATO. His primary objective was to secure French independence in the military affairs, particularly in the development, deployment and decision-making process relating to the possible use of nuclear weapons. De Gaulle stated that as part of NATO, French nuclear priorities would be subjugated to those of the Alliance, and that France could be endangered in the event of Soviet aggression should it have to wait for NATO approval /decision making on how to respond. His first step was to withdraw its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command in February 1959, and in 1962 he removed the Atlantic and Channel fleets. In 1966, the remaining French armed forces were withdrawn from NATO's integrated military command, and all non-French NATO troops began to leave France, which was completed by 1967. Though it affected military planning in Europe, the withdrawal was also part of an attempt to re-establish France' standing internationally, and to allow it to regain and retain more international diplomatic independence.<sup>[39]</sup>

Numerous times in the minutes of the meetings of the WEU Council, the consequences of France's withdrawal from the integrated military command of NATO were discussed.<sup>[40]</sup> For the British, the French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command would weaken not only NATO, but also the WEU. In the minutes of a WEU Council meeting in March 1966, the British foreign secretary raised the issue of France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command, stating that he now doubted France's commitment to WEU, and that the French decision may have been illegal, undermining NATO's existence.<sup>[41]</sup> The French Secretary for foreign affairs responded by stating that France's decision was based on the belief that the NATO of 1949 no longer corresponded to the realities of 1966. The decision therefore was made in an attempt to change NATO, not to endanger its existence, and the French also stated that they nonetheless remained committed to the European Integration process.<sup>[42]</sup>

The implications of France's withdrawal from NATO continued to be discussed in the WEU Council in 1967 and 1968. On several occasions the British Representative Lord Hood commented on the difficulties created by the withdrawal in pursuing the objectives of the modified Brussels Treaty, and that NATO had been weakened, and indirectly the WEU. The British also commented on the negative impact the withdrawal would have on the operation of the Arms Control Agency (ACA) since French forces would no longer be subjected to controls.<sup>[43]</sup> The French position in regard to British concerns was that WEU and NATO were separate entities and distinct from one another, and that only the Protocols dealing with integrated military command were affected. Additionally, the French agreed to continue to supply WEU with numbers of forces that remained available for common defence in coordination with the North Atlantic Council.<sup>[44]</sup> In June 1968, the French delegation to the WEU, re-affirmed France's commitment to European defence and security, and pledged to respect the limits on and inspections of French air and land forces (with the exception of nuclear forces), and to report those levels to the WEU.<sup>[45]</sup> However, the British continued to view the French withdrawal as making WEU more dependent on NATO. They believed that by having fewer resources available for NATO to meet its strategic objectives, WEU would be less able to meet its own, showing how closely the British linked NATO and Western European security. For the French however, the withdrawal would allow them to pursue their objective for an independent and complementary role for WEU with greater flexibility in the assignment of French forces than they had had before.<sup>[46]</sup>

In spite of the withdrawal, political consultations between WEU and NATO in matters of defence continued in the 1970s, with numerous crises in the Middle East, coinciding with a rise in Arab Nationalism and Arab conflicts with Israel. Consultations also occurred over disarmament talks, and

information about allied and Warsaw Pact positions in the talks was shared.<sup>[47]</sup> Notwithstanding French attempts to increase WEU's independence from NATO, the WEU continued to consult with and support NATO, since it was through NATO that their interests in energy security in the Middle East and military security in Europe could be met.

The WEU Assembly passed recommendations calling for the Council to request the North Atlantic Council to take action, or to state the WEU assembly's support for NATO's response to a certain crisis, such as the Euromissile crisis or the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>[48]</sup> The WEU Assembly and Council discussed the impact that these crises had, and issued statements that their member states were jointly committed to finding solutions to them.<sup>[49]</sup> For example, in 1979, after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and continued to deploy SS-20 nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, the WEU Assembly passed a recommendation which called for the European members of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) to act collectively to oppose Soviet actions.<sup>[50]</sup> Assembly recommendations such as these demonstrated that WEU regularly sought political consultation and cooperation on matters of defence with NATO after the French withdrawal. It also showed how WEU members viewed their dependence on NATO and its military potential to provide the necessary leverage to effectively oppose the Warsaw Pact, to pursue Nuclear disarmament talks, or to respond to crises in the Middle East.

[1] 'Historique de l'UEO,' at: <http://www.weu.int/Historique.htm>, retrieved October 5<sup>th</sup> 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato/>, retrieved October 5<sup>th</sup> 2014.

[4] Dominique Delhauteur, La coopération européenne dans le domaine des équipements militaires: la relance du GEIP, dossier Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP) - See more at: <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1015#sthash.86VSyvvp.dpuf> GRIP no 160, p. 3.

[5] Report on the meeting of WEU Foreign Ministers held on 18 December in Paris (21 December 1954)

[6] Summary Record of the joint meeting between the Council and the Assembly Committee on defence questions and Armaments (London, 3 July, 1956) [C(56)133]

[7] Secretary General's note for the meeting of the seven foreign ministers on 18 December (14 December 1954) in: WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-1987. BTO, 1 12<sup>th</sup> Consultative Council, 14<sup>th</sup> meeting – Paris- April 1954. Year 1954. 15/03/1954 – 30/12/1954, File BTO-012, Volume 1/1

[8] Extract from minutes of the 62<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (17 November 1960) in: WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-1987. Year 1957. 01/11/1954 – 31/12/1957, File 330.00, Volume 1/3

[9] Extract from minutes of the 166<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (24 October 1956) in: WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-1987. Organs of the WEU. Year 1960. 01/01/1960 – 30/08/1961, File 202.414.05. Volume 1/1

[10] Chart: 'Interconnections Between NATO and WEU' - from The National Archives of the UK (TNA), file FO 371

[11] For example: Recommendation 323 of the WEU Assembly on disarmament (Paris, 21 November 1978)

[12] <http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/> - retrieved 1 October 2014

[13] Report on the meeting of WEU Foreign ministers held on 18 December in Paris (21 December 1954)

[14] Extract from minutes of the 145<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (London, 4 February, 1960) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Year 1962, 01/12/1955-30/06/1962, File 350.00 Volume 1/2.[CR(60)4] and , Extract from minutes of the 423<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at ministerial level (London, 1 July 1971) CR(71)14. For links with NATO, see: Extract from the report on the third meeting of the Interim Commission (22 November 1954)

[15] Extract from minutes of the 69<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (19 December 1956) [CR(56)34 1 2, CR(56)35]

[16] Extract from minutes of the 289<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at the ministerial level (London, 15 and 16 March 1966)in: WEU Archives, BTO, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year 1966, 01/03/1966 – 30/03/1967, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.

[17] Reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 292 on the role of the Atlantic Alliance in the world today (14 June 1977) in: WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Organs of the Western European Union, Year 1974, 01/07/1974 – 30/06/1977. File 202.413.72. Volume 1/1.

[18] Secretary General's note on the level of forces of the Member States of WEU placed under NATO command (London, 28 February 1980), in: WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Organs of the Western

European Union, Year 1980, 01/10/68 – 31/05/1980. File 243.20. Volume 3/5.

[19] Amendments proposed by the United Kingdom delegation to the WEU Council from the draft reply to Recommendation 254 on security and the Mediterranean (London, 20 November 1974) [WPM(74)28/1] Also, see sections: 'Soviet presence in the Mediterranean,' and 'issues surrounding energy security for more details.'

[20] Recommendation 351 of the WEU Assembly on the international situation and European security (Paris, 4 June 1980) Paris, 5th sitting) in Proceedings, 26th ordinary session, first part, Vol. II, minutes, official reports of debates. WEU Assembly, Paris June 1980, pp. 44.

[21] For example: Recommendation 351 of the WEU Assembly on the international situation an European Security (Paris, 4 June 1980)

[22] Dominique Delhauteur, La coopération européenne dans le domaine des équipements militaires: la relance du GEIP, dossier Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la Paix et la Sécurité (GRIP) - See more at: <http://www.grip.org/fr/node/1015#sthash.86VSyvvp.dpuf> GRIP no 160, p. 3.

[23] Report on the meeting of WEU Foreign Ministers held on 18 December in Paris (21 December 1954)

[24] Extract from minutes of the WEU Council meeting on the future pattern of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe (London, 7 March 1957) in, WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Subjects dealt with by various WEU organs, Year, 1957, 01/03/1957-31/12/1957. File 441.10, Volume 2/4.

[25] Extract from minutes of the WEU Council meeting on the future pattern of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe (London, 7 March 1957) in, WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Subjects dealt with by various WEU organs, Year, 1957, 01/03/1957-31/12/1957. File 441.10, Volume 1/1. [CR(57)8], and Extract from minutes of the WEU Council meeting on the future pattern of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe (London, 26 March 1957) in, WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Subjects dealt with by various WEU organs, Year, 1957, 01/03/1957-31/12/1957. File 441.10, Volume 2/4.

[26] Extract from minutes of the WEU Council meeting on the future pattern of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe (London, 26 March 1957) in, WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Subjects dealt with by various WEU organs, Year, 1957, 01/03/1957-31/12/1957. File 441.10, Volume 2/4.

[27] Minutes of the joint meeting between the Council and the Assembly Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Rome, 12 June 1958) WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Subjects dealt with by various WEU organs, Year, 1958, 01/06/1957-30/04/1958. File 442.10, Volume 1/4. [TEXT\_12124] and chart: Interconnections between WEU and NATO – Kew Archives, doc

[28] Extract from minutes of the 145<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (London, 4 February, 1960) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Year 1962, 01/12/1955-30/06/1962, File 350.00 Volume 1/2. [CR(60)4] and , Extract from minutes of the 423<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at ministerial level (London, 1 July 1971) CR(71)14.

[29] Extract from minutes of the 145<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (London, 4 February, 1960) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Year 1962, 01/12/1955-30/06/1962, File 350.00 Volume 1/2. [CR(60)4]

[30] Explanation for the French withdrawal is more fully explained in Section 2 – The nuclear question.

[31] Extract from minutes of the 289<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at the ministerial level (London, 15 and 16 March 1966)in: WEU Archives, BTO, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year 1966, 01/03/1966 – 30/03/1967, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.

[32] Report on the meeting of WEU Foreign ministers held on 18 December in Paris (21 December 1954)

[33] Extract from minutes of the 145<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (London, 4 February, 1960) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Year 1962, 01/12/1955-30/06/1962, File 350.00 Volume 1/2. [CR(60)4] and , Extract from minutes of the 423<sup>rd</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at ministerial level (London, 1 July 1971) CR(71)14. For links with NATO, see: Extract from the report on the third meeting of the Interim Commission (22 November 1954)

[34] Extract from minutes of the 69<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (19 December 1956) [CR(56)34 1 2, CR(56)35]

[35] Amendments proposed by the United Kingdom delegation to the WEU Council from the draft reply to Recommendation 254 on security and the Mediterranean (London, 20 November 1974) [WPM(74)28/1] Also, see sections: 'Soviet presence in the Mediterranean,' and 'issues surrounding energy security for more details.'

[36] For example, see: Reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 3349 on impact of evolving situation in the near and middle east on western European security. European security, (London, 4 November 1980), WPM (81) 23/1. 7 p. In Western European Union Archives, Secretary-General/Council Archives, 1954-1987. Organs of the WEU, Year 1980, 01/11/1980 – 05/05/1981. File 202.413.999.12, Volume 1/1. [c(80)145]

[37] Recommendation 351 of the WEU Assembly on the international situation and European security (Paris, 4 June 1980) Paris, 5th sitting) in Proceedings, 26th ordinary session, first part, Vol. II, minutes, official reports of debates. WEU Assembly, Paris June 1980, pp. 44.

[38] Letter from General De Gaulle to Harold Macmillan (17 September 1958), Gaulle, Charles de, Lettres, notes et carnets (juin 1958-décembre 1960). Paris: Plon, 1985. ISBN 2-259-01409-7. p.87.



- [39] Frédéric Bozo, “France and Gaullism,” *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II, Crises and Detente, eds., Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p. 165.
- [40] For example: Extract from minutes of the 289<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at the ministerial level (London, 15 and 16 March 1966)in: WEU Archives, BTO, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year 1966, 01/03/1966 – 30/03/1967, File 113.2, Volume 2/2. [CR(66)6], and, Extract from minutes of the 326<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (20 July 1967)in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year, 1967, 01/03/1967 – 14/06/1968, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.
- [41] Extract from minutes of the 289<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at the ministerial level (London, 15 and 16 March 1966)in: WEU Archives, BTO, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year 1966, 01/03/1966 – 30/03/1967, File 113.2, Volume 2/2. [CR(66)6]
- [42] Extract from minutes of the 289<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council held at the ministerial level (London, 15 and 16 March 1966)in: WEU Archives, BTO, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year 1966, 01/03/1966 – 30/03/1967, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.
- [43] Extract from minutes of the 326<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (20 July 1967) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year, 1967, 01/03/1967 – 14/06/1968, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.
- [44] Extract from minutes of the 325<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (12 July 1967) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year, 1967, 01/03/1967 – 14/06/1968, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.
- [45] Extract from the minutes of the 326<sup>th</sup> meeting of the WEU Council (20 July 1967) in WEU Archives, Secretary General/Council's Archives, 1954-87, Year 1967, 01/03/1967 – 14/06/1968, File 113.2, Volume 2/2. (TEXT\_12327)However, it must be noted that while France did leave NATO's military Integrated Command, it remained a part of the political council.
- [46] French proposals for the note on NATO-WEU relations (31 May 1968) WEU Archives, BTO, Interpretation of Brussels Treaty and Paris Protocol, Year 1966, 01/03/1976 – 14/06/68, File 113.2, Volume 2/2.
- [47] For Example: Recommendation 323 of the WEU Assembly on disarmament (Paris, 21 November 1978), and, Reply by the WEU Council to question 230 put by a member of the Assembly on limiting Nuclear Weapons (London, 27 October 1982) [C(82)111]
- [48] Recommendation 374 of the WEU Assembly on the reappraisal of global dangers to western peace and security (Paris, 2 December 1981)
- [49] For example, see: Reply by the WEU Council to Assembly Recommendation 3349 on impact of evolving situation in the near and middle east on western European security. European security, (London, 4 November 1980), WPM (81) 23/1. 7 p. In Western European Union Archives, Secretary-General/Council Archives, 1954-1987. Organs of the WEU, Year 1980, 01/11/1980 – 05/05/1981. File 202.413.999.12, Volume 1/1. [c(80)145]
- [50] Recommendation 351 of the WEU Assembly on the international situation and European security (Paris, 4 June 1980) Paris, 5th sitting) in Proceedings, 26th ordinary session, first part, Vol. II, minutes, official reports of debates. WEU Assembly, Paris June 1980, pp. 44.