## Recommendation 264 of the WEU Assembly on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Bonn, 27 May 1975)

**Caption:** On 27 May 1975, the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) adopts Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, urging the WEU Council to ask member countries to adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) and to accept the full application of the controls provided for under the treaty, and also to speak with one voice at the Geneva conference and to adopt joint positions at an international level.

**Source:** Assembly of Western European Union. 'Recommendation 264 on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Bonn, fourth sitting, 27th May 1975)' in Proceedings: Twenty-first ordinary session, First Part, Vol. II, Minutes: Official Report of Debates. Paris: Assembly of WEU. May 1975, pp. 38-39.

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## **RECOMMENDATION 264**

## on the proliferation of nuclear weapons

The Assembly,

Regretting that despite a certain progress in arms control negotiations, and the acceptance of "essential equivalence" in strategic armaments by the superpowers, the numbers of nuclear weapons have continued to grow;

Considering that the nuclear explosion conducted by India threatens the stability of relations in the area, undermines the basis on which nuclear technology can be made available by one country to another, while doubtless adding nothing to the security or economic resources of India;

Aware of the vital importance, in view of the energy crisis, of nuclear power being available to all countries for civil applications;

Believing that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still offers the best basis on which the peaceful applications of nuclear energy can be made available in full to all countries, while avoiding total nuclear anarchy;

Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification;

Aware that the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

That it urge member countries:

- 1. To adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, where possible, to deposit their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference;
- 2. In all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty;
- 3. To accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty, and to concert their policies with other supplying powers to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on their acceptance of full IAEA controls on all nuclear installations and material on their territory or under their control;
- 4. Subject to the foregoing overriding consideration, to provide the maximum possible assistance to third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy;
- 5. To consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a view to achieving, through the various arms control negotiations, a genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing the essential basis of their security;
- 6. To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty and of the IAEA;



TEXT ADOPTED FOURTH SITTING

7. With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest the treaty lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination;

- 8. To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular:
  - (a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United States by making their civil installations subject to IAEA safeguards;
  - (b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole nuclear fuel cycle.

