

‘The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’,
from *Sécurité et Stratégie* (Brussels, March 2004)

Caption: Article published in 2004 by Sven Biscop that provides an analysis of the European security strategy and makes suggestions on how to further its implementation.

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The European Security Strategy Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security

Dr. Sven BISCOP
Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels

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Contact:

Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)
Rue de Namur 69, 1000 Brussels
Tel. (+32) 02/223.41.14 – Fax (+32) 02/223.41.16 – s.biscop@irri-kiib.be
www.irri-kiib.be

PREFACE: STRATEGIC SURPRISE

In December 2002, the Security & Global Governance Department of the Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB), at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated a strategic reflection on Europe's security policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, so it was felt, was lacking strategic clarity, a clear definition of its interests and long-term policy objectives. Under the direction of Prof. Dr. Rik Coolsaet and myself, an informal working group was set up, comprising members from the diplomatic, military, intelligence and academic worlds. To all of them, I owe my sincerest gratitude. Without their input of ideas and their informed critiques of my work, this paper could never have been written.

The aim of our working group was to forge a European strategic concept, in order to stimulate a strategic debate, which at that time, outside of academic circles, was almost nonexistent. Then in early May 2003 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU achieved strategic surprise as they tasked the High Representative for the CFSP, Dr. Javier Solana, with the elaboration of a strategic document. Out of the blue the strategic debate that we had hoped to stimulate was all over us. So far for our grand ambitions – which political scientist does not secretly hope to alter the course of history through his writings – but, in the wake of the Iraq divide, this was marvellous news for the EU indeed.

Henceforth, having rediscovered our modesty, we reoriented ourselves: rather than continuing it as a project on its own, we now explicitly framed our work in Solana's major endeavour, seeing it as a Belgian contribution to the broad debate that the EU organized following the presentation of Solana's first draft, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', to the Thessalonica European Council in June 2003.

The result of our work, 'A European Security Concept for the 21st Century',¹ was formally presented to Javier Solana and Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis Michel at an IRRI-KIIB conference on 26 November 2003, organized in collaboration with the three institutes that hosted the seminars that the EU set up in the Fall of 2003 to discuss the draft Strategy: Aspen Institute Italia, the EU Institute for Security Studies and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.² These seminars allowed for a thorough debate between EU officials, politicians, diplomats, the military, academics, journalists and NGOs.³ Furthermore, an analysis of the draft Strategy was published as Policy Paper No. 8 by Notre Europe, the Paris-based think tank presided by former Commission President Jacques Delors.⁴

Since the adoption of the final European Security Strategy by the Brussels European Council in December 2003, IRRI-KIIB has been continuing its work on the issue, with the organization of a second conference on 18 February 2004, again in collaboration with the three institutes, and the publication, thanks to the kind cooperation of the Centre for Defence Studies, of this paper. The aim of the paper is to present an analysis of the approach advocated by the Strategy, comparing the first draft to the final version, and to suggest steps to further

¹ IRRI-KIIB, 'A European Security Concept for the 21st Century'. Brussels, IRRI-KIIB, 2003, <http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/SecConcept%20Outline%20EN.pdf>.

² The conference proceedings are available on the IRRI-KIIB website: www.irri-kiib.be.

³ The EUISS coordinated all three seminars. See: www.iss-eu.org.

⁴ Sven Biscop & Rik Coolsaet, 'The World is the Stage – A Global Security Strategy for the European Union'. In: Notre Europe Policy Papers, 2003, No. 8, <http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/fichiers/Polycypaper8.pdf>. See also: Sven Biscop & Rik Coolsaet, 'Une Stratégie de l'UE pour la Sécurité: Définir la Voie européenne'. In: Défense nationale, Vol. 59, 2003, No. 10, pp. 125-133.

the Strategy's implementation. The first chapter outlines the historical context, explaining the absence of a strategy until recently, while arguing on the basis of actual EU policies that in recent years a distinct European approach to security was already emerging. The second chapter then provides a brief overview of 'new' approaches to security that have been elaborated by other international organizations and academics, before proceeding with the analysis of the actual Strategy in chapter 3. Chapter 4 goes into more depth with regard to the concept of comprehensive security that underlies the Strategy, analyzing it from a normative perspective. Then follows a more practical chapter 5, which discusses the Strategy's implementation. Finally, a brief conclusion is offered.

The elaboration of a Security Strategy by Dr. Solana and his Policy Unit without doubt is one of the most exciting, but certainly also one of the most important projects the EU has recently undertaken in the broad field of foreign and security policy. To be able to offer one's own modest contribution to this stirring debate is not work – it is a pleasure.

Dr. Sven BISCOP

1. FROM PRACTICE TO STRATEGY

Security is ‘the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger; [...] a feeling of safety or freedom from or absence of danger’.⁵ Also described as ‘freedom from fear’, security thus clearly contains a subjective element, an element of perception. The latter part of the definition can also be expressed as ‘confidence in the future’, which has a more positive ring to it. Since there are many kinds of danger, security is by nature a very broad concept that comprises several dimensions.

Security policy can then be defined as a policy aiming to keep an object, in this case the values and interests of the EU, safe. Traditionally, security policy was associated only with its military dimension, with the use of politico-military instruments.⁶ For the purpose of this paper, *defence policy* is defined as the aspect of security policy that has to do with self-defence against acts of aggression.

A *strategy* is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the EU, outlines the long-term overall policy *objectives* to be achieved and the basic categories of *instruments* to be applied to that end. It serves as a reference framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment and it guides the definition of the *means* – i.e. the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed.

1.1 Strategic Void

The need to tackle the means was what there was consensus about back in 1998, when the process leading to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the military dimension of the CFSP, was launched.⁷ The British turnabout that was announced at the informal Pörschach European Council (24–25 October) and at the Franco-British St-Malo summit (3–4 December), i.e. London’s willingness to build a military capacity in the framework of the EU, was welcomed by all Member States. The need to improve the usability of European armed forces, highlighted by the Member States’ difficulties to field 40 to 50 000 troops in Kosovo while having over 1.5 million men and women in uniform, was evident to all. The UK accepted the fact that for the other Member States, for budgetary as well as for political reasons, this would only be feasible through increased European cooperation, a solution implying the creation of EU military bodies: the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff (EUMS).

But there consensus ended. Member States widely differed on the political/strategic dimension, a debate which goes far beyond ESDP, beyond the CFSP even, as it concerns the whole of EU external action, across all three pillars. What should be the scope of the EU’s foreign and security policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy should the EU have? And what then should be the precise role of the military instrument in EU external action? In the

⁵ Oxford English Dictionary.

⁶ Politico-military instruments comprise, *inter alia*, mechanisms for early warning and peaceful settlement of disputes; confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), political dialogue and military cooperation; non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament; preventive diplomacy; sanction regimes; observer, humanitarian, peacekeeping, police and peace enforcement operations (which can be summarised under the general heading of peace support operations and which include a civil dimension); and defence operations.

⁷ Sven Biscop, ‘The UK’s Change of Course: A New Chance for the ESDP’. In: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 4, 1999, No. 2, pp. 253-268.

British view, European military capabilities would still primarily be put to use in the framework of NATO, as the main if not exclusive forum for decision-making on security policy. Others certainly preferred the EU to define and implement policies of its own. Even on the assessment of the security environment, Member States differed, with threat perceptions being influenced by individual States' proximity to specific unstable regions.⁸ Because of these deep-running divisions and in order not to lose the momentum, it was decided, as happens so often in European decision-making, to push through with those elements on which an agreement existed, i.e. the means and institutions of ESDP, assuming that once these were in place the strategic debate would inevitably have to follow.

Accordingly, following the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki, where the 'Headline Goal'⁹ was defined, the EU started building military – ESDP – and civilian capabilities for crisis management, without possessing an overall strategic framework for its external action. In Article 11, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) does define the objectives of the CFSP,¹⁰ but these are statements of principle rather than policy objectives and hence far too general to provide a framework for daily policy-making. As to the role of the military instrument, the TEU stipulates which types of operations the EU can launch, by including the so-called Petersberg Tasks, as originally defined by the WEU, in Article 17 – humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking – but it provides no guidelines as to the circumstances under which the use of the military instrument can be considered.

The absence of an explicit strategy need not be a problem if all those involved in policy-making share the same basic views and can thus easily reach a consensus on policies that fit within these general guidelines, even if they are not explicitly written down. But with regard to the external policies of the EU, this is clearly not the case. There was no common strategic vision behind the existing – but incomplete – consensus on the need to develop more effective military capabilities for the EU. As a consequence, EU external action has lacked direction, determination and consistency. Faced with the initiatives of a dominant global player, the US, that is both very determined and very powerful and that does possess an explicit strategy – the National Security Strategy adopted in September 2002 – the EU is necessarily restricted to a reactive role. Without a clear strategy of its own, the EU cannot escape the American framework of thought and promote its own policy priorities in terms of both objectives and instruments.

⁸ Serge Van Camp, Dominique Collins, 'Les Etats Membres de l'UE et la PESD, Eléments de Convergence et de Divergence'. Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense, Sécurité et Stratégie No. 78, 2003, 135 pp.

⁹ 'Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50 000–60 000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks'. 'Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999'.

¹⁰ 'to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders; to promote international cooperation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'.

1.2 Strategic Indications

That is not to say of course that EU external action has been completely ad hoc. Over the years, a distinctive European approach to security has emerged, which is characterized by a broad, multidimensional or *comprehensive* notion of security, which starts from the interdependence between all dimensions of security – political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military – rather than just focusing on the latter; hence the need to set objectives and apply instruments in all of these fields. A further characteristic is a focus on dialogue, cooperation and partnership, or *cooperative* security. This approach can be deduced from actual EU policies.

In its 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention¹¹ e.g. the Commission proposed to address the ‘root causes of conflict’ by promoting ‘structural stability’, defined as ‘sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resort to conflict’. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts¹² that is based on the above communication calls for an integrated policy, surpassing the pillar structure, and defines conflict prevention as a priority for all of the EU’s external action. It also lists EU instruments for both long-term structural prevention and short-term direct prevention. The EU has now developed instruments such as the Country and Regional Strategy Papers, which outline policy priorities, the Check-List for Root Causes of Conflict and the continually revised Watch List of Priority Countries (countries where there is a serious risk of conflict). But what the EU is lacking is a conceptual dimension that brings its range of external policies together and that can serve as a framework for the comprehensive and integrated approach that is advocated in the Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts.

A comprehensive approach to security is particularly characteristic of EU policy with respect to neighbouring States, which it attempts to integrate in an encompassing network of relations: witness the Stability Pact for the Balkans, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and the successful transition of Central and Eastern Europe, probably the most significant European achievement since the start of the European integration project itself. Under the heading ‘Wider Europe/Neighbourhood Policy’, this approach was recently promoted by the Commission as an enhanced framework for relations between the EU and its neighbours.¹³ The aim of the Neighbourhood Policy would be to achieve an ‘area of shared prosperity and values’ by creating close partnerships with the EU’s neighbouring States. This should lead to in-depth economic integration, close political and cultural relations and a joint responsibility for conflict prevention. To that end, the EU would offer very concrete ‘benefits’, in the fields of market access and investments for example, which should be linked to progress made towards political and economic reforms in the neighbouring States.

When it comes to long-term policies, the comprehensive and cooperative approach to security does seem to emerge as the predominant characteristic of most areas of EU external action. Keukeleire calls these spheres of action ‘the structural foreign policy’ of the EU. They are less visible than traditional diplomacy or ‘high politics’, but nonetheless they represent a huge and

¹¹ COM (2001) 211 final, ‘Conflict Prevention’, p. 10.

¹² Adopted by the European Council at its meeting in Göteborg, 15-16 June 2001.

¹³ COM (2003) 104 final, ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’.

often very successful effort on the part of the EU.¹⁴ A similar picture emerges from Bretherton and Vogler's major study of the EU as global actor.¹⁵ The EU's profile in these areas corresponds to the often-used definition of the EU as a 'civilian power', i.e. an actor which seeks to influence the international environment in the long term – which has 'milieu' rather than 'possession goals'¹⁶ – which operates mainly through economic, diplomatic and ideological power and via multilateralism, and which is inspired not only by material interests, but also by norms and ideas.¹⁷ A number of implicit strategic assumptions guide EU policy in this regard; this represents an important *acquis*. Yet these assumptions need to be substantiated and policy areas need to be integrated in order to arrive at a framework for maximally consistent, coherent and effective external action.

But when the EU is confronted with acute crises, such as the one in Iraq, these implicit assumptions have proved to be insufficient to arrive at a common policy. More often than not, the EU fails to achieve consensus on how to respond to such crises, even when the instruments and means to do so are at hand.¹⁸ As a result, little or no effective action is taken – hence the need to define a strategy as a framework for dealing with crisis situations.

At first, the EU did react jointly to the terrorist attacks of '9/11'. Its differentiated response, which focuses on the underlying causes of terrorism, is another example of the comprehensive approach. The extraordinary European Council meeting of 21 September 2001 called for 'an in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which terrorism comes into being' and 'the integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development'. '9/11' was therefore not a turning point for EU external action. Rather it served to confirm the view that a policy that focuses exclusively on military instruments cannot achieve long-term stability or ensure national security.¹⁹ The subsequent events, notably Washington's declaration of a war on terrorism and the US invasion of Iraq, led to deep divisions within the EU however, between on the one hand those joining the American-led coalition of the willing invading and occupying Iraq – led by the UK, Spain, Poland – and on the other hand those resisting the use of force without sufficient UN mandate and before the exhaustion of all other options – led by Belgium, France, Germany. Or between 'new' and 'old Europe', as US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld worded it, putting the motto of *divide et impera* to good use. The unwillingness of the latter group to join the invading coalition provoked uncommonly sharp criticism from a US government that could not understand their reluctance; a transatlantic crisis on top of the intra-European one was the result. At an extraordinary meeting on 17 February 2003 the European Council did state that 'force should be used only as a last resort' and emphasised the importance of reinvigorating the Middle East peace process if peace and stability are to be

¹⁴ 'Stephan Keukeleire', 'The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor'. Diplomatic Studies Programme, Discussion Paper No. 7, 2000. Ibid., 'Au-dela de la PESC. La Politique étrangère structurelle de l'Union européenne'. In: 'Annuaire français de Relations internationales', Brussels, Bruylant, 2001, pp. 536-551.

¹⁵ Charlotte Bretherton & John Vogler, 'The European Union as a Global Actor'. London, Routledge, 1999.

¹⁶ Arnold Wolfers, 'Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics'. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962.

¹⁷ Jan Orbie, 'Conceptualising the Role of the EU in the World: Civilian Power Europe?' Paper presented at the EUSA 8th International Biennial Conference, Nashville, 27–29 March 2003.

¹⁸ In the words of former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt: '[...] our number one capabilities gap was not in smart bombs, but in smart policies'. Carl Bildt, 'We Have Crossed the Rubicon – But Where Are we Heading Next? Reflections on the European Security Strategy versus the US National Security Strategy'. Lecture, Centre for European Reform, London, 17 November 2003.

¹⁹ With regard to enhancing CFSP/ESDP, '9/11' thus only accelerated evolutions that were already put in motion by the Union's experiences on the Balkans.

brought to the region. But due to its internal divisions, the EU as such was absent from the scene.

A clear-cut strategy should be able to avoid such damaging internal divides and ensure the EU's participation in international decision-making. The EU operation in the Congo, 'Artemis', even though it was of limited duration (12 June – 1 September 2003) and had limited objectives (the stabilisation of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the city of Bunia), was certainly not of limited risk, and has demonstrated that the EU can act rapidly and decisively if the political will is there. Therefore the taboo on strategic thinking at European level needed to be broken and the strategic concepts of the individual Member States – some more, others less elaborate – aligned.

A strategy would not only provide the reference framework that is needed for day-to-day policy-making. It should also determine the instruments and capabilities that are being developed, rather than the other way around. This is especially so with regard to ESDP: the EU's ambitions and the role it sees for the military instrument, should guide force planning at the EU level. A Strategy would further bring political benefits.²⁰ If consensus can be found on the EU's general approach to security and on what it will and will not do, those Member States that are now reluctant about the EU's security dimension, out of resistance against a perceived 'militarisation' of external action or for fear of undermining the transatlantic alliance, might be persuaded to fully support converting the EU into an effective international actor.²¹ Of course, one can question the degree to which some of the larger Member States, even those that are playing the European card, are really willing to 'Europeanise' their security policies. Will they stop at the technical level of pooling capabilities for efficiency purposes, or will they be willing to accept the full implications, in terms of national policy-making and sovereignty, of their demands for a stronger and therefore more unified Europe? In any event, a strategy would provide a clear framework for policy-making and would thus render unilateral action more difficult. Such a step might also alleviate the misgivings among the EU's neighbours about a build-up of military capacity which in their view lacks clear objectives, and could thus very well be directed against them. Finally, the adoption of a strategy would increase the openness and democratic legitimacy that are needed to gain the vital support of public opinion.

1.3 Strategic Momentum

Undoubtedly, '9/11' and Iraq influenced Member States' willingness to consider an exercise in strategic thinking that was impossible when ESDP was created just a few years earlier. The various States may have had differing motivations: defining a distinctive 'European way' for some, so as to distance themselves from a US policy with which they could not agree and to highlight alternatives; aligning European priorities with those of the US for others, to preserve a transatlantic partnership perceived to be threatened in its existence; or a combination of both, reconciling the necessary drafting of an EU agenda with the need for continued transatlantic partnership. Whatever the motivation, the important thing is that this enabled the

²⁰ Sven Biscop, 'In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP'. In: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7, 2002, No. 4, pp. 473-490.

²¹ In the words of Commissioner Pascal Lamy: 'No State, no national parliament would accept to act through the Union if the debate on objectives and principles has not taken place' (authors' translation). The European Convention, Working Group VII on External Action, Working Document 10, 15 October 2002, p. 9.

decisive step to launch a strategic debate in the EU, to translate policy practice into strategy, an endeavour which far exceeds the specific issue of Iraq.

An endeavour also which complemented the European Convention which was then in process and the Draft Constitution that it produced, which dealt primarily with institutions and capabilities. Voices in favour of the definition of a new approach to security were raised in the Convention.²² The final report of Working Group No. VIII on defence – chaired by European Commissioner Michel Barnier – did state that ‘the concept of security is very broad, by nature indivisible, and one that goes beyond the purely military aspects covering not only the security of States but also the security of citizens. On the basis of this broad concept of security, the CFSP and the ESDP which forms part of it promote international security founded on multilateral solutions and respect for international law. Conflict prevention is a key element in the approach followed by the EU in international relations. The ESDP allows the EU military options over and above the civil instruments of crisis prevention and management’.²³ The Working Group did not advance such a concept however, as this fell outside of its mandate.

At the informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Greece on 2 and 3 May 2003, Javier Solana was thus – rather unexpectedly – tasked with producing a draft strategic document. At its meeting in Thessaloniki (19-20 June), the European Council welcomed the document submitted by Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’,²⁴ and charged him with taking the work forward with a view to completing a *European Security Strategy*, which was duly adopted by the European Council meeting in December 2003.²⁵

²² E.g. Dr. Wim van Eekelen, the former Secretary General of WEU, called for the formulation of a strategic concept which ‘would develop the notions of comprehensive security, including conflict prevention, democracy building and economic development and also cooperative security with neighbouring regions, but – in order to be credible – should also contain a military capability underpinning the policies of the Union’. The European Convention, Working Group VIII on Defence, Working Document 2, 19 September 2002, p. 4.

²³ European Convention, WG VIII 22, Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence’, 16 December 2002, pp. 3-4.

²⁴ Javier Solana, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf>.

²⁵ ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12 December 2003’. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/78367.pdf>.

2. RE-CONCEPTUALISING SECURITY

The immediate background and motivation of the formulation of the European Security Strategy was the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, which produced a divide both among Europeans and between Europe and the US, but Solana's exercise also fits in a series of broader efforts to define a new approach to security. This ongoing re-conceptualization of security was prompted by the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War.

2.1 A New Security Environment

During the Cold War, Europe's security was essentially defined in politico-military terms, as the avoidance of direct *military* danger by a clearly identified foe. This uni-dimensional definition was a product of the bipolar constellation, in which Europe's security was deemed to hinge on avoiding armed conflict on the European continent by maintaining a nuclear and politico-military balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union. So European security policy was forged under American leadership, mostly within the framework of NATO, and was essentially limited to defence policy. The non-military dimensions of security were regarded as being of much less consequence, as were developments in other parts of the world. There was a tendency to develop security policy without taking other external policy aspects into consideration, even to dominate them.

The end of the cold war produced a drastic change in Europe's security environment. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and of the Soviet Union itself meant the end of a direct and major military threat to Europe's security, i.e. one that could threaten the very survival of the EU. Accordingly, defence policy became less important. The EU Member States had long ceased being a threat to one another, and through enlargement the deeply integrated European 'security community' was to be extended to Central and Eastern Europe.²⁶ But the end of the cold war also triggered a wave of inter- and intra-State armed conflicts in the vicinity of the EU. Although they have not threatened the EU directly, they have produced negative spill-over effects. In these conflicts, the civilian population has been targeted more than ever before. And a much more diffuse threat is now posed by international terrorism. The issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery is closely intertwined with both developments.

In the absence of a major military threat, other factors that can constitute the underlying causes of terrorism or of armed conflict between or within third States, or that can intrinsically affect the values and interests of the EU, have come much more to the fore: organised crime, illegal immigration, social and economic underdevelopment, lack of democratic institutions and respect for human rights, failed States, ineffective multilateral institutions, ecological problems etc. These factors are much more difficult to grasp than the previous clearly identifiable threat. Another element is the growing awareness of the importance of values in international relations, such as democracy and respect for human rights and an effective international legal order. The number of international players – State and non-State, legal and illegal – has increased too. Security is evidently becoming a multidimensional concept.

²⁶ Karl W. Deutsch *et al.*, 'Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience'. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

The background to this shifting importance of security factors is globalisation. At the global level, interdependence has proven to be more than economic; it also has political, cultural and security aspects. As a consequence of globalisation, itself a source of tensions between those that benefit from it and those that suffer its negative effects, Europe's interests are inseparably linked to the stability of its worldwide interaction with other players, and vice versa. This interdependency implies that events anywhere in the world can have an immediate impact on Europe – there no longer is a fixed correlation between the importance of developments for European security and their geographical distance from the EU. It further means that the security of one is dependent upon the security of the other, hence the need for multilateral cooperation. In effect therefore, the security of Europe nowadays is dependent on the stability of the international system as such.

This much more unpredictable context rendered a common assessment of the security environment upon which to base a strategy very difficult for the Member States of the EU.

2.2 A New Approach to Security

In response to this changing security environment and based on a new assessment of security threats, a number of States and international organisations have sought new ways to deal with security – ways that go beyond the State-centric and the defence and politico-military approach. The use of politico-military instruments can deal effectively with immediate security threats, by ending violence or preventing its eruption, but the underlying causes of instability, conflict and terrorism demand a much broader, long-term and permanent policy of conflict prevention. '9/11' has demonstrated that possession of the greatest military might on earth, including the most advanced technology, cannot by itself guarantee security.

Thus these approaches are all much more encompassing than NATO's Strategic Concept adopted in 1999.²⁷ The Alliance does recognize 'the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension'. But because of its very nature, that of a defence organization, NATO can only offer the politico-military part of the answer to the new security environment: collective defence (*cfr.* Article 5), peace support operations ('non-Article 5 missions'), and politico-military dialogue and partnership.

One 'new' approach to security that involves the EU Member States in fact dates back to the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1973: the *comprehensive* view of security taken by the CSCE (now OSCE), which is reflected in the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act. The OSCE considers 'the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, along with economic and environmental cooperation [...], to be just as important for the maintenance of peace and stability as politico- military issues'. Security is further seen as indivisible. 'States have a common stake in the security of Europe and should therefore cooperate', to the benefit of all parties, since 'insecurity in one State or region can affect the well-being of all'.²⁸ This *cooperative* aspect of the OSCE approach to security amounts to inclusiveness or 'institutionalised consent':²⁹ security policy is aimed at reassuring third

²⁷ 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Washington DC, 23-24 April 1999'.

²⁸ OSCE, 'OSCE Handbook'. Vienna, OSCE, 2000, pp. 1-3.

²⁹ Janne E. Nolan, 'The Concept of Cooperative Security'. In: Janne E. Nolan (ed.), 'Global Engagement, Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century'. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1994. Richard Cohen &

countries, through cooperation in a wide range of fields, rather than deterring them.³⁰ In practice the OSCE has focussed on a number of specific issues and instruments which have proved very successful, including confidence and security-building measures, peaceful settlement of disputes, election monitoring and minority rights. Thanks to its pan-European membership, the OSCE also contributes to disseminating the comprehensive and cooperative approach to security. Through their membership of the OSCE, the newly independent countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States e.g. can be familiarized with this approach and its underlying values.

In 1995, a first limited attempt to draft a distinctive European security strategy was undertaken within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU). In the resulting Common Concept³¹ the WEU States ‘acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent’. The Common Concept stressed ‘Europe’s new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe’s security is not confined to security in Europe’, and described the security environment, highlighting *inter alia* the importance of ‘the maintenance of international peace and order and the widest possible observance of generally recognised norms of conduct between States’ and of ‘democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law’, as well as the need to ‘prevent economic imbalances from becoming a threat to our continent’. In terms of how to deal with this new environment, however, the document was limited to an assessment of Europe’s military capabilities and the identification of partners for cooperation. A real review of strategy proved to be politically unfeasible because of divisions between the Member States; furthermore the CFSP, to which WEU provided a military arm, was then still in its infancy. Nevertheless, as the first official European assessment of the changing security environment, it was an important and all too easily forgotten step.

The concept of *human security* is usually thought to have originated in the 1994 Human Development Report.³² It is also very much present in the report drawn up by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in preparation of the September 2000 Millennium Summit.³³ Human security takes the individual and his community as point of reference, rather than the State, by addressing both military and non-military threats to his security. The security of the State is not an end in itself, but a means of – and necessary precondition for – providing security for people. Indeed, the State itself can be the source of the insecurity of its citizens. Territorial integrity, traditionally the cornerstone of security policy, is less important. Human life and dignity are the keywords. The UNDP lists seven dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. This very broad and therefore unwieldy definition, with ‘vulnerability’ as its defining feature, *inter alia* is prominent in Japan, one of the proponents of human security.

Michael Mihalka, ‘Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order’. The Marshall Center Papers No. 3, 2001.

³⁰ Or, as defined by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans: ‘consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism’. Gareth Evans, ‘Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict’. In: Foreign Policy, Vol. 25, 1994, p. 96.

³¹ WEU, ‘European Security: A Common Concept of the 27 WEU countries’. WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid, 14 November 1995.

³² UNDP, ‘Human Development Report 1994’. New York, UN, 1994. Commission on Human Security, ‘Human Security Now’. New York, UN, 2003.

³³ Kofi Annan, ‘We the Peoples. The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century’. New York, UN, 2000.

Another ‘school of thought’ limits human security to ‘vulnerability to physical violence during conflict’.³⁴ This is the view often found in Canada e.g., which under the leadership of former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy became one of the leading promoters of human security. Axworthy defines human security as ‘freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives’: i.e. ‘freedom from fear’ as opposed to ‘freedom from want’, the latter corresponding to well-being rather than security.³⁵ Canada has identified five policy priorities – protection of civilians, peace support operations, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and public safety – reflected in a focus on a number of specific issues, including landmines, the International Criminal Court, women and children in armed conflict, small arms proliferation and child soldiers.³⁶ In the Canadian view, the pursuit of human security can involve the use of military power. This was also the conclusion of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established on the initiative of Canada within the framework of the UN General Assembly to look into the concept of humanitarian intervention. The commission identified as a basic principle that ‘where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or State failure, and the State in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non- intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’, including, under strict conditions and if authorised by the Security Council, by military means.³⁷

Like comprehensive security, human security highlights the interconnections between different dimensions of security. It also underlines the global nature of security challenges, which results in mutual vulnerability. Human security therefore requires comprehensive and cooperative responses. While comprehensive security raises the question ‘which threats to our security?’, human security adds ‘whose security?’. It is geared to attaining justice and emancipation, not just order and stability. The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, a non-governmental grouping of Western and Asian think-tanks, has attempted to merge the two approaches by including the individual level in its formulation of comprehensive security, which is defined as the ‘pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental) in both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means’.³⁸

For its part, the Council of Europe has developed the concept of *democratic security*, building on the assumption that armed conflict between democracies is unlikely, and aiming to protect the individual by guaranteeing the rule of law and respect for human rights. At the first Council of Europe Summit of Heads of State and Government, Member States declared that ‘the end of the division of Europe offers an historic opportunity to consolidate peace and stability on the continent. All our countries are committed to pluralist and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and a common

³⁴ Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security: East versus West’. In: *International Journal*, Vol. 56, 2001, No. 3, pp. 442-460.

³⁵ Lloyd Axworthy, ‘NATO’s New Security Vocation’. In: *NATO Review*, Vol. 47, 1999, No. 4, pp. 8-11. *Ibid.*, ‘La Sécurité Humaine: La Sécurité des Individus dans un Monde en Mutation’. In : *Politique étrangère*, Vol. 64, 1999, No. 2, pp. 333-342.

³⁶ Wayne Nelles, ‘Canada’s Human Security Agenda in Kosovo and Beyond’. In: *International Journal*, Vol. 57, 2002, No. 3, pp. 459-479. Rob McCrae & Don Hubert (eds.), ‘Human Security and the New Diplomacy. Protecting People, Promoting Peace’. Montreal – Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001.

³⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001.

³⁸ CSCAP, ‘The Concepts of Comprehensive and Cooperative Security’. Memorandum No. 3, 1996.

cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. Europe can thus become a vast area of democratic security’.³⁹

In that it reflects the need to maintain the stability of the international system, comprehensive security can be linked to another concept that emerged in the context of the UN at the end of the 1990s: *global public goods* (GPG). Public goods are characterised by non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability. *Global* public goods provide benefits that are ‘quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations)’.⁴⁰ GPG can be grouped under the following broad headings, the core GPG:

- international stability and security, for which the greatest powers have to carry the greatest responsibility;
- an open and inclusive economic world system that meets the needs of all, in particular the poorest, so as to enable all to participate fully in decision-making;
- an international legal order which ensures the effective equality of all;
- global welfare as the global equivalent of national social security systems, which provides for basic services for all;
- a shared commitment to combat pockets of lawlessness and settle regional conflicts.⁴¹

GPG are strongly interrelated: ultimately, one cannot be ensured without the other. Global stability, and therefore the security of all States, depends on the availability of sufficient access to the core GPG; an excessive gap between haves and have-nots will lead to destabilisation. Indeed, it is often only when a threat to the global order is perceived that such deficiencies are taken seriously.⁴² An international system that fails to provide the core GPG, as a State should do at national level, lacks legitimacy, hence the need for effective global governance. The idea of promoting global governance in order to increase access to GPG is prevalent in the UN’s Millennium Goals. GPG are usually seen in the context of development, but currently the concept is also being used in more general political terms, by Joseph Nye for instance.⁴³ The definition of the root causes of conflict in the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention is very similar to the notion of GPG, although in the EU GPG are only explicitly mentioned in the context of economic globalisation and sustainable development.

2.3 A New Opportunity

This overview of the ongoing re-conceptualization of security highlights the continuity stretching from the origins of the CSCE, one of the first major endeavours to forge a common and autonomous European approach to foreign and security policy, right up to the European Security Strategy. All of these exercises have yielded similar conclusions: only a

³⁹ Council of Europe, ‘Vienna Declaration’. 9 October 1993.

⁴⁰ Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern, ‘Global Public Goods. International Cooperation in the 21st Century’. Oxford, Oxford University Press – UNDP, 1999, pp. 2-3.

⁴¹ This is the definition arrived at by IRRI-KIIB, which under the heading ‘Global Governance: the Next Frontier’ has also elaborated a concept of global governance. <http://www.irri-kiib.be/papers/GlobalGovernance.pdf>.

⁴² Barbara Harriss-White, ‘Globalisation and Insecurity. Political, Economic and Physical Challenges’. New York, Palgrave, 2002, p. 189.

⁴³ Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone’. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

comprehensive security concept can provide an effective response to the new security environment. Several States and organisations have attempted to implement this approach and integrate aspects of it in their policies. The EU, as a *sui generis* organisation, with a foreign and security policy that has a global scope and covers all dimensions of international relations, now has the opportunity to adopt the comprehensive approach as the foundation of its external action.

The recent developments in American strategic thinking have gone in precisely the opposite direction. From merely being reaffirmed when the Bush administration came into office, the traditional ‘neo-con’ concepts of national sovereignty, national interest and the balance of power⁴⁴ became the cornerstones of US policy after ‘9/11’. In the EU as well, ‘9/11’ brought about a certain renewed emphasis on defence, as reflected in the proposals to introduce a ‘solidarity clause’ and a reference to mutual defence in the Draft Constitution, but defence issues did not push the comprehensive approach to security off the agenda – quite the contrary.

⁴⁴ ‘Mr Man Patten is busy, busy, busy!’. In: European Voice, 27 March 2003.

3. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

At its December 2003 Brussels meeting, ‘The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy and warmly congratulated SH/HR Javier Solana for the work accomplished’.⁴⁵ The introduction to the Strategy highlights the fact that a Europe which ‘has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free’ and which ‘as a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, [...] is inevitably a global player’, hence ‘Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’. A call to duty, in the interest of global security as well as our own, for ‘Europe still faces security threats and challenges’.

The Strategy is then organized into three chapters: an analysis of the security environment, the definition of three strategic objectives, and an assessment of the policy implications for the EU.

3.1 The Security Environment

Under the heading ‘global challenges’, the starting point of the analysis of the security environment is the impact of globalisation. On the one hand, globalisation has ‘brought freedom and prosperity to many people’, but ‘others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice’. Globalisation has ‘increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure, in transport, energy, information and other fields; as a consequence of globalisation, ‘the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’. The Strategy then goes on to specify a number of the worrying features of this globalized world: poverty; disease, especially AIDS; competition for scarce resources, notably water; global warming; migratory movements; and Europe’s energy dependence.

In the second part of the analysis, recognizing that ‘large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable’, a jump is then made to five ‘key threats’, all of which are closely interconnected:

- terrorism, for which ‘Europe is both a target and a base’; the Strategy notes that terrorism ‘arises out of complex causes’, including ‘the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies’;
- proliferation of WMD, ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’, which in ‘the most frightening scenario’ could be acquired by terrorists;
- regional conflicts, both worldwide and at the borders of the EU, which ‘impact on European interests directly and indirectly’ and which ‘can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure’;
- state failure, which ‘undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability’ and which ‘can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism’;
- organized crime, an internal threat with ‘an important external dimension’, such as ‘cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons’ as well as gemstones and timber; organized crime ‘can have links with terrorism’ and is ‘often associated with weak or failing states’.

⁴⁵ ‘Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council, 12 December 2003’.

In the first draft, the emphasis on threats, especially terrorism and WMD, was much stronger; thus the first draft was much closer to the American National Security Strategy, which focuses very strongly on defence against external threats. This renewed focus on defence, provoked by the events of '9/11', can to some extent also be found in the proposals in the Draft Constitution, subsequently discussed at the IGC, to introduce a 'solidarity clause', which would provide for the use of ESDP means and mechanisms within the territory of the EU in the case of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disasters, and to include provisions on mutual defence based on Article V of WEU's Modified Brussels Treaty. More than one observer thought of the first draft as the EU 'unambiguously re-calibrat[ing] its priorities to match those of the US'.⁴⁶ Confirming the American threat assessment can be interpreted as a political statement, signalling to Washington, in the aftermath of the transatlantic divide over Iraq, that the EU shares the US' concerns on the threats posed by terrorism and WMD – without necessarily implying that it will adopt the same approach to deal with them. For the 'strong' first chapter can also be seen as a means of softening the US to the much more comprehensive approach to security advocated in the ensuing chapters of the Strategy. One can thus also discern an intra-European compromise, between the two camps in the Iraq crisis: including a firm stand on terrorism and WMD in the threat assessment, in return for an emphasis on comprehensive security in the following chapters.

In the final version of the Strategy, the analysis of the security environment has been extended and toned down at the same time:

- more attention is being devoted to the effects of globalisation, which went almost without mention in the first draft;
- a distinction is no longer being made between 'old' and 'new' terrorism; the first draft seemed to reflect the hypothesis that current, 'new' terrorism is somehow unique, notably as to the scale of its destructiveness and its lack of constraints, but this is being contradicted by scholars pointing out that such waves of terrorism are recurrent throughout recent history;⁴⁷
- proliferation of WMD has been re-defined as 'potentially the greatest', rather than 'the single most important' threat, and the statement that against small groups having acquired WMD deterrence would fail, has been deleted;
- state failure and organized crime have become separate entries in the list of key threats and regional conflicts have been added to it.

These amendments reflect the mood at all three seminars on the draft Strategy that the EU organized in the Fall of 2003, where it was pointed out that the current predominance of terrorism and WMD on the political agenda should not allow policy-makers to forget either 'old' threats, such as regional conflicts, or the need to address the root causes of threats.

Yet it can be argued that even the final version is overly threat-based, both by overestimating the threat of terrorism and WMD specifically and by overemphasizing the need of 'addressing the threats' in general, which is put down as the first of the EU's strategic objectives in the second part of the Strategy. Such a threat-based approach carries the risk of focusing too

⁴⁶ Gerrard Quille, 'Making Multilateralism Matter: The EU Security Strategy'. In: European Security Review (ISIS Europe), 2003, No. 18, pp. 1-2. See also: Caroline Pailhe, 'Un Concept stratégique utile mais dangereux'. Brussels, GRIP, Note d'Analyse, 6 January 2004, www.grip.org.

⁴⁷ Teun Van de Voorde & Merijn Van den Eede, 'Internationaal terrorisme als een fenomeen van transitie'. In: Carl Devos (ed.), 'Schijn of scharnier? Politieke trendbreuken in de jaren negentig'. Gent, Academia Press, to be published 2004. David C. Rapoport, 'The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11'. In: Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), 'The New Global Terrorism. Characteristics, Causes, Controls'. Upper Saddle River (NJ), Prentice Hall, 2003, pp. 36-52.

much on defence, which is the most obvious, but not necessarily the most effective way of dealing with threats, to the detriment of prevention. Although the links between the five ‘key threats’ is emphasized, much less is said on the causal relationship between the ‘global challenges’ or the ‘dark side of globalisation’, which is the first part of the analysis of the security environment, and the second part, the ‘key threats’. In that sense, the threat assessment seems to be lacking coherence.

Terrorism and proliferation of WMD certainly are the most important remaining *direct* threats to the EU, now that large-scale aggression is no longer a probability. That does not mean that by themselves these threats are likely to materialise, however. The fact remains that most terrorist groups have a domestic agenda and are therefore unlikely to target the EU. A far bigger threat seems to be posed by internal, European terrorism, as witnessed e.g. by the ongoing activity of the ETA movement in Spain, or by the unexpected letter bomb campaign against the EU institutions by an obscure grouping originating in Bologna at the end of 2003. The likelihood that the EU will be targeted by international terrorism is further lessened by the fact that its non-confrontational policies, in the Middle East for instance, present little cause for the anger and frustration that provide the brains behind terrorist organizations with a fertile recruiting ground for potential martyrs. The threat would indeed be increased if a terrorist group were to acquire WMD, but none has done so yet. This demonstrates the importance of effective non-proliferation, but should not lead to alarmism. The only parties that do currently possess WMD are therefore States. In their case, the danger is even more limited: no State, apart from the EU’s allies, has the means to mount a full-scale offensive and pose any serious threat. Besides, the use of WMD would imply the risk of massive retaliation, by conventional means or otherwise. But the main argument is that in view of the EU’s economic might it is hard to imagine which State would not damage its own interests by an act of aggression.⁴⁸ This is not to say that terrorism and WMD can be ignored, but the threat that they pose should be put in the right perspective.

Rather than terrorism or WMD, the most important threat emerging from the new security environment seems to be the ever growing gap between haves and have-nots, or rather haves and have-lesses, a gap which can be best expressed in terms of access to the essential global public goods. The ‘global challenges’ mentioned in the Strategy – poverty, disease etc. – are all symptoms of this gap, which in some form or other often is at the heart of the ‘key threats’ or, in other words, often reveals their root causes. This gap is foremost among the challenges of the globalized world, because it threatens the stability of the international system itself: at a certain level of inequality, the resulting political upheaval, extremisms of all kinds, economic uncertainty and migration flows will become uncontrollable – as Europe already experienced once, in the 1930s. Against this background of globalisation, specific politico-military challenges do indeed stand out. They include regions of chronic tension and long-standing disputes and conflicts, failed States and civil wars, proliferation of WMD and excessive militarization, and terrorism. These challenges directly threaten other regions and States. On account of spill-over effects and the challenge that they pose to international stability, they also indirectly affect the EU. They have to be tackled head-on, but as they are symptoms of the ‘dark side of globalisation’, effective global governance, improving access to global public goods, must be pursued at the same time as the key to *preventing* such threats. ‘Security is the precondition of development’, the Strategy states, but this works the other way around as well. Of course, the strength of the causal relationship between, on the one hand, the gap between haves and have-lesses in the broadest sense and, on the other hand,

⁴⁸ Sven Biscop, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership’. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2003, 178 pp.

specific politico-military issues differs from case to case. Nonetheless, in the long term no durable settlement of such issues can be achieved unless the stability of the world system itself is assured.

In its final version the Strategy certainly is much more balanced, mentioning at it does a wide range of global challenges linked to globalisation, and presenting a completer picture of the ‘key threats’. It appears though that the inseparable link between the overall challenges of globalisation and more specific threats, from which follows the priority need of ensuring the stability of the world system as such, could have been highlighted more in the analysis of the security environment. At the same time, one should not overlook the fact that reconciling the threat perceptions of the Fifteen, all influenced by specific geographic and other circumstances, is a big achievement in itself.

3.2 First Objective: Addressing the Threats

‘Addressing the threats’ is the first of three strategic objectives outlined in the Strategy, which lists the initiatives the EU has already taken:

- the European Arrest Warrant, measures addressing terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the US;
- the EU’s long-standing non-proliferation policies, highlighting its commitment to strong and verifiable multilateral treaty regimes;
- its interventions to help deal with regional conflicts, notably in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Strategy then outlines the approach which the EU will continue to pursue in dealing with the ‘key threats’, taking into account the nature of these threats and the exigencies of the new globalized security environment. ‘In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand’, therefore ‘the first line of defence will often be abroad’, which confirms that the EU cannot be but a global actor. As ‘the new threats are dynamic’ and ‘[...] spread if they are neglected’, ‘conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’. And because ‘none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means’, prevention will require the application of ‘a mixture of instruments’. ‘The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations’, it is stressed.

Placing the threats first among the objectives – in the first draft they came last – can again be seen as a political message, in order to emphasize once more that the EU shares US concerns.⁴⁹ At the same time though the comprehensive EU approach is stressed, which aims to put to use the whole range of available instruments, which is rightly highlighted as a distinctive feature of EU external action. On the whole, as far as the threats are concerned, this paragraph might appear rather superfluous and repetitive; the actual approach that effectively addresses the threats, or rather global challenges in general, is detailed in the ensuing paragraphs. The stipulations on the necessarily global reach of EU external action, on prevention, and on the mixture of instruments indicate the basic principles of this approach, but are somewhat obscured by the emphasis on threats.

⁴⁹ That in this chapter the notion of ‘new’ threats is still being used, whereas this distinction has been abolished in the chapter on the security environment, seems to be a minor oversight.

3.3 Second Objective: Building Security in Europe's Neighbourhood

'Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important', the Strategy points out: 'neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on our borders all pose problems for Europe'. Therefore 'a ring of well-governed countries' must be established, 'with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations', which is to be achieved through partnership and action in the political, economic, cultural as well as security fields. This 'ring' is seen to include:

- the Balkans, where Europe's substantial achievements must be consolidated;
- 'our neighbours in the East', to whom 'the benefits of economic and political cooperation' should be extended – this seems to mean all remaining European non-Member States except for Russia, which is mentioned as a 'strategic partner' in the last chapter of the Strategy;⁵⁰
- the Southern Caucasus, which thus finds itself promoted to an area of special interest for the EU⁵¹ – besides calling for 'a stronger and more active interest' on the part of the EU, the Strategy does not indicate any direction for future EU policy though;
- the Mediterranean, understood as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process between the EU and twelve Mediterranean States,⁵² which should be rendered more effective.

It is indeed the case that, while the security issues arising in the vicinity of the EU are global phenomena that are not specific to this region, their potential effects on the EU are greater because of the geographic proximity. The EU and its neighbourhood, and in particular its neighbours on the European continent, can be considered a 'security complex' as defined by Buzan: 'a group of States whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another'.⁵³ Therefore, in this area the onus is on the EU to assume responsibility and take the lead: a stable neighbourhood is a necessity for our own security *and* promoting stability in our area is our duty, since we are the local actor with the means to do so. Through its force of attraction, the EU has succeeded in stabilising the European continent; now it has to replicate that success in a wider neighbourhood.

The Strategy offers a definition of how far this neighbourhood reaches, and an ambitious one at that. The neighbourhood can be seen as the area in which the EU deems it has a specific responsibility for peace and security, and therefore the leading role, as opposed to its general contribution to global stability as outlined under the third strategic objective. The Strategy also puts down the general principle of how comprehensive and cooperative relations with the States concerned will increase security, i.e. an approach that emphasises long-term prevention. It does not however go into any further detail as to the instruments that the EU

⁵⁰ The first draft specified these Eastern neighbours to be Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, a formulation which left the accession candidates not joining the Union in 2004 completely without mention. Perhaps another reason for omitting a specific reference to these three States can be sought in the wish not to infringe too much on what Russia still considers to be its sphere of influence, in view of the envisaged strategic partnership with Russia.

⁵¹ On 7 July 2003 the EU appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus (Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP. In: Official Journal L169, 2003, pp. 74-75).

⁵² Cyprus and Malta, which join the EU in 2004 and thus move over to the other side of the table; and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey; Libya has been invited to join as soon as it formally accepts the Barcelona acquis.

⁵³ Barry Buzan, 'People, States and Fear. Second Edition. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era'. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

can apply to make these relations work, although in fact several instruments already exist or are being envisaged.

The potentially most effective instrument would be the comprehensive Neighbourhood Policy proposed by the Commission under the heading of 'Wider Europe'. The concrete benefits and preferential relations offered in that framework, besides aiming to promote economic and political reform via conditional assistance – and thus having a broad preventive scope – could also be linked to substantial politico-military cooperation, in order to establish joint mechanisms for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The benefits offered are basically a stake in the EU's internal market, which is to be accompanied by further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital – 'the four freedoms'.

The Neighbourhood Policy's overall objectives would thus be:

- preventing conflicts in our neighbourhood and acts of aggression against the EU;
- settling ongoing disputes and conflicts;
- establishing close economic and political partnerships based on shared values, prosperity and security;
- controlling migration and all forms of illegal trafficking into the EU;
- protecting the security of EU citizens living abroad.

The Commission does not aim to replace existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks for relations, such as the EMP, the Stability Pact for the Balkans or the Common Strategy on Ukraine; rather it wants to supplement and build on them. The Neighbourhood Policy will have to strike a balance between bilateral action plans, so that benefits and benchmarks for progress can be tailored to specific needs and circumstances, and multilateral partnerships such as the Barcelona Process, in order to deal with regional issues and promote regional integration between partners. The founding document of the EMP, the Barcelona declaration, actually already mentions a lot of the measures that are now being proposed in the framework of Wider Europe. For the Neighbourhood Policy to succeed, the Member States will have to muster the necessary political will to invest sufficient means and offer the neighbouring States *real* benefits.⁵⁴ Otherwise, it will suffer the same fate as the 'old' EMP: well-intentioned principles, but very limited implementation. Promises only of the proverbial carrot will be insufficient, for they have been made too often. A large effort will thus also be required on the part of the EU.⁵⁵

In the long term, if it is successful, the Neighbourhood Policy could, through permanent close interaction and sharing of norms and values, lead to the progressive emergence of new 'security communities'⁵⁶ encompassing the EU – a 'security community' in itself that is expanding through enlargement – and the neighbouring regions or sub-regions. Implementing

⁵⁴ William Wallace, 'Looking after the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25'. Notre Europe Policy Paper No. 4, July 2003.

⁵⁵ The Commission proposes *inter alia* the following incentives: extension of the internal market and regulatory structures; preferential trade relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons; integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European research area; new instruments for investment promotion and protection; and support for integration into the global trading system. In this regard, the protectionist nature of the Common Agricultural Policy is particularly sensitive.

⁵⁶ Adler & Barnett define a 'pluralistic security community', that can evolve from 'loosely' to 'tightly coupled' as 'a trans-national region comprised of sovereign States whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change'. (Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett (eds.), 'Security Communities'. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

the Neighbourhood Policy should be nothing less than a top priority. It is not as such mentioned in the Strategy, but the title of the second strategic objective has been changed from ‘extending the zone of security around Europe’ to ‘building security in our neighbourhood’.

With regard to the Mediterranean specifically, the Strategy stresses that resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a ‘strategic priority’, for indeed ‘without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems’, as the Mediterranean partners are reluctant to engage in cooperation in the security and other fields while the conflict is raging. The Middle East conflict receives additional emphasis in the final version, which as compared to the first draft adds a strong call for a joint effort by the EU, the US, the UN and Russia to implement the ‘two state-solution’.⁵⁷ This could then also be the first step towards a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. But other conflicts and disputes demand a settlement as well: the EU should support a settlement for the Western Sahara, it should make use of the association agreement to engage in a critical dialogue with Algeria and it should continue to encourage Libya to accept the Barcelona *acquis* and join the EMP. If significant steps are taken in this regard, it will enhance the legitimacy of the EU and hence the chances for success of the Neighbourhood Policy. In that framework, a deepening of the EMP’s politico-military basket could then be achieved through partners’ active participation in the ESDP. This would also dispel their misgivings about it.⁵⁸ The Strategy does not mention Turkey separately, although this would certainly have pleased Ankara, and would perhaps have better reflected its status as the only remaining Mediterranean candidate for accession after Cyprus and Malta join the EU; but it is of course one of the Mediterranean partners and thus included in the framework of the EMP.

The Strategy further states that ‘a broader engagement with the Arab world should also be considered’. This can be seen as a reference to the report on the EU’s relations with the Arab world that Romano Prodi, Javier Solana and Chris Patten submitted to the December 2003 European Council, in which they recommend, for the States outside the Barcelona Process, ‘to explore proposals for a possible regional strategy for the Wider Middle East, comprising relations with GCC⁵⁹ countries, Yemen, Iraq and Iran’.⁶⁰ This one sentence in the Strategy thus ambitiously extends the EU’s definition of its neighbourhood, but rightly so, for relations with these States are less developed, while at the same time certain security issues affecting the members of the EMP, notably in the Middle East, obviously cannot be tackled without them. The European Council invited the Council to pursue this work, within the implementation of the Strategy and taking into account Wider Europe and the EMP. It thus seems that these States would not be included in the Neighbourhood Policy or the EMP, but that an additional framework is envisaged which would be closely linked to both existing frameworks.

Perhaps under the heading of ‘building security in our neighbourhood’, Sub-Saharan Africa could have been mentioned as well. Not to include it in the Neighbourhood Policy, but as an area where it is the EU’s duty, *inter alia* because of historic ties, to play a special role. A more systematic, comprehensive partnership with Sub-Saharan Africa could be envisaged.

⁵⁷ This reflects the conclusions of the three seminars, where it was generally felt that more attention should be devoted to the conflict.

⁵⁸ Sven Biscop, ‘Opening up the ESDP to the South: A Comprehensive and Cooperative Approach to Euro-Mediterranean Security’. In: Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, 2003, No. 2, pp. 183-197.

⁵⁹ The Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

⁶⁰ ‘Strengthening EU’s Relations with the Arab World’. <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/78372.pdf>.

3.4 Third Objective: Effective Multilateralism

Referring to the impact of globalisation again, the Strategy names as final strategic objective the establishment of ‘an effective multilateral system’: ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’. The centre of that system is the UN, hence ‘equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’. Contrary to the first draft, in the Strategy’s final version the central position of the UN is also reflected in its place in the text, where it now comes first. The institutional architecture further comprises global organizations like the WTO and the International Financial Institutions on the one hand, and regional organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union on the other hand. The transatlantic relationship, of which ‘NATO is an important expression’ – thus not the sole one – is also defined as a core element, in the EU’s bilateral interest but also for the international community as a whole. The final version of the Strategy further adds an emphasis on ‘confidence building and arms control regimes’. Through this network of regimes and institutions, what amounts to *global governance* must be pursued, which implies: ‘spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights’, as well as ‘assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures’.

The emphasis on long-term prevention through the combination, as envisaged in the Neighbourhood Policy, of partnership and support in order to promote reforms, is thus repeated at the global level, but rather than ‘leading from the front’ itself, as it proposes to do towards its neighbours, the EU will primarily act through the UN and other multilateral institutions and regimes. The comprehensive approach that is advocated, without naming it comes very close to the notion of global public goods.⁶¹ Promoting regional integration is part and parcel of this approach, in order to consolidate peaceful relations between States and strengthen their position in the global order, so as to increase their access to GPG. The aim is ‘a world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone’. An attempt can thus be made to provide an answer to the feelings of exclusion, marginalization and impotence with regard to the core GPG that certainly constitute one of the root causes of political extremism, terrorism and conflict.⁶² The document does not go into detail as to how effective global governance is to be primarily pursued, i.e. how can the institutional architecture be improved and which are the priority policy fields in which action must be taken, apart from proliferation and terrorism, which are just two of the global issues that need to be addressed. With regard to the institutional dimension e.g., the Commission has already elaborated extensive proposals.⁶³ Perhaps at least a general direction could have been indicated. Now the need for global governance overall is somewhat obscured by the emphasis on the politico-military aspects.

The Strategy strongly stresses that for ‘international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective’, the EU must ‘be ready to act when their rules are broken’. *Effective* multilateralism would thus appear to mean *enforceable*. A two-step approach seems to be envisaged with regard to short-term prevention and crisis management, which complement long-term

⁶¹ The same holds true for Art. III-193 §2 of the Draft Constitution, which rephrases the general objectives of external action to include inter alia ‘sustainable economic, social and environmental development’ and ‘stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance’ – the latter notion is a peculiar combination of two quite distinct concepts which will hopefully not escape the scrutiny of the legal experts.

⁶² Rik Coolsaet, ‘International Terrorism: Symptom of a Sick World Order’. Paper presented at the IRRI-KIIB conference ‘Why 9/11? The Root Causes of International Terrorism’, Brussels, 20 November 2003, <http://www.irri-kiib.be/speechnotes/terrorism/201103coolsaet.pdf>.

⁶³ COM (2003) 526 final, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism’.

prevention, i.e. towards States that ‘have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society’, either because they ‘have sought isolation’ or because they ‘persistently violate international norms’. In the first place, ‘the EU should be ready to provide assistance’ to help them ‘rejoin the international community’. But: ‘Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union’. At first instance, this price will be paid in terms of economic sanctions and cutting back partnership and cooperation, as can be gathered from the use of the notion of conditionality in the Strategy, but when necessary it can also include military intervention, and this at an early stage. This becomes clear when the chapter on effective multilateralism is read together with the next chapter of the Strategy, on policy implications, and notably the paragraph on an EU that is ‘more active in pursuing [its] strategic objectives’, which ‘applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities’. In that context the EU needs ‘to develop a culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention’, for ‘we need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise’. Or in other words: ‘preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future’. For the thorough assessment of situations that this approach requires, the EU can build on the extensive toolbox for early warning and prevention that the Commission has created.

The emphasis clearly is on the comprehensive approach, on putting to use ‘the full spectrum of instruments’. The coercive use of military power therefore certainly is not the default instrument for short-term prevention and crisis management, although the Strategy does not explicitly say that it is an instrument of last resort. This seems to be confirmed though by the fact that – very significantly – the words ‘pre-emptive engagement’ in the first draft have been replaced by ‘preventive engagement’ in the final version. From the point of view of the clarity of the document and the rationality of the debate, this was without doubt a wise thing to do, for the connotation that ‘pre-emption’ has acquired since the US-led invasion of Iraq, i.e. the use of force at the State’s own initiative before it has been the subject of armed attack, at the same time blurs the debate and renders it very emotional.⁶⁴

This immediately leads to the issue of the legal mandate required for the use of force, excluding cases of course in which intervention takes place with the consent of the parties, e.g. in the context of the OSCE, or when the EU is invited, as was the case in Macedonia. On this question the Strategy is not very explicit either. It states that the EU is ‘committed to upholding and developing International Law [sic]’, an addition as compared to the first draft, and that ‘the United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. But it does not say that the EU should always seek a UN mandate for coercive military action. The Strategy thus leaves a lot of room for interpretation, which on this issue detracts from its utility as a framework for policy-making. Even taking into account the extreme sensitivity of the issue – the matter was at the heart of the Iraq divide – and the fact that the need for unanimity serves as a very effective

⁶⁴ There is a minority school in international law that has a wider interpretation of the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter, claiming it to include the possibility of pre-emptive action in case of an imminent attack, i.e. at a time between the moment when an enemy is perceived to be about to attack and the actual launching of that attack, and even then only if there is an urgent necessity of self-defence against this attack and there is no alternative to self-defence. The US National Security Strategy goes a lot further by allowing ‘anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’, a formulation that appears to do away with the condition of the ‘imminence’ of an attack; in effect, this is not pre-emptive action, but preventive war, which inherently violates the Charter.

built-in brake on over-hasty military operations, it is to be regretted that the EU has renounced from setting an example – and thus from leading by example.

Inspiration to solve both questions – at what point and under which mandate is coercive military action possible – could have been found in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. As mentioned earlier, the ICISS made a very recommendable attempt to collectively define common criteria, adapted to today's security environment, for the use of coercive measures, military and other, in order to provide a response to States that do not live up to their commitments – vis-à-vis the international community, but also vis-à-vis their own population, whom it is indeed the international community's responsibility to protect as the ICISS states⁶⁵ – and in order to counter threats at an early stage.

The criteria that the ICISS devised can be summarized as follows:

- 'Just cause: is the harm being experienced or threatened sufficiently clear and serious to justify going to war?
- Right intention: is the primary purpose of the proposed military action to halt or avert the external or internal threat in question, even if there are some other motives in play as well?
- Last resort: has every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures will not succeed?
- Proportional means: is the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective?
- Reasonable prospects: is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the external or internal threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction?
- Right authority: is the military action lawful?'⁶⁶

In this view, the coercive use of military power must be a last resort in the European approach to security. It should be considered only if all other means have clearly failed, and subject to an explicit mandate from the Security Council – the 'right authority'. But if these conditions are met, the EU should indeed have no hesitation in taking military action. If, however, the Security Council – whose authorisation should in all cases be sought prior to action being taken – proves unable to act in a situation where the responsibility to protect is obvious, then the ICISS recommends the consent of the UN General Assembly can be sought at a meeting in emergency special session under the Uniting for Peace procedure, or action within its area of jurisdiction by a regional organisation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter can be envisaged, subject to it seeking subsequent authorisation from the Security Council. But the purpose in this case cannot be to authorise 'pre-emptive' coercive military action on the initiative of the EU or its Member States, i.e. before all other options have been exhausted. Since Article 51 of the UN Charter allows military action by way of self-defence only *after* an armed attack occurs, the Security Council is the only body that can legally – and legitimately – decide on any other form of coercive military action. Any deviation from this rule, by

⁶⁵ The first draft spoke of States that 'persistently violate international norms of domestic governance or of international behaviour [author's emphasis]', which clearly covers threats to both the international community, including proliferation and support of terrorism, and their own population, but the latter phrase was deleted in the final version.

⁶⁶ Gareth Evans, 'Waging War and Making Peace'. 2003 Annual Hawke Lecture, University of South Australia, 18 September 2003.

allowing individual States to determine the need for coercive military action, would pave the way for a complete dismantling of the Charter and the multilateral system.

This approach has in fact already been developed more explicitly with regard to the specific issue of WMD, in the 'EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction' that was adopted by the December 2003 European Council. This provides for two stages. The first includes strengthening the multilateral non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes, notably with regard to verification, and, in a longer-term perspective, dealing with the underlying causes of proliferation by pursuing political solutions to tensions and disputes and regional arrangements for arms control and disarmament: the 'first line of defence'. Only when these instruments have failed, can 'coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law' be envisaged, 'as a last resort'. The Security Council is to play a central part, which implies that its role 'as the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance [...] needs to be effectively strengthened'. Recent EU policy with regard to possible proliferation by Iran can be seen as a successful example of this approach. Given that the Strategy on WMD elaborates upon one aspect of the overall Security Strategy, it is doubly regrettable that the latter is not more explicit on this issue itself.

As the Security Strategy says, such a stance implies the need to strengthen the decision-making capacity and legitimacy of the Security Council. If the Security Council is indeed to be 'the final arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance', then it must be given the means for effective action – or others will continue to be tempted to act unilaterally in its stead. This is repeated in the next chapter of the Strategy, where under the heading 'more active' the EU is said to be 'committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations'. The necessary reforms include curtailing veto powers and amending the composition of the Security Council to make it more representative and thus more *legitimate* – a necessary prerequisite for the success of the collective security system. With two of its Member States having a permanent seat, the key is to a large extent in the EU's hands. If the will can be mustered to replace these seats with a single EU one, it will give the EU the legitimacy to demand further reforms.

Continuing the work of the ICISS is another field of action. At the end of 2003 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a High-Level Panel with the aim of recommending 'clear and practical measures for ensuring effective collective action, based upon a rigorous analysis of future threats to peace and security, an appraisal of the contribution collective action can make, and a thorough assessment of existing approaches, instruments and mechanisms, including the principal organs of the United Nations'.⁶⁷ 'It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming', the Strategy says – the High-Level Panel should provide part of the answer. Whereas admittedly reforming the Security Council will be very difficult, for both legal and political reasons, adopting a clear framework allowing for more pro-active Security Council action is a much more realistic objective.

The EU can also contribute on a more practical level. A close partnership has already been established between the EU and the UN in the field of conflict prevention and early warning, and on 24 September 2003 both organizations signed a joint declaration on cooperation in

⁶⁷ The Panel counts sixteen members and is chaired by Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister of Thailand. UN, 'Secretary-General names High-Level Panel to Study Global Security Threats, and Recommend Necessary Changes'. Press Release SG/A/857, 4 November 2003, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sga857.doc.htm.

crisis management, aiming to establish information and consultation mechanisms. The ongoing development of ESDP would enable the EU to provide the UN with a minimum of standing forces, so as to contribute to an effective crisis management capacity.

3.5 Policy Implications

The EU has ‘instruments in place that can work effectively’, but should ‘make a contribution that matches [its] potential’. Therefore under the heading of ‘policy implications’, in its final chapter the Strategy calls for an EU that is more active, more capable, more coherent and works with others.

As mentioned earlier, ‘*more active*’ means ‘preventive engagement’ and ‘early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention’, i.e. long- and short-term prevention and crisis management, and this by way of the ‘full spectrum of instruments’ at the EU’s disposal. This does include politico-military power, which in the global environment plays a more prominent role than on the European continent, so there is no escaping the fact that projection of military power, within the bounds of the UN Charter, may be necessary to ensure peace and stability. In the EU’s range of instruments, an effective military instrument *and* the willingness to use it, are necessary assets to enhance the credibility of the EU as a player on the international stage. As the Strategy puts it – and this applies to all instruments, to both prevention and crisis management: ‘A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one which carries greater political weight’.

With regard to operations, the Strategy specifies that the EU ‘should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously’, which can be seen as an objective for the formulation of a new, extended Headline Goal (‘Headline Goal 2010’), a process which was launched in 2003. Furthermore, the EU ‘could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities’. The same emphasis on the combination of military and civilian instruments as a distinctive feature of the EU approach can be found in the December 2003 European Council decision to add a ‘cell with civil/military components’ to the EU Military Staff, which is to function as a core that can rapidly be expanded into an operations centre for EU operations without the use of NATO assets when no national HQ of one of the Member States is being used, and particularly when a joint civil and military response is required – which nowadays applies to most if not all operations. This decision ended the heated debate on the proposal, launched by Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg at their ‘Quadrilateral Defence Summit’ in Brussels on 29 April 2003, to set up a fully-fledged EU operational headquarters in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren.⁶⁸

Under the heading of ‘*more capable*’, foremost is the need to further ‘transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces and to enable them to address the new threats’. While ‘actions underway – notable the establishment of a defence agency⁶⁹ – take us in the right direction’, the Strategy also calls for ‘more resources for defence’ and, in its final version,

⁶⁸ The agreement reached further provides for an EU cell within SHAPE to run EU operations with the use of NATO assets. ‘EU Establishes Autonomous but Non-Permanent Military Headquarters’. EIS European Report, 13 December 2003.

⁶⁹ Originally proposed in Maastricht as far back as 1991 and taken up by the Convention in 2003, the establishment of ‘an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments’ was decided upon by the June 2003 European Council, to become operational in 2004.

‘more effective use of resources’. The latter addition reflects the budgetary and political unfeasibility of increasing defence spending in the majority of the Member States, a fact which *inter alia* was voiced at the last of the three EU seminars on the Strategy. Hence the need to make better use of current budgets; as the first draft already said, ‘systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads, and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities’.

Currently, the Headline Goal concerns no more than a fraction of the armed forces of the Member States, which together have over one and a half million men and women in uniform. Furthermore, it is no more than a catalogue of forces made available by the Member States, on a case by case basis, which do not cooperate on any permanent basis. Member States could easily assign a *larger* share of their armed forces to a more *integrated* European framework. A new Headline Goal – ‘2010’ – could thus be widened and deepened at the same time.

Certainly for the smaller Member States, widening could lead to them making the whole of their armed forces available to the EU. Deepening would imply increasing multinational cooperation, pooling of means, and task specialisation around cores of excellence, on the basis of force planning at the European level by the Military Staff, in function of the capabilities required for the implementation of the Strategy.⁷⁰ Thus a much greater output in terms of capabilities could be realised within the current defence budgets thanks to increased efficiency; the smaller Member States would no longer need to maintain the whole range of units and equipment in small and therefore inefficient numbers; and the EU could make use of the full potential of Member States’ armed forces, while ensuring that each Member State contributes its fair share. Pooling of means, e.g. in the fields of strategic transport and intelligence, and multinational cooperation, focussed on creating easily deployable and modular force packages – which could be done in the framework of ‘structured cooperation’ as included in the Draft Constitution – imply a larger permanent dimension in terms of *inter alia* staff elements and manoeuvres than the simple force catalogue, and therefore stimulate further-reaching integration with regard to concepts, procedures and equipment. The Eurocorps, with its permanent staff, or the Belgo-Dutch naval cooperation, with its single operational command and training cycle, provide useful examples. Of course, increased multinational cooperation implies reduced sovereignty and increased solidarity between Member States. But only by increasing efficiency can the Member States release the necessary budgets to pursue the conversion of their armed forces from what all too often still are large and unwieldy Cold War armies to ‘usable’ forces. The capacity for rapid reaction, projectability and sustainability determines the effectiveness of European forces in a globalized environment. In this light, downsizing and the move to professional armies are inevitable.

The Strategy lists other fields in which the EU can be made ‘more capable’ yet:

- ‘A greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations’, which again emphasises the added value of the EU’s comprehensive set of instruments; the stipulation in the first draft that ‘in particular we should look at stronger arrangements for civilian planning and mission support’ has been deleted, probably in view of the agreement on the ‘cell with civil/military components’ that was afterwards reached;

⁷⁰ On the notion of task specialisation, see: Alain De Neve, ‘La Spécialisation des Tâches : Une Révolution pour l’Europe? Approches théoriques’. Institut royal supérieur de défense, Sécurité et Stratégie No. 79, 2003. Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken, ‘Militaire Samenwerking in Europa. Mogelijkheden en Bependingen’. Advies No. 31, 2003.

- ‘Stronger diplomatic capability’, notably ‘a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions’; the reference to the desirability of pooling national diplomats in the first draft has been omitted however, as the debate in the Convention and the IGC did not yield any result on this matter. The Draft Constitution does provide for a ‘European External Action Service’, which would integrate the relevant parts of the Commission administration and the General Secretariat of the Council, as well all external representations of the Commission and the Council, and which is to cooperate with the diplomatic posts of the Member States;⁷¹
- ‘Improved sharing of intelligence’, an area in which cooperation is still rather limited.

The Berlin Plus arrangement, which provides the EU with assured access to NATO operational planning, the presumption of availability of NATO assets and NATO European command options for EU-led operations, is mentioned in the final version as a factor enhancing EU capabilities. In view of steadily increasing capabilities, the Strategy calls for ‘a wider spectrum of missions’, a reference to the extended definition of the Petersberg Tasks included in the Draft Constitution: ‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories’. The Petersberg Tasks as originally formulated in the TEU already include everything but collective defence however, so this mere specification does not really add to the content.

The Strategy does not discuss other than diplomatic and politico-military capabilities, e.g. in the field of trade or development. As in the paragraph on ‘effective multilateralism’, a strong emphasis on the politico-military dimension rather obscures the comprehensive approach that is put forward as the general principle.

Under the heading of ‘*more coherent*’, the Strategy states that ‘the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities’, for ‘diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda’ – an unambiguous call for a comprehensive approach, which should also embrace ‘the external activities of the individual Member States’. The Strategy’s final version adds to this an emphasis on ‘better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies [which] is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organized crime’, and on the fact that ‘coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict’. Coherence, though perhaps at first sight a vague and theoretical notion, will indeed be crucial to the effective implementation of the comprehensive approach, at the level of policy objectives, instruments and means, across the three pillars. Given the scale of the EU and the diversity of the policy fields involved, this is far from an easy task, which requires that coherence be institutionalized. In that regard, the Draft Constitution already includes far-reaching proposals, particularly the creation of a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs, who would combine the current positions of Commissioner for External Relations and High Representative for the CFSP – Patten and Solana – and who would be assisted by the unified European External Action Service mentioned above.⁷² Although different decision-making procedures would remain in vigour

⁷¹ In order to be maximally effective, this service should include all relevant Commission DGs, i.e. external trade, development, aid etc.

⁷² See Articles 27 and III-197. The Union Minister could, in an ideal scenario, also represent the EU in the Security Council; at the very least he ought to be involved by the Member States holding a seat.

for Community matters and other, this would constitute a significant break-through of the pillar system, which greatly hinders effective coordination of policies.

Finally, the Strategy states that the EU will be '*working with partners*', and this 'both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors'. The former are listed in the paragraph on 'effective multilateralism'; the latter are deemed to include first of all the US and Russia, and then also Japan, China, Canada and India, 'as well as all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support'.⁷³

Overcoming the dark side of globalisation requires the cooperation of all States. Great powers have the greatest responsibility for projecting stability in the world. It follows that a comprehensive and equitable transatlantic partnership is indeed indispensable to promote global governance.

In the politico-military field, the transatlantic partnership is embodied in NATO. In the wake of the 2003 crisis in the Alliance and in view of the ambitions of the EU as an international actor – and its ever growing capabilities – a rethinking of NATO seems to be in order. The growing awareness in the EU of its distinctive identity in international relations and the increasing will to make a proper mark on the course of events, as evidenced by the Strategy, is a major new factor in transatlantic relations. A 'two-pillar' NATO could provide the answer. With regard to 'non-Article 5 missions', now that the EU has the necessary institutional and military capabilities at its disposal to act autonomously, the EU can itself implement – coercive and non-coercive – military operations to support its global and neighbourhood policy; it could also assume first-level responsibility in the event of crises in its neighbourhood. Such burden-sharing would meet long-standing US demands for a greater European effort, and would contribute to transform NATO into an equitable, two-pillar alliance, in which both partners have responsibilities and can call upon the alliance and its assets according to pre-arranged mechanisms.⁷⁴ The overarching NATO level would then be activated only if the means of one of the pillars turned out to be insufficient to resolve a crisis or if the EU and the US agreed, for political reasons, to be jointly involved in an operation from the very beginning. In such a constellation, non-participation in a non-Article 5 operation by the other pillar need no longer automatically be considered a breach of solidarity. The level activated – NATO or one of the pillars – rather than being the subject of a strict 'right of first refusal' on the part of NATO, would depend on whether both pillars consent on the proposed intervention or not. This implies that the pro-active, global role for NATO that is being envisaged in some circles is far from automatic. In the case of threats to the territorial integrity of either partner, however, the mutual defence commitment under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty provides the ultimate security guarantee. An EU-US division of labour along the lines of 'soft' and 'hard' power, as suggested by some,⁷⁵ makes no sense: either player needs both in order to implement an effective and a legitimate foreign policy.

The transatlantic partnership is more than NATO however, as the Strategy itself points out. 'Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world', therefore the final version has added 'our aim should be an effective and

⁷³ In the first draft, Russia was set on an equal par with Japan, China, Canada and India; in the final version a separate paragraph has been devoted to it.

⁷⁴ The US would thus also have to agree a 'Washington Plus' arrangement with the Alliance.

⁷⁵ Andrew Moravcsik, 'Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain'. In: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, 2003, No. 4, pp. 74-89.

balanced partnership with the USA'. The latter emphasis seems to confirm the need to re-think transatlantic relations.

Of course, the Strategy's comprehensive approach contrasts with the US National Security Strategy and certainly with recent US policies. The two documents share an emphasis on threats. Threats are the dominant theme *throughout* the US document; all policy areas are considered in the light of the fight against proliferation of WMD and 'rogue States' and particularly of the 'war' against terrorism – a struggle that 'will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over a long period of time' – referred to as 'our strategic priority'. When it comes to dealing with these threats, the European Strategy however advocates a much more positive and comprehensive approach. Unlike the US, the EU does not consider itself to be engaged in a new war.⁷⁶ As a diplomat once put it: according to the American document, the world is dangerous; according to the Solana document, the world is complex. In the National Security Strategy, the emphasis is on defence policy and the use of military means, including pre-emptively. The US document also exudes unilateralism: even though the text is peppered with references to 'allies and friends', it makes it clear that these are expected to accept US leadership and that the US 'will be prepared to act apart when our interests and unique responsibilities require'. The EU is barely mentioned. It is primarily seen as 'our partner in opening world trade' and even though the US 'welcome[s] our European allies' efforts to forge a greater foreign policy and defence identity within the EU', the basic concern is 'to ensure that these developments work with NATO'. The document does mention other dimensions of security and corresponding policy instruments: trade and aid, democratization etc. But these too are primarily put in the context of the 'war on terrorism'. Besides, actual US policies have evidently focussed on the use of the military instrument; Iraq is the obvious example. Other dimensions of security than the military, although they are present, have thus been eclipsed by the predominantly military discourse and policies of the Bush administration.

The existence of different strategic approaches means that the EU and the US will continue to have differences of opinion as to how to deal with the problems – current and future ones – of this world. Yet, these differences need not be irreconcilable. By focussing on Iraq, it is easily forgotten that on other issues, e.g. North Korea, policies are remarkably similar. Nor should the European Strategy be interpreted as being directed against the US. On the contrary, the EU and the US should aim to reinforce the transatlantic partnership in all fields of external policy, not just in NATO, in order to put their combined means to use in the most efficient and effective way 'for good in the world'. But this should be an equitable partnership, one which both partners enter into on the basis of their own priorities and their own distinctive approaches to security. As long as the EU had not defined its own agenda, a balanced partnership was impossible; the intra-European strategic debate is inextricably linked to the debate on the autonomy of EU policy-making vis-à-vis the US.⁷⁷ So the adoption of the Security Strategy has been a necessary first step towards an enhanced transatlantic partnership. The ambitions of the EU as a global actor which it expresses represent a new factor in transatlantic relations. The debate on the legitimacy of the use of force now seems to

⁷⁶ Felix Berenskoetter, 'Mapping the Mond Gap: A Comparison of US and EU Security Strategies'. FORNET Working Paper No. 3, January 2004,

<http://www.fornet.info/documents/Working%20Paper%20no.%203%20Berenskoetter.pdf>

⁷⁷ WEU Assembly, 'A European Strategic Concept – Defence Aspects'. Document A/1841, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. Gubert, Rapporteur, 1 December 2003.

stand out as the first hurdle to be overcome,⁷⁸ certainly if the work of the High-Level Panel is to have any effect.

3.6 Security within the EU

A level that is not dealt with separately in the Strategy is that of security within the EU, although in the final version several references to the link between internal and external security have been added. Of course, the Member States no longer pose any threat to each other. By strengthening the existing web of political, economic, social and military interdependence between current and, further to enlargement, future Member States, the EU is continuing to build an area of freedom, security and justice. But the EU's territory and population remain vulnerable to global threats. To enhance the confidence of Europe's population, the EU and its Member States, as the Strategy stipulates, have equipped themselves with new instruments, such as the European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism and Eurojust. The effectiveness of these developments will be further enhanced by enabling full harmonisation of policies in areas commonly agreed upon, in particular terrorism, border control, human trafficking, drugs trafficking, corruption, euro counterfeiting, arms trafficking, money laundering and organised crime.

Since the organization of collective defence remains the prerogative of NATO, the Strategy does not mention it. The adoption of the 'solidarity clause' would signal the move of the EU Member States towards a political community, committing themselves to mutual help and assistance in the case of natural or man-made disasters or terrorist strikes. For the foreseeable future, the EU and its Member States no longer face any direct military threat to their territorial integrity. The mutual defence commitment to which the Member States are bound, through NATO and WEU, and including the possibility of symbolically including it in the Constitution in some form or other, serves as a long-term insurance against possible future threats. EU policy with respect to its neighbourhood and at the global level must prevent such threats from materialising in the first place.

⁷⁸ François Heisbourg (ed.), 'European Security Strategy: Is it for real?'. European Security Forum (ESF), Working Paper No. 14, October 2003, 23 pp.

4. COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY AS AN EU CONCEPT

The Strategy clearly builds on the ‘European way’ in international relations that can be observed in actual EU policies, especially the EU’s encompassing, long-term conflict prevention efforts and partnership arrangements. What the Strategy does is bringing these policies together within a conceptual framework that establishes a link between the various EU external policies, including short-term conflict prevention and crisis management. These are the areas where the EU today too often lacks a common approach, as the Iraqi crisis so forcibly demonstrated. This conceptual framework emerging from existing policies can be referred to as *comprehensive security*, which is hereafter analyzed from a normative perspective.

A comprehensive security strategy starts with the recognition that there are various dimensions of security in the current international environment and therefore that the underlying causes of potential threats to the security of the EU are very diverse in terms of both nature and origin. Kirchner and Sperling dub this ‘the new security agenda’. It is concerned with the ability to protect the social and economic fabric of society, to act as gatekeeper between desirable and undesirable interactions and to foster a stable international economic and political environment. This agenda goes beyond the politico-military dimension, which nonetheless remains a vital element, so for Kirchner and Sperling ‘a broader, holistic definition of the relationship between the “new” and “traditional” conceptualisations of security’ is required.⁷⁹ Because of the multidimensional nature of security, achieving the overall objective of safeguarding the values and interests of the EU is equally dependent on the specific politico-military and on the broader, global governance dimensions of external action: on the one hand the continued absence of a direct military threat to the EU itself must be ensured and spill-over effects of conflicts between or within third States to the EU avoided; and on the other hand the stability of the EU’s neighbourhood and of the international system as such must be maintained.

In order to achieve these twin objectives, a comprehensive security strategy looks beyond the traditional confines of security policy, i.e. beyond the use of politico-military instruments: it aims to *integrate a range of external policies*, which together offer a broad set of instruments that have a worldwide scope and that address the different dimensions of security. This range of policies covers all three pillars of the EU; it includes *inter alia* external trade, development cooperation, international environmental policy, international police, justice and intelligence cooperation, immigration policy, foreign policy (multilateral diplomacy and the promotion of the values of the EU) and politico-military measures. The overall objective of this range of policies, which functions as an integrating mechanism, is the promotion of the core global public goods. ‘Traditional’ security policy can thus be seen as one aspect of a much broader, integrated framework in which it is on the same level as the other EU external policies, thereby avoiding a ‘compartmentalisation’ of external action. Within the overall objective of promoting global public goods, these policies all operate according to their own rationale and dynamic. In doing so, they contribute to a permanent or structural policy of prevention and stabilisation, and thus to the security of the EU. At the same time, ‘securitisation’ or ‘militarization’ of external policies other than security policy is avoided, i.e. specific politico-military concerns and means do not determine overall policy in other fields of external action, which would otherwise be detrimental to the legitimacy of EU policies. This should provide

⁷⁹ Emil Kirchner & James Sperling, ‘The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence’. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 7, 2002, No. 4, pp. 423-452.

an answer the concerns expressed by NGOs and others regarding e.g. the independence of humanitarian aid.⁸⁰

A comprehensive security strategy gives priority to active *prevention* of conflict and instability as opposed to a reactive and curative approach, which would be much more costly in both human and economic terms.⁸¹ Global public goods are the angle from which prevention can be tackled in the most encompassing and fundamental way. Accordingly, rather than being threat-based, a comprehensive security strategy is a positive approach that aims at achieving positive objectives, GPG, through global governance, in the interests not only of the EU but also of human beings everywhere. In that sense, working towards GPG can also be said to be a responsibility of the EU.⁸² ‘What for?’ rather than ‘against whom?’ is the question that determines policy. A comprehensive security strategy will thus be able to avoid the classic ‘security dilemma’ of over-emphasising threats, leading to unnecessary military build-ups and in return provoking distrust and military measures on the part of others.⁸³ In the terms used by Buzan, comprehensive security amounts to an ‘international security strategy’, i.e. a strategy addressing the root causes of threats by trying to change ‘the systemic conditions that influence the way in which States make each other feel more (or less) secure’, as opposed to a ‘national security strategy’, aimed at reducing one’s own vulnerability by taking defensive measures.⁸⁴

At the level of regions, States and individuals, insufficient access to GPG provokes tensions and armed conflict and, in case of a major deficiency, can destabilise the international system as such. Comprehensive security therefore by necessity demands global action: prevention must aim to safeguard and improve access to GPG *worldwide*. This global scope does not contradict the specific EU role vis-à-vis its neighbourhood envisaged in the Strategy. This is not a question of a hierarchy of priorities: an effective system of governance at the regional level is a component of the overall objective of global governance; because of globalisation, stability of the world order as such is equally important as stability in our neighbourhood. Rather the *modus operandi* differs: whereas at the global level the EU chooses to act through the multilateral architecture, in its neighbourhood it seeks to assume leadership itself. The often-used division of EU interests and, accordingly, scope of action in a hierarchy of concentric circles therefore is not really valid anymore.⁸⁵ The first circle can still be clearly distinguished, both geographically, i.e. the territory of the EU and its Member States, and functionally, i.e. the core or vital interests bearing on their own immediate survival. But the ensuing circles overflow into each other: geographically, because the link between the distance of an event and its potential impact on the EU, though often still present, no longer is automatic; and functionally, because in the long-term ‘immaterial’ issues, such as lack of respect for human rights and the absence of the rule of law, can lead to instabilities and crises

⁸⁰ See e.g. Oxfam, ‘Letter to European Union Foreign Ministers regarding EU Security Strategy’. 26 November 2003. www.oxfam.org.

⁸¹ ‘An ounce of conflict prevention is worth a pound of humanitarian intervention’, as Paul Heinbecker puts it (‘Human Security: The Hard Edge’. In: Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 1, 2000, No. 1, pp. 11-16).

⁸² Or, as the Commission suggests in its Communication on Conflict Prevention (p. 5): ‘Given the importance of the EU on the international scene, its interests and ambitions and the considerable resources it has committed to assistance and cooperation, there is no doubt that the EU should play its part in these efforts’.

⁸³ Vincent Desportes, ‘Pour la pensée stratégique’. In: Défense nationale, Vol. 55, 1999, No. 8-9, pp. 109-121.

⁸⁴ Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*

⁸⁵ See e.g. Alfred Van Staden, Kees Homan, Bert Kreemers, Alfred Pijpers & Rob de Wijk, ‘Towards a European Strategic Concept’. The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 2000, 43 pp.

that are equally threatening to the EU as more immediate economic or politico-military events.

A comprehensive security strategy operates through dialogue, cooperation, partnership and institutionalised, rule-based *multilateralism* – itself an important global public good. Third States and organisations are regarded as partners for cooperation rather than as mere subjects of EU policies; the aim is to influence rather than to coerce, to use the carrot rather than the stick. But partnership and cooperation cannot be unconditional: benefits granted are linked to progress made in predefined fields. A critical dialogue is maintained with partners that do not respect their commitments; if they persist, they will pay the price in their relations with the EU. Coercion is regarded as a last resort. It is not out of the question, but will only be used if all other options have been exhausted and, of course, within the bounds of international law.

The comprehensive security concept is not contradictory with defining the EU as a ‘civilian power’, contrary to what *inter alia* Smith⁸⁶ claims: the question is *when*, under what circumstances, and not *if* force can be used. This is in line with Maull’s definition of civilian power as including military power ‘as a residual instrument’.⁸⁷ Without the willingness to apply pressure, sanctions and, if need be, force, EU external action will not acquire the credibility it needs to be effective. This leads Stavridis to the assertion that ‘thanks to the militarising of the Union, the latter might at long last be able to act as a real civilian power in the world’.⁸⁸ In that regard, the concept ‘civilian superpower’ is gaining currency. Keukeleire too concludes that what he terms ‘structural foreign policy’ can be effective only ‘if it goes hand in hand with an effective traditional foreign policy which can be supported by military instruments’.⁸⁹ The deciding factor is that since it has acquired a military capacity, the EU still presents itself, not as a ‘traditional’ power, but as ‘a power which is unique because it will be able to use military means as an integrated part of a much broader range of political, economic and diplomatic means’.⁹⁰ As Gnesotto states, ‘the great debate of the 1980s over Europe as a civil power or a military power definitely seems to be a thing of the past [...] what the Union intends to become is a *sui generis* power’.⁹¹ ‘Comprehensive security’ therefore is a term better suited to the EU than ‘civilian power’, as it emphasises the integration of all fields of external action, and avoids the paralysing debate on the validity of the claim to ‘civilian power-status’ when possessing a military dimension that is inherent in the literature on the latter.⁹²

⁸⁶ Karen E. Smith, ‘The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or a Cause for Concern?’ In: *The International Spectator*, Vol. 35, 2000, No. 2, pp. 11-28.

⁸⁷ Hans Maull, ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’. In: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, 1990, No. 5, pp.92-93.

⁸⁸ Stelios Stavridis, ‘“Militarising” the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Revisited’. In: *The International Spectator*, Vol. 41, 2001, No. 4, pp. 43-50.

⁸⁹ Stephan Keukeleire, ‘Reconceptualising (European) Foreign Policy: Structural Foreign Policy’. Paper presented at the ECPR First Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, Bordeaux, 26-28 September 2002.

⁹⁰ Henrik Larsen, ‘The EU: a Global Military Actor?’. In: *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, 2002, No. 3, pp. 283-302.

⁹¹ Nicole Gnesotto, ‘European Strategy as a Model’. In: *EU Institute for Security Studies, Newsletter No. 9*, January 2004, pp. 1 & 4.

⁹² This division within the literature on ‘civilian power’ is already apparent in the earliest authors’ writings. Whereas the ‘founder’, Duchêne, used the term ‘civilian power’ to refer to the EEC, which did not possess a military capacity at all, Maull applied the concept to Germany and Japan, which do have armed forces. (François Duchêne, ‘Europe’s Role in World Peace’. In: Richard Mayne, ‘Europe Tomorrow’. London, Fontana, 1972).

There will be cases where the use of force is inevitable, for ‘modern’ nation States and ‘pre-modern’ regions of incompletely functioning States operate according to other rules than ‘post-modern’ Europe, in the terms used by Cooper to describe the world order.⁹³ For any such EU action to be successful, legitimacy is a necessary prerequisite; this legitimacy will be strengthened by implementing a permanent policy aimed at promoting GPG. Partnership can be built on the common aspiration to strengthen GPG, in the mutual interest of all concerned. That is precisely the nature of GPG. In that sense, comprehensive and cooperative security are inextricably linked: the objectives of a comprehensive security strategy can be realised only through cooperation, and cooperation and partnership cannot rely on the politico-military dimension alone, but require a broad base. Any use of force must always be put in the wider context of the prospect of – renewed – partnership and cooperation. In parts of the world where ‘the law of the jungle reigns’, as Cooper puts it, we must be prepared to act accordingly if necessary, but not without the aim of changing those laws and bringing the States or regions concerned within the area of partnership and cooperation.

The success of any security strategy depends on *the will to take action*. The EU must be prepared to invest the necessary financial means in effective partnership and cooperation and in developing its own policy instruments, and must also be prepared and able to implement those instruments, including, if need be, the coercive use of military means. What counts is not so much the size of the armed forces, but the willingness and ability to use them.⁹⁴ The EU need not, therefore, strive for a military capacity equal to that of the US, but must carefully plan its capability needs according to the Strategy, abandoning the all too simple logic of ever more troops and equipment and daring to downsize overcapacities in certain areas.⁹⁵ Through the Headline Goal process, national armed forces can be recast into rapidly deployable and sustainable capabilities. ‘Artemis’ serves as an example of the potential of a determined EU.

In other words, this need for a will to act is tantamount to the need for the EU to behave as a global power. Or, in the words of the Laeken Declaration adopted by the European Council in December 2001: ‘a power wanting to change the course of world affairs [...]’. For the EU to become a power, it must have the will and the capacity to weigh on the course of international events and influence the other players on the international stage. The EU and its Member States must consciously and collectively muster the will to form one of the poles of a multi-polar world and pursue their own distinctive policy: comprehensive security.

A strategy along these lines is comprehensive or encompassing in a number of ways:

- In terms of policy objectives, instruments and means: integration of policy fields by working towards GPG. Rather than working only on specific aspects in an ad hoc way, the comprehensive security approach offers a fundamental concept underlying, and thus integrating all fields of EU external action.⁹⁶
- In terms of the subjects of policy, which include individuals: on the one hand the security of EU citizens at home and abroad is included in the interests that have to be secured; on the other hand the access of individuals worldwide to GPG is the long-

⁹³ Robert Cooper, ‘The Postmodern State and the World Order’. London, Demos, 2000.

⁹⁴ Christoph Bertram, ‘Europe’s Best Interest: Staying Close to Number One’. In: *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, 2003, No. 1, pp. 61-70.

⁹⁵ Groupe d’officiers du CHEM, ‘Un Concept de sécurité et de défense, pour la France, pour l’Europe?’. In: *Défense nationale*, vol. 59, 2003, No. 8-9, pp. 113-124.

⁹⁶ The key elements of comprehensive security are – sometimes in different forms – also included in Ehrhart’s ‘cooperative security provider model’, but the integrating element is a vital distinction. (Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ‘What Model for CFSP?’ EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 55, 2002).

term objective of EU external action – hence a clear link with ‘human security’, but without ignoring the importance of States and international organisations.

- In terms of its worldwide scope, which does not exclude that the EU has a specific responsibility with regard to its neighbourhood.
- In terms of its inclusion of third States and organisations in policy-making, through multilateral cooperation and partnership, instead of considering them to be just subjects of EU policy.

Comprehensive security in effect translates the principles on which the EU itself is founded – liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law – into the principles underlying the EU external action.

The actual European Security Strategy is not equally explicit or precise on all aspects of the concept of comprehensive security as proposed above. But the general approach chosen by the Strategy is certainly conform with it: ‘effective multilateralism’ as a global objective and with regard to the EU’s neighbourhood in particular; which amounts to global governance in a whole range of policy fields, corresponding to the notion of GPG, putting to use all instruments available to the EU, in cooperation with States, regions and international organizations, with the emphasis on prevention of the ‘key threats’ that are identified, and with the option of having recourse to force if necessary.

5. FROM CONCEPTS TO PRACTICE

In the European Security Strategy, the EU now has an overall policy framework for its external activities across the pillars. The Strategy should function as a tool for policy-makers, as a set of guidelines for day-to-day policymaking in all of these fields; this applies to setting objectives as well as choosing the instruments and building the necessary capabilities. The adoption of the Strategy is a major step for EU external action, a step which until the Iraq crisis was quite unimaginable. The challenge now is to put this breakthrough to value and to effectively implement the Strategy's comprehensive approach, or as the December 2003 European Council worded it, 'to draw all the consequences of those strategic orientations and to mainstream them into all relevant European policies'. On its policy practice, the EU has based its Strategy – now this has to be translated into practice again.

At the same time, the ambitious agenda set forth in the Strategy serves as an affirmation of the EU as a global actor. By the mere adoption of the Strategy, the EU emphasises its ambition to make a proper mark on the course of global events. Effectively implementing the Strategy therefore is now essential to the credibility of the EU. In that sense, the Strategy also is a measure of performance.

5.1 Strategic Choices and Specific Policies

The Strategy itself is not an immediately operational document in the sense that it is not a detailed plan of action: it lays down the overall objectives of EU external action and the principal ways of achieving these. These constitute a set of political choices. The overall choice is for comprehensive security as the general approach. This choice is the most important; it determines all dimensions of external action. This approach the EU will implement in its neighbourhood, which geographically is defined very ambitiously. Here, the EU seeks the leading role itself; resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. At the global level, a clear choice is voiced for reinforcing the multilateral system, of which the UN is the core. A strong commitment to actively pursue these objectives and to enhance capabilities and coherence accordingly completes the picture.

All the aspects of these choices have then to be elaborated in specific policy plans, across the pillars, with regard to States, regions and global issues, as well as with regard to the development by the EU itself of the instruments and capabilities that the implementation of the Strategy requires. The difficulty is that while the Strategy words a clear choice for the general approach of comprehensive security, on a number of particular issues it remains rather vague and prone to interpretation, because no clear choice is being made with regard to more specific objectives and/or with regard to the instruments to apply. In that sense, the Strategy could have been somewhat more operational.

In some instances therefore, political choices have yet to be made, at the level of the specific policy plans; a number of difficult debates might therefore still lay ahead, while in the meantime on these issues the EU still lacks a clear and unambiguous framework for day-to-day policy-making:

- Global governance is at the core of the objective of 'effective multilateralism', but although a whole range of issues are mentioned as determining 'the quality of international society', the Strategy does not prioritize between policy fields or name more specific objectives, nor does it contain any guidelines as to how the international

institutional architecture in general and the UN in particular are to be improved. Similarly, under the heading of ‘more capable’ the Strategy does not mention capabilities in the fields of *inter alia* aid and trade. The EU certainly is one of the most active and often most powerful players in the vast and diverse fields of international trade, development, environmental policy etc., most of which fall within the Community competence – all the more reason to make clear strategic choices.

- NATO is mentioned as an important ‘strategic partnership’ for the EU, specifically with regard to crisis management and enhancing the EU’s military capabilities, but no indication is given as to how relations within NATO should evolve in view of the shifting role of the Alliance and its growing global involvement, the creation of the NATO Response Force and the affirmation of the EU’s own ambitions as an international actor. That ‘an effective and balanced partnership’ with the US is wanted might indicate that some sort of re-balancing is sought. Partnership with the US includes far more than NATO, as the Strategy says, but no details are given with regard to other policy fields.
- The OSCE is mentioned as a regional organization of ‘particular significance’ to the EU. EU-OSCE relations are certainly very close, but at the same time raise a number of significant questions. As a consequence of ever-growing EU activity, particularly with regard to its neighbourhood, the geographic as well as functional overlap between the two organizations is increasing. The naming of an EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus, which is now also mentioned in the Strategy, is a case in point. A clearer division of labour, with each organization focussing on the areas where it can offer the greatest added value, would enhance the efficiency and efficacy of both the EU and the OSCE.
- Implicitly, the Strategy opts for the use of force as a last resort only, and with a UN Security Council mandate. On this issue, if at all, a crystal-clear, unambiguous position is wanted however, in order to prevent a recurrence of the paralyzing divide over the invasion of Iraq. Of course every case is particular and has to be judged on its merits to some degree, but as the Strategy is now formulated, too much room for interpretation is left; consequently, future crises could again lead to serious divisions and the paralysis of EU external action when it is most needed. The exemplary function of the EU vis-à-vis other States and regions calls for an explicit choice as well – who will yet support the collective security system of the UN if not the EU?

In other cases, policy documents in fact already exist even though the Strategy itself is less explicit; here the matter is to link current dynamics and policies to the overall objectives in the Strategy:

- Although the Strategy names ‘building security in our neighbourhood’ as a strategic objective and defines the geographic scope of ‘neighbourhood’ very ambitiously, slight reference is made, beyond the general principle of promoting ‘good governance’ and providing economic support, as to how the effectiveness of existing instruments can be reinforced. The Wider Europe/Neighbourhood Policy initiative, which offers an opportunity to integrate existing policies towards the EU’s neighbouring States and, more importantly, to revitalize them at the same time, is not even mentioned at all, although on 13 October 2003 the Council already invited the Commission to submit detailed proposals for action plans by early 2004.
- Little guidance is offered with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa, although the Strategy’s general approach is evidently applicable to the African continent. A very ambitious comprehensive approach is in fact outlined in a Common Position on conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa adopted in January 2004, which

- replaces the earlier 2001 position.⁹⁷ A strong emphasis is put on empowering African States and regional organizations to deal themselves with crisis and conflict.
- No idea is provided of what strategic partnership with Japan, China, Canada and India might entail, particularly whether a reorientation or deepening of existing relations is being envisaged.

The EU is a prominent international actor that has indeed developed policies in a vast range of fields. A first step towards the effective implementation of the Strategy could therefore be to draw up an inventory of existing policies in all fields of external action. On the one hand this would allow for a process of reassessing policies in view of the objectives in the Strategy and of strengthening coordination between policies; on the other hand the aspects of the Strategy which yet require elaboration into more specific policies could be identified.

5.2 Institutionalizing Strategic Culture

Four areas for initial action have in fact already been defined by the December 2003 European Council in Brussels, at the same time as adopting the Strategy:

- ‘Effective multilateralism with the UN at its core’: this is at the heart of the comprehensive security approach. In this field a dynamic has certainly been created, which started with a new Commission communication on the subject⁹⁸ and the EU-UN Joint Declaration of 24 September 2003, to which the strong emphasis on the UN in the Strategy has given additional impetus. In this light, the EU should certainly give its full support to the work of the High-Level Panel. Perhaps in this context substance can be given to the notion of global governance that is inherent in ‘effective multilateralism’;
- ‘The fight against terrorism’: for the EU, the actual ‘fight’ is above all a matter of law enforcement agencies, in which field a lot has already been done to strengthen intra-European and transatlantic cooperation; intelligence sharing seems to be an area where there is a lot of room for improvement still. Apart from these specific measures, the EU believes in the general preventive scope of the global and neighbourhood policies rather than in the use of the military instrument; terrorism will certainly be an issue in political dialogues, partnerships and agreements between the EU and third States/organizations. So terrorism obviously remains high on the political agenda, *inter alia* because of its significance for the transatlantic partnership, but is unlikely to be the defining issue for EU external action;
- ‘A strategy towards the region of the Middle East’: the priority accorded to a settlement in the Middle East certainly represents a change of pace, for in recent years the EU has been rather inactive with regard to the conflict, especially when compared with the period 1996-1999. The EU has long adopted an unambiguous position on the resolution of the conflict though. Nevertheless, forcing a breakthrough will not be easy, in view of the parties’ intransigence. By all means a joint effort by the EU and the US is required, given the fact that each has leverage on one of the parties to the conflict; in other words, an effective role for the EU also depends on the US recognizing it as an equal partner;

⁹⁷ ‘Council Common Position 2004/85/CFSP of 26 January 2004 Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa and Repealing Common Position 2001/374/CFSP’. In: Official Journal, 2004, L021, pp.25-29.

⁹⁸ COM (2003) 526 final, ‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of multilateralism’. 10 September 2003.

- 'A comprehensive policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina': following the large-scale accession on 1 May 2004, integrating Bosnia-Herzegovina and then gradually the rest of the Balkans, continuing the stabilisation of the European continent through its force of attraction, seems to be the next challenge for the EU. Taking over SFOR from NATO fits in this broad approach towards the region.

The Brussels European Council also adopted the Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, crowning and completing EU policies on this issue, so this aspect of the Security Strategy has been elaborated upon already. The Irish Presidency, which assumed the leadership of the EU on 1 January 2004, has added an emphasis on conflict prevention, notably an increased focus on early warning leading to early preventive action and on longer term conflict prevention strategies.

Also ongoing is the process leading to the definition of a new 'Headline Goal 2010', which would serve to implement the military aspect of the Strategy's chapter on capabilities. The level of ambitions as defined in the Strategy should determine which types of capabilities, and in which quantity, the EU needs to develop. Capabilities must meet the desire to play the leading role in stabilizing the EU's neighbourhood, while also allowing for projection of forces further a field in support of the UN and 'effective multilateralism'; in all cases, operations both with and without the use of NATO assets must be envisaged, so as to provide for all possible scenario's. That use of force is considered rather an instrument of last resort is another factor to be taken into account when defining capability objectives. So the Strategy is the basis for the elaboration of scenarios; it is the overall political framework within which the EU Military Staff can assess which types of operations, at which scale and frequency, the EU can be confronted with, which can then be translated into capability needs. This would effectively amount to a 'strategic defence review' at the EU level.⁹⁹ Only such a top-down process can ensure that the combined capabilities generated by the Member States, either nationally or through multinational cooperation and pooling of means, e.g. in the framework of 'structured cooperation' as provided for in the Draft Constitution, constitute a complete, coherent and interoperable whole that meets the needs and requirements of the EU.

The crucial challenge now is to establish the Strategy as *the* reference framework for external action, effectively guiding *all* of the EU's external policies.

At the individual level, reference to the Strategy should come intuitively to all policy-makers involved in external action. A strategic culture should indeed be developed, not in the sense that policy-makers should look for politico-military or 'robust' answers to problems by default, as it is sometimes understood, but in the sense that policy-makers should at all times refer back to the choices contained in the Strategy and make their decisions accordingly. Greater consistency of EU policies will follow automatically. The same actually applies to the Member States, who should have the reflex to always act through the EU when dealing with issues covered by the Strategy, instead of acting under the national flag as often they still do, especially when specific actions are thought to have a big chance of success and would thus enhance national prestige. Recommendable though the objectives and results of national initiatives often may be, in the end they detract from the image of the EU as a coherent international actor and carry with them the risk of a lack of coordination and inconsistency.

⁹⁹ Gerrard Quille, 'Turning the Rhetoric of European Defence Cooperation into Reality'. In: New Defence Agenda (ed.), 'Fresh Perspectives on European Security'. Brussels, NDA, 2004, pp. 27-31.

At the institutional level, permanent mechanisms could be provided for continuously reviewing existing policies, elaborating the aspects of the Strategy that have not yet been translated into specific policies and ensuring coherence between policies. Institutionalizing these processes would not provide any guarantees as to the implementation of the Strategy; in the end, the political will of the Member States is the decisive factor. But without doubt it would diminish the chance, which is still present, of the Strategy being just a nicely-worded document conveniently smoothing over differences between the Member States and between both sides of the Atlantic, but without it really becoming the driver of external action.

A way of institutionalizing strategic culture would be to include a reference to the Strategy in the Constitution when the IGC is resumed. Analogous to the current Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union, Article III-193 of the Draft Constitution, in paragraphs 1 and 2 respectively, defines the principles and general objectives of the EU external action. The third and final paragraph of this Article could be amended so as to stipulate that the Security Strategy that is adopted by the European Council shall define how these objectives are to be pursued throughout the different dimensions of EU external action, thus formalizing the obligation to link all external action-related decisions to the Strategy. Currently, the Strategy basically is a political document, a European Council declaration; contrary to what its name might suggest, it does not have the legal status of a Common Strategy, the more specific and rather more binding CFSP-instrument that the European Council can adopt.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the Security Strategy and the Strategy on WMD formally have the same status, although the latter elaborates just one aspect of the former. Including a binding reference to the Security Strategy in the Constitution would thus significantly enhance its status and would provide a sense of direction for the decision-making process.

Furthermore, existing mechanisms like the annual report on the CFSP and the annual Council debate on the effectiveness of external action could be reoriented and focus on the implementation of the Strategy as the policy framework covering the whole of external action. A further possibility would be to also provide for a regular review of the Strategy, every five years e.g., but such a mechanism would probably be too rigid. It could perhaps best be left to the discretion of policy-makers to decide when changed circumstances require a review of the Strategy, in order to avoid formal exercises without much actual content just because the Constitution demands so.¹⁰¹

With regard to coherence, the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs and the unified External Action Service as proposed in the Draft Constitution offer the best prospect of effectively integrating all fields of external action. The Minister of Foreign Affairs could also serve as the focal point for rapid decision-making when events demand short-term preventive measures or crisis management. As Rynning puts it: ‘Coercive power demands executive authority to make decisions and command resources [...]’.¹⁰² The effective implementation of the Strategy is thus linked to the institutional reform of the EU that the Constitution should provide.

¹⁰⁰ Interestingly, the Council can act by qualified majority when taking decisions on the basis of a Common Strategy (TEU, Art. 23 §2).

¹⁰¹ This has often been the case in the US, where a regular review of the strategy is obligatory. Usually these reviews did not attract much attention; only the latest National Security Strategy, released in a period of increasing tension over Iraq and emphasising – pre-emptive – military action, gave rise to a major debate.

¹⁰² Sten Rynning, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture ?’. In: Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, 2003, No. 4, pp. 479-496.

6. CONCLUSION

The adoption of a European Security Strategy is a major achievement in itself. Until the Iraq crisis, defining a joint agenda for external action for all Member States was considered by many observers to be a necessary, but also a highly unlikely step, given the different views existing within the EU. By convincing the Member States of the necessity of defining a strategy, the Iraq crisis has at least achieved one positive result.

But the Strategy is much more than a formal reconciliation after the divides over Iraq. Building on existing partnerships and policies, the Strategy contains an ambitious agenda for an EU that assumes the responsibilities of a global actor. In order to implement this agenda, the Strategy outlines a distinctive European approach, based on the concept of comprehensive security. Aiming to integrate the full range of the EU's policies, instruments and capabilities under the overall objective of effective governance at both the global and the regional level, the Strategy renders explicit a comprehensive approach that was already apparent throughout actual EU policies and partnerships. Like all human achievements, the Strategy is not perfect; not on all issues is it sufficiently clear; not all the necessary choices have already been made. But as a tool for policy-makers, the Strategy has enormous potential. This potential cannot be wasted. A strategic culture must be developed; at all times policy-makers must decide and act with the objectives and the approach of the Strategy in mind. This will increase the coherence of EU external action, harmonizing the agendas of all policy fields; it will increase efficiency, putting the available means to better use; and ultimately it will increase efficacy, achieving the objectives that the EU has set.

It is crucial for the success of the Strategy to recognize that it does not just concern security policy in the narrow sense, i.e. the politico-military dimension, but that because of its distinctive and ambitious comprehensive approach it directly covers *all* dimensions of EU external action. In that sense, it is really more than a Security Strategy – it is a Comprehensive Strategy for External Action.