

## El futuro de las relaciones euro-españolas: escenario especial de España (5 enero 1975)

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THE FUTURE OF EURO-SPANISH RELATIONS:

REAL SPAIN SCENARIO

J.R. Lasuén, Marbella 5 January 1975.

## Introduction

Most of the previous speakers have elaborated their specialized themes under one common assumption. Namely, that neither Spain nor Europe will be substantially different whenever, in the future, they attempt to establish the closer relationship that present political factors inhibit.

Under that assumption, I would only have marginal comments to add to what has already been said. Therefore, in order to, at least aim to be relevant, I intend to analyse another scenario of future euro-spanish relations, likely enough to deserve some attention.

The question to which I want to address myself is the following: What can Europe expect to be Spain's reaction towards her in the future, in the case that, at the present regime's succession, real Spain's forces take power away from formal, ~~official~~ Spain.

It is not an idle question, as it would be in a more politically integrated country, where the formal political forces would replicate the real ones. Similar instances have already taken place in spanish history: In 1802 and, of late, in the 1930s; in general, whenever a regime's change takes place in times of economic and political disorder, the same scenario of forces may happen again.

To answer it, however briefly, I must first establish an ad-hoc analytical framework, describe Spain's alternative dynamics within it, evaluate the feasibility of the scenario before, and then predict its likely behaviour towards Europe.

## The Framework

To avoid unjustified generalizations and common place remarks, I shall try, within the time available to: 1) sketch in some detail the political forces in present Spain; 2) hint at their main driving objectives and impulses; 3) present their possible coalitions, and 4) evaluate their feasibility, in the face of the likely presence of the larger internal and external conditioning factors.

Under the assumption that a stable political force must have an economic and social doctrine, a social base, a historical sense and an organization, political forces shall be defined in reference to four main dialectical-hypotheses - technological, sociological, psychological and institutional.

Of the four hypotheses, the first two are universally used; the second two have been especially derived for Spain, by Spanish analysts: Larra and Ortega respectively.

With reference to the hypotheses before, and following their order, a Spanish political force can be classified according to the following eight polar categories: Modern or traditional, bourgeois or proletariat, progressive or conservative, real or ~~official~~ (formal).

The first two hypotheses and four categories above do not need any special comment save that: Since the traditional part of society is still large, the first hypothesis largely conditions the second, for only in modern Spain can one find conscious bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Concerning the other four categories: Backward-looking conservative Spain is made up of most its traditional society, part of modern bourgeoisie and a small part of modern proletariat. Forward-looking progressive forces are the complement. <sup>Formal</sup> ~~essential~~ Spain is constituted by those modern and traditional forces (bourgeois and proletariat, conservative and progressive), which are organized and active; Real Spain, the largest, being latent and shapeless.

In the Spanish spectrum, the first two hypotheses apply at all times and hence, however, weakly, are significant generally. The second two apply only at specific times, as shall be indicated in the analysis, but then with a critical force.

Due to this, to determine the existing political forces, their size and effectiveness, I shall first overlap the first pair of polar categories and then the other pair.


The first two classifications intersect originating four subsets: Modern and traditional bourgeoisie and modern and traditional proletariat, approximately of similar size each, around 25% of the country

Projecting now on them, the conservative-progressive mapping of forces , it can be found that: Today, progressive Spain is the addition of the whole of modern proletariat plus a small part of modern bourgeoisie, between 30 and 35% of the country; conservative Spain is the rest of the modern bourgeoisie, 15% to 20%. As it will be observed, traditional bourgeoisie (20 - 25%) - mostly integrist - and traditional proletariat - mostly anarchist (25 - 30%) - are not contained in the projection. This is because lacking any efficient economic viewpoint they place themselves out of the current order of political battle. They enter the political arena only in times of chaos.

The projection over the above mapping of the official-real classification reduces even further the effective day to day political forces. ~~Official~~ <sup>Formal</sup> Spain - hardly 30% of the country - is constituted today by approximately half of modern bourgeoisie, a small part of traditional bourgeoisie, and some modern proletariat, the communist party and most socialist leadership. Real Spain, around 70% of the country, is made up of integrists, petty bourgeois, anarchists and most socialists. It exists out of the political arena, enters it only in times of great crisis, and then it tends to do so in a disorganised manner.

The following is a summary graph of the text above.

- MB - Modern Bourgeoisie
- TB - Traditional "
- MP - Modern Proletariat
- TP - Traditional "
- C - Conservative
- Pr - Progressive
- O - Official
- R - Real



Official Spain Evolution

After these definitions, it should be obvious how difficult it is for Spain's political system to evolve within the bounds of <sup>formal</sup> official Spain.

The bourgeoisie cannot do it. Though the largest subset of <sup>formal</sup> official Spain, the modern conservative bourgeoisie cannot reach the required threshold for change, for it cannot integrate at the same time, the other two limping bourgeois subsets: the integrists and the liberals. Nor can it do it sequentially: choosing one ahead of the other antagonizes the other - as it has happened several times, ultimately in 1974. That is why the present regime cannot evolve from within itself, from within <sup>formal</sup> official Spain's Right. Nor is it easily feasible by <sup>formal</sup> official Spain's Left. In effect, the only driving force there, the communist party, while up to now has not been able to integrate all the progressive forces (liberals and socialists), much less the anarchists, it has not failed to unite against its attempts a large number of conservative and traditional bourgeois.

Therefore, it can be predicted that: 1) unless the conservative modern bourgeoisie can enlarge its present coalition (with the conservative traditional bourgeoisie) enclinging the progressive modern bourgeoisie, or 2) unless the modern institutionalized proletariat can enlobe the rest of modern progressive proletariat, the modern progressive bourgeoisie and/or the traditional proletariat, there's little hope that the country can evolve politically lead by official Spain. The first strategy being more likely in the present circumstances: the second, only feasible after Franco is gone, will still be very difficult to implement for the two sub-strategies to perform are contradictory.

In this latter respect, it should be borne in mind that, since the main social cleavage in Spain lays between modern and traditional forces, and since the prevalence of modern over traditional society depends on the stability of economic growth, the only two common sense strategies Right and Left official Spain should follow, for its dominance depends on continuous economic growth, should be: 1) On the Right, modern conservative bourgeoisie should search first for the integration of modern progressive rather than of traditional bourgeoisie. 2) On the Left, the institutionalized modern progressive proletariat should aim first to integrate all modern progressive forces before attempting to enlobe the traditional

proletariat; the first sub-strategy, in this case, being undoubtedly the union of all modern proletariat before attempting the integration of progressive modern bourgeoisie.

Neither the Right nor Left <sup>formal</sup>official Spains are following the best strategy. Nor are they likely to follow them in the future, for the rules of the game, inside <sup>formal</sup>official Spain are clearly sociological not technological. They are those of the Bourgeois-proletariat hypothesis. Thus instead of planning their courses on the basis of probable economic conditions, which are the first conditioning forces, both Right and Left have started to move on the basis of socio-political considerations: The Right has looked for numbers (outside official Spain), the Left for acceptance (within). The contrary should have been the choices!

### Real Spain Chances

Which are the chances for Real Spain? I think high. As I have maintained several times, Spanish growth is a multiplied reflection of European growth and it is likely to remain so. Not that it couldn't be otherwise. The best proof being that European growth is multiplied, a theme that I have also developed in depth. But, for reasons of its very essence, official Spain is very unlikely to change the country's economic course; on the contrary, it is likely to tie further its fortune to Europe's.

Now, you know as well as I do, Europe's dark short-term economic future. Even if a deep depression is avoided, high energy and (linked) high food prices will place Europe (and Japan) in a very weak competitive position among the industrial powers. Projecting against that background and its probable course, the regime's change probable timetable, we find that normally it will take place around its most difficult point in its economic course.

Within the scope of our assumptions, this means that the political change will not be controllable neither by Spain's <sup>formal</sup>official Right nor Left. The slow-down of economic growth will overpower real Spain's political inertia, and will force it to break through the roof of <sup>formal</sup>official Spain's political machinery.

Scenario of Forces in Future Real Spain.

Which is likely to be the resulting political structure in this case? In many ways we may be watching a repetition of the 30s set-up, but with significant changes.

To start with, on the Right, the bourgeoisie is much larger relatively to what it was. And it is not likely to stick together as much as it did. First, because its larger numbers are due to the increase of petty bourgeois (the small entrepreneurs brought about by the industrial, tourist and service booms) and bureaucrats (public and private), leaning against capitalism and towards social-democracy. Second, because the most critical institutions in that moment - the Church and the Army - will be radically different than in the 30's, due to the social changes registered in their internal structure. It is most likely that, unless the Left's behaviour is chaotic, the present bourgeois coalition will split up: the integrist and the hard-core conservatives would be left out by the modern conservative and progressive bourgeois, which would seek out a <sup>national</sup> ~~social~~ pact with the proletariat.

And on the left handside? The numbers will be, and more so probably than before, with the anarchists. The organization, supported with a larger following than ever (second only to the anarchists) with the communists. The socialists being the losers on both accounts.

Given the changes registered by the anarchists and the comunists, the outcome seems very favourable to the achievement of the <sup>national</sup> ~~social~~ pact. In effect, the anarchists, surer than ever of their ethic, are very conscious of their lack of economic strategy and of the inefficiency of their past political tactics. They are searching for an economic doctrine and walking up a pacifist path. The comunist, conscious of their inability to enlarge easily their base and of the antagonistic image they produce among the bourgeoisie, have diagnosed the situation very wisely and produced a respectable pluralistic strategy addressed to favour a proletariat-intellegentsia alliance of great potential, as can be deduced from the above.



Finally, the socialists' strategy, which up to now is split among two alternatives: northern european social-democracy and french socialism, are not likely to change the previous trend. If they follow the first, they would guarantee the <sup>national</sup> ~~social~~ pact directly; if they follow the second, indirectly, through the comunists. Their behaviour, however, may be critical in determining, first, where the Left's power will be based; second, depending on how intelligently they play, they may even be able to determine where the real base of the <sup>national</sup> ~~social~~ pact will lay. Most likely, if they choose the french alternative, the Left will be organized by the comunist party. If they choose the social-democrat way they will favour a formally easier social pact lead by the bourgeoisie. If they find new ways to link up with the anarchists, they may help to constitute the driving force both of the Left and of the <sup>national</sup> ~~social~~ pact.

#### External Conditions

Apart from the internal factors, all positive, the external factors seem also to be very much more favourable than in the 30s. Europe will not be desintegrating as it then was, and will not use up real Spain as a pre-testing ground, as it then did. Rather, on the contrary, new economic pressure on top of the permanent strategic pressure, is likely to result in a new wave of european integration, which will favour the solution of real Spain's access to power.

Once analysed the feasibility of the unknown scenario, it is high time to turn to the question: What can Europe then expect from Spain?

#### Real Spain and Future Europe

Let us see, very bluntly: First, Real Spain despises today's 'merchant Europe which official Spain likes. Second, nor does she like the European record towards real Spain since the 30s'.

In effect, Real Spain knows she did not fight a civil war but the first stage of the european war: for Europe's benefit but at her cost. She also knows that later on, Europe, with the compliance of official Spain, did not pay its debt. On the contrary, profiting from two opposing facts, the cold-war needs and official Spain's acceptance of Europe's legitimate reluctance to accept her

interests, which need to be compensated for.

Third, real Spain will not need as much political and economic support from Europe and the West in general, as official Spain. Besides, in case it needs it, she could obtain it by means of a neutralist or Third World oriented national policy.

Fourth, nor would she in general be willing to pay as high a political price for economic benefits as official Spain. As the data show, Spaniards are not as indolent a people as Montesquieu viewed them, nor as honest and proud as he sized them up. However national virtues and defects being sharper in real Spain, it may be precluded that economic benefits would be higher discounted before pride and ideals. So that, even if Europe was in the capacity to offer economic benefits in exchange for closer interaction, which is doubtful in view of its not too bright future, real Spain would not be easily induced to change her goals.

Summing up: Contrary to official Spain, real Spain is not attracted by Merchant Europe. It has deep grievances against her which have to be compensated. In case she took over power, it would not likely be as dependent of her economic and political support, for it would have other alternatives. Nor would she be willing to accept an economic price for its ideals, were Europe willing to offer it.

Hence, it is difficult to imagine how real Spain could interact more closely with Europe if the latter maintains its present shape.

On the other hand, real Spain has been too long oppressed. When and if she wakes and if she conquers power, she must realize herself rapidly to overcome her frustrations. Since she is more really european than either official Spain or Merchant Europe - both inwardly not outwardly european -, she would be longing to embark herself deeply in any new european venture compatible with her projective needs.

That means she would throw herself headway into any project to build a really free Europe. Free of strategic external conditions;

free of external ideological handovers; free of internal nationalistic, centralist and bureaucratic trappings, and free of internal materialistic -capitalistic and otherwise-limitations.

Real Spain, in resumé, would tend to join, or work for, a neutralized, socio-politically creative, decentralized and regionalized formal and real democratic Europe. A People's Europe, open to the Third World, not to reconquer it but to cooperate with; and to the world at large, with the aim, difused of all power politics, of using her traditional creativity in the endeavour of detouring the world away from its present crazy course. A peaceful, creative, free and solidarious Europe.