# Frédéric Allemand, Comparatifs des différentes versions de travail de l'accord international sur l'union économique renforcée

Légende: Dans cette étude, Frédéric Allemand, maître de conférences à Sciences Po et HEC, compare les différentes versions de travail de l'accord international sur l'union économique renforcée (Dernière mise à jour: 31 janvier 2012).

Source: Frédéric Allemand.

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## Comparatifs des différentes versions de travail de l'accord international sur l'union économique renforcée, Frédéric Allemand. Dernière mise à jour : 31 janvier 2012.

: élément ajouté par rapport à la version précédente

.....: élément supprimé dans la version suivante

European Union : formulation modifiée par rapport à la version précédente

Déclaration des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement, 9	Version du 16 décembre 2011	Version du 5 janvier 2012 – Présidence danoise	Version du 10 janvier 2012	Version du 19 janvier 2012	Version du 27 janvier 2012	Version finale	Dispositions communauta
décembre 2011							en discussio
	DRAFT	DRAFT		DRAFT	DRAFT		
	INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON A REINFORCED ECONOMIC UNION	INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON A REINFORCED ECONOMIC UNION		TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION	TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION	TREATY ON STABILITY, COORDINATION AND GOVERNANCE IN THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION	
	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	THE CONTRACTING PARTIES	
	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	CONSCIOUS of the obligation of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,	
	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	DESIRING to promote conditions for stronger economic growth in the European Union and, to that end, to develop ever-closer coordination of economic policies within the euro area,	
	BEARING IN MIND that the coordination of the economic policies of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment,	BEARING IN MIND that the coordination of the economic policies of the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment,	(supprimé)				
	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including the need to take necessary corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including the need to take necessary corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	BEARING IN MIND that the need for governments to maintain sound and sustainable public finances and to prevent a government deficit becoming excessive is of an essential importance to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, and accordingly requires the introduction of specific rules to address this need, including a balanced budget rule and an automatic mechanism to take corrective action,	
	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits remain below 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt is below, or sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits remain below 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt is below, or sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3 % of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60 % of their gross domestic product at market prices,	CONSCIOUS of the need to ensure that their deficits do not exceed 3% of their gross domestic product at market prices and that government debt does not exceed, or is sufficiently declining towards, 60% of their gross domestic product at market prices,	
	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notaby the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts,	RECALLING that the Contracting Parties, as Member States of the European Union, should refrain from adopting any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives in the framework of the economic union, notably the practice of accumulating debt outside the general government accounts, BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or	
	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	BEARING IN MIND that the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	Government of the euro area Member States agreed on 9 December 2011 on a reinforced architecture for Economic and Monetary Union, building upon the European Union Treaties and facilitating the implementation of measures taken on the basis of Articles 121, 126 and 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	
	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union remains to incorporate the provisions of this Agreement as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union remains to incorporate the provisions of this Agreement as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Agreement as soon as possible into the Treates on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treaties on which the European Union is founded,	BEARING IN MIND that the objective of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union is to incorporate the provisions of this Treaty as soon as possible into the Treates on which the European Union is founded,	
	TAKING NOTE, in this context, of the intention of the European Commission to present further legislative proposals within the framework of the Union Treaties regarding a mechanism of ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, a procedure of economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as a new coordination procedure at the level of the euro area for major economic policy reform plans,	TAKING NOTE, in this context, of the intention of the European Commission to present further legislative proposals within the framework of the Union Treaties regarding a mechanism of ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, a procedure of economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as a new coordination procedure at the level of the euro area for major economic policy reform plans,	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission within the framework of the European Union Treathies on 23 November 2011 and TAKING NOTE of its intention to present further legislative proposals regarding a mechanism of ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, a procedure of economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as a new coordination procedure at the level of the euro area for major economic policy reform plans,	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011 and TAKING NOTE of its intention to present further legislative proposals <u>concerning</u> , <u>in padicular</u> , ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, economic pathership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member States in excessive deficit procedure as well as coordination of major economic policy reform plans for euro area Member States.	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission for the euro area within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011, <b>on the</b> <b>strengthening of economic and budgetary</b> <b>surveillance of Member States experiencing of</b> threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, and on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States, and TAKING NOTE of the Commission's intention to present further legislative proposals concerning, in particular, ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans of the Member States of the European Union, economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for euro area Member	WELCOMING the legislative proposals made by the European Commission for the euro area within the framework of the European Union Treaties on 23 November 2011, on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, and on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States, and TAKING NOTE of the Commission's interion to present further legislative proposals for the euro area concerning, in particular, ex ante reporting of debt issuance plans, economic partnership programmes detailing structural reforms for imots supprimes) Member States in excessive deficit	

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utaire en vigueur ou sion	
	<b>Commentaire [f2]:</b> Reprise de la formule exacte du 1 <sup>er</sup> considérant du protocole sur l'Eurogroupe.
	protocole sur l'Eurogroupe.

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					States in excessive deficit procedure as well as coordination of major economic policy reform plans for euro area Member States,	procedure as well as coordination of major economic policy reform plans of Member States,
				EXPRESSING their readiness to support proposals which the Commission might present to further strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by introducing, for Member States whose currency is the euro, a new range for medium term objectives in line with the limits established in this Treaty.	EXPRESSING their readiness to support proposals which the Commission might present to further strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by introducing, for Member States whose currency is the euro, a new range for medium term objectives in line with the limits established in this Treaty,	EXPRESSING their readiness to support proposals which the Commission might present to further strengthen the Stability and Growth Pact by introducing, for Member States whose currency is the euro, a new range for medium term objectives in line with the limits established in this Treaty,
n ti a P E	TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Agreement, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,	TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Agreement, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,	TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,	TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,	TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,	TAKING NOTE that, when reviewing and monitoring the budgetary commitments under this Treaty, the European Commission will act within the framework of its powers as provided by the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, in particular Articles 121, 126 and 136 thereof,
tt b s c	NOTING in particular that, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Agreement, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific reference values and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,	NOTING in particular that, for the application of the budgetary 'Balanced Budget Rule' described in Article 3 of this Agreement, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific reference values and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,	NOTING in particular that, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Agreement, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party. Temporary deviation from the medium-term objective will only be allowed in cases of unusual event outside the control of the contracting party with a major impact on the financial position of the general government or in periods of severe economic downtum for the euro area, the EU or the concerned Contracting party as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	NOTING in particular that, for the application of he budgetary 'Balanced Budget Rule' described in Article 3 of this Treaty, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party. [Phrase suivante supprimée]	NOTING in particular that, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Treaty, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,	NOTING in particular that, for the application of the budgetary "Balanced Budget Rule" described in Article 3 of this Treaty, this monitoring will be made through the setting up of country specific medium term objectives and of calendars of convergence, as appropriate, for each Contracting Party,
			NOTING that the medium term objectives should be updated regularly on the basis of a commonly agreed method, the main parameters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact,	NOTING that the medium term objectives should be updated regularly on the basis of a commonly agreed method, the main parameters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact,	NOTING that the medium term objectives should be updated regularly on the basis of a commonly agreed method, the main parameters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact,	NOTING that the medium term objectives should be updated regularly on the basis of a commonly agreed method, the main parameters of which are also to be reviewed regularly, reflecting appropriately the risks of explicit and implicit liabilities for public finance, as embodied in the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact,
			NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under the law of the Union, in particular Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97, as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1175/2011.	NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under European Union law, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies, as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 (hereinafter "the revised Stability and Growth Pact").	NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under European Union law, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/87 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies, as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 (hereinafter "the revised Stability and Growth Pact"),	NOTING that sufficient progress towards the medium term objectives should be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions specified under European Union law, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of budgetary policies, as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 (hereinafter "the revised Stability and Growth Pact"),
					NOTING that the correction mechanism to be introduced by the Contracting Parties should aim at correcting deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path including their cumulated impact on government debt dynamics.	NOTING that the correction mechanism to be introduced by the Contracting Parties should aim at correcting deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path including their cumulated impact on government debt dynamics,
tr n e ji E	NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems at constitutional or equivalent level should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal <b>systems through binding and</b> permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,	NOTING that compliance with the obligation to transpose the "Balanced Budget Rule" into national legal systems through binding and permanent provisions, preferably constitutional, should be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in accordance with Article 273 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
				RECALLING that Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union empowers the Court of Justice of the European Union to impose the payment of a lump sum or penalty on a Member State of the European Union having failed to comply with one of its judgments,	RECALLING that Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union empowers the Court of Justice of the European Union to impose the payment of a lump sum or penalty on a Member State of the European Union having failed to comply with one of its judgments and that the European Commission has established criteria for the determination of the lump sum or penalty to be paid in the framework of that Article	RECALLING that Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union empowers the Court of Justice of the European Union to impose the payment of a lump sum or penalty on a Member State of the European Union having failed to comply with one of its judgments and that the European Commission has established criteria for the determination of the lump sum or penalty to be paid in the framework of that Article,
n P d w p	RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, complet the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,	RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,	RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,	RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,	RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,	RECALLING the need to facilitate the adoption of measures under the excessive deficit procedure of the European Union for euro area Contracting Parties whose planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds 3%, whilst strongly reinforcing the objective of that procedure, namely to encourage and, if necessary, compel the Member State concerned to reduce a deficit which might be identified,
P %	RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,	RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,	RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,	RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,	RECALLING the need for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,	RECALLING the obligation for those Contracting Parties whose government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark,





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		BEARING IN MIND the need to respect the role of social partners, as it is foreseen in the law of each of the Contracting Parties, in the implementation of this Treaty.	BEARING IN MIND the need to respect, in the implementation of this Treaty, the specific role of the social partners, as it is recognized in the laws or national systems of each of the Contracting Parties,	BEARING IN MIND the need to respect, in the implementation of this Treaty, the specific role of the social partners, as it is recognized in the laws or national systems of each of the Contracting Parties,	BEARING IN MIND the need to respect, in the implementation of this Treaty, the specific role of the social partners, as it is recognized in the laws or national systems of each of the Contracting Parties,
		STRESSING that none of the provisions of this Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	STRESSING that none of the provisions of this Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	STRESSING that none of the provisions of this Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,	STRESSING that none of the provisions of this Treaty is to be interpreted as altering in any way the economic policy conditions under which financial assistance has been granted to a Contracting Party in a stabilisation programme involving the European Union, its Member States and the International Monetary Fund,
			NOTING that the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union makes it necessary that the Contracting Parties work jointly towards an economic policy where, whilst building upon the mechanisms of economic policy coordination as defined in the European Union Treates, they take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area.	NOTING that the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union makes it necessary that the Contracting Parties work jointly towards an economic policy where, whilst building upon the mechanisms of economic policy coordination as defined in the European Union Treates, they take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area,	NOTING that the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union makes it necessary that the Contracting Parties work jointly towards an economic policy where, whilst building upon the mechanisms of economic policy coordination as defined in the European Union Treaties, they take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area,
			NOTING, in particular, the wish of the Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to benchmarking best practices.	NOTING, in particular, the wish of the Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to benchmarking best practices,	NOTING, in particular, the wish of the Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro pursuant to Article 138 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to benchmarking best practices,
RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement of the Euro Plus Pact by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011, STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union,	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement of the Euro Plus Pact by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011,	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement of the Euro Plus Pact by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011,	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011 of the Euro Plus Pact Which Identifies the issues that are easential to fostering competitiveness in the euro area.	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings per year, as well as the endorsement by the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States and of other Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011 of the Euro Plus Pact which identifies the issues that are essential to fostering competitiveness in the euro area,	RECALLING the agreement of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area Member States on 26 October 2011 to improve the governance of the euro area, including the holding of at least two Euro Summit meetings pe year to be convened, unless justified by exceptional circumstances, immediately after meetings of the European Council or meetings with the participation of all Contracting Parties having ratified this Treaty. RECALLING also the endorsement by the Headd of State or Government of the euro area Membe States and of other Member States of the European Union on 25 March 2011 of the Euro Plus Pact which identifies the issues that are essential to fostering competitiveness in the euro area,
	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union.]	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union <b>and</b> POINTING OUT that compliance with Article 3(2) shall be considered as a condition for the granting of assistance under the European Stability Mechanism as soon as the transposition period mentioned in Article 3(2) has expired.	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and POINTING OUT that the granting of assistance in the framework of new programmes under the European Stability Mechanism will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of this Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period mentioned in Article 3(2) has expired, on compliance with the requirements of this Article.	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and POINTING OUT that the granting of assistance in the framework of new programmes under the European Stability Mechanism will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of this Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period mentioned in Article 3(2) has expired, on compliance with the requirements of this Article,	STRESSING the importance of the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism as an element of a global strategy to strengthen the Economic and Monetary Union and POINTING OUT that the granting of assistance in the framework of new programmes under the European Stability Mechanism will be conditional as of 1 March 2013, on the ratification of this Treaty by the Contracting Party concerned and, as soon as the transposition period mentioned in Article 3(2) has expired, on compliance with the requirements of this Article,
			NOTING that are Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and that, as such, they will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty from the first day of the month following the depositor their instrument of ratification if the Treaty is in force at that date; NOTING ALSO that all other Contracting Parties are, at the date of signature of this Treaty. Member States of the European Union with a derogation or an exemption from participation in the single currency and may be bound, as long as this derogation or exemption is not abrogated, only by those provisions of Titles III and IV by which they declare, on depositing their instrument of ratification or at a later date, that they intend to be bound,	NOTING that are Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and that, as such, they will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty from the first day of the month following the deposit of their instrument of ratification if the Treaty is in force at that date; NOTING ALSO that are <u>Contracting Parties which</u> , as Member States of the <u>European Union</u> , have, at the date of <u>signature of this Treaty</u> , a derogation or an <u>exemption from participation in the single</u> <u>currency and</u> may be bound, as long as this derogation or exemption is not abrogated, only by those provisions of Titles III and IV by which they declare, on depositing their instrument of ratification or at a later date, that they intend to be bound,	NOTING that are Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and that, as such, they will be bound by the provisions of this Treaty from the first day of the month following the deposit of their instrument of ratification if the Treaty is in force at that date; NOTING ALSO that are Contracting Parties which, as Member States of the European Union, have, at the date of signature of this Treaty, a derogation or an exemption from participation in the single currency and may be bound, as long as this derogation or exemption is not abrogated, only by those provisions of Titles III and IV by which they declare, on depositing their instrument of ratification or at a later date, that they intend to be bound,
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions,	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, TITLE I	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions: TITLE I	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions:	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions: TITLE I	HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions:
TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	PURPOSE AND SCOPE	PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE	PURPOSE AND SCOPE	TITLE I PURPOSE AND SCOPE
Article 1 1. By this Agreement, the Contracting Parties,	Article 1 1. By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties, as	Article 1 1. By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree,	Article 1 1. By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree,	Article 1 1. By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree,	Article 1 1. By this Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree,
which are Member States of the European Union, agree to strengthen their budgetary discipline	Member States of the European Union, agree on a "fiscal compact" and on a stronger coordination	as Member States of the European Union, to strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	as Member States of the European Union, to strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	as Member States of the European Union, to strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic	as Member States of the European Union, to strengthen the economic pillar of the Economic





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	and to reinforce their economic policy coordination and governance.	of economic policies, involving an enhanced governance to foster fiscal discipline and deeper integration in the internal market as well as stronger growth, enhanced competitiveness and social cohesion.	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth and employment.	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.	and Monetary Union by adopting a set of rules intended to foster budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area, thereby supporting the achievement of the European Union's objectives for sustainable growth, employment, competitiveness and social cohesion.	
	2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They may also apply to the other Contracting Parties, under the conditions set out in Article 14.	2. The provisions of this <u>Treaty</u> shall apply to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They may also apply to the other Contracting Parties, under the conditions set out in Article 14.	<ol> <li>The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent conditions set out in Article 14.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The provisions of this Treaty shall apply in full to the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro. They shall also apply to the other Contracting Parties to the extent and under the conditions set out in Article 14.</li> </ol>	
	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	TITLE II CONSISTENCY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LAW OF THE UNION	
	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	Article 2	
It will rest on anenhanced governance to foster fiscal discipline and deeper integration in the internal market as well as stronger growth, enhanced competitiveness and social cohesion.	This Agreement shall be applied by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union Iaw.	<ol> <li>This <u>Treaty</u> shall be applied by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be applied by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be applied and interpreted by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law, including procedural law whenever the adoption of secondary legislation is required.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be applied and interpreted by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union law, including procedural law whenever the adoption of secondary legislation is required.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be applied and interpreted by the Contracting Parties in conformity with the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, in particular Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, and with European Union Iaw, including procedural Iaw whenever the adoption of secondary legislation is required.</li> </ol>	
	2. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union. In accordance with the case law of the Count of Justice of the European Union, European Union law has precedence over the provisions of this Agreement.	2. The provisions of this <u>Treaty</u> shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union. In accordance with the case law of the Count of Justice of the European Union, European Union Iaw has precedence over the provisions of this Treaty.	2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union. [Phrase supprime]	2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.	2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.	2. The provisions of this Treaty shall apply insofar as they are compatible with the Treaties on which the Union is founded and with European Union law. They shall not encroach upon the competences of the Union to act in the area of the economic union.	
	TITLE III BUDGETARY DISCIPLINE	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	TITLE III FISCAL COMPACT	
	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	Article 3	
	<ol> <li>The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition to and without prejudice to the obligations derived from Union Law:</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition to and without prejudice to the obligations derived from Union Law:</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition to and without prejudice to the obligations derived from Union law:</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition and without prejudice to the obligations derived from European Union law:</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition and without prejudice to the obligations derived from European Union law:</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Contracting Parties shall apply the following rules, in addition and without prejudice to the obligations derived from European Union law:</li> </ol>	
General government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus []	a) Revenues and expenditures of the general government budgets shall be balanced or in surplus. The Contracting Parties may temporarily incur deficits only to take into account the budgetary impact of the economic cycle and, beyond such impact, in case of exceptional economic circumstances, or in periods of a severe economic downturn, provided that this does not endanger budgetary sustainability in medium term.	a) <u>The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus</u> . The Contracting Parties may temporarily incur deficits only to take into account the budgetary impact of the economic cycle and, beyond such impact, in case of exceptional economic circumstances, or in periods of a severe economic downtum, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in medium term [FA].	<ul> <li>a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus. [Phrase supprimée]</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.</li> </ul>	The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.	<ul> <li>a) The budgetary position of the general government shall be balanced or in surplus.</li> </ul>	
[] this principle shall be deemed respected if, as a rule, the annual structural deficit does not exceed 0.5% of nominal GDP. Member States shall converge towards their specific reference level, according to a calendar proposed by the Commission	b) The rule under point a) above shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural deficit of the general government does not exceed a countryspecific reference value, which ensures an adequate safety margin with respect to the 3 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU (hereinafter 'Protocol No 12) as well as rapid progress towards sustainability, also taking into account the budgetary impact of ageing. The Contracting Parties shall ensure convergence towards their respective country-specific reference value. As a rule, the country specific reference value shall not exceed 0.5 % of nominal GDP.	b) The rule under point a) above shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural deficit of the general government does not exceed a country-specific reference value, that is in line with the country-specific medium-term objective referred to in Article 2(a) of Reculation (EC) No. <u>1466/97</u> , as amended by Regulation (EC) No. <u>1456/91</u> , and which ensures an adequate safety margin with respect to the 3 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of the Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the TFEU (hereinafter 'Protocol No 12') as well as rapid progress towards fiscal sustainability, also taking into account the budgetary impact of ageing. The Contracting Parties shall ensure convergence towards their respective country- specific reference value. [Mots supprimes] The country specific reference value shall not exceed 0.5 % of nominal GDP.	b) The rule under point a) above shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is <u>at its</u> country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact (Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011) with a deficit not exceeding 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contraction Parties shall ensure convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. Convergence shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference. including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures. In line with the grovisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	b) The rule under point a) [mot supprime] shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact [mot supprime] with the annual structural deficit not exceeding 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure fapile convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking indo consideration country-specific subalitability neks. Progress lowards and respect of the medium-term objective. The sist of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	The rule under point a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact with a <u>lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 %</u> of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. Progress towards and respect of the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	b) The rule under point a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance of the general government is at its country-specific mediumitem objective as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact with a lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medium-term objective. The time frame for such convergence will be proposed by the Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability risks. Progress towards and respect of the medium-term objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revoure measures, in line with the provisions of the revised Stability and Growth Pact.	
			c) The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective in case of an unusual event [FA] outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the government or in periods of a severe economic downturn as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term [FA]	c) The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective <b>pr the</b> <b>adjustment path towards</b> i <u>only</u> in exceptional <u>circumstances as defined in paragraph 3</u> .	The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in paragraph 3.	c) The Contracting Parties may temporarily deviate from their medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it only in exceptional circumstances as defined in paragraph 3.	
	c) Where the debt level is significantly below the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the country-specific reference value for the annual structural net deficit may take a higher value than specified under point b).	c) Where the debt level is significantly below the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the country-specific reference value for the annual structural net deficit may take a higher value than specified under point b).	d) Where the <u>ratio of government debt to gross</u> <u>domestic product at market prices</u> is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term <u>sustainability of public finances are low [FA]</u> the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified	d) Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified	Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified	d) Where the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices is significantly below 60 % and where risks in terms of long-term sustainability of public finances are low, the lower limit of the medium-term objective specified	
		but in any case no more than 1.0% of nominal GDP.	under point b) can reach a deficit of maximum 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at market	under point b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at	under point b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at	under point b) can reach a structural deficit of at most 1.0 % of the gross domestic product at	





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			Constant of the Association	and the Area	
		prices.	market prices.	market prices.	market prices.
			e) In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.	In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.	e) In the event of significant observed deviations from the medium-term objective or the adjustment path towards it, a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically. The mechanism shall include the obligation of the Contracting Party concerned to implement measures to correct the deviations over a defined period of time.
2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall be introduced in national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature. The Contracting Parties shall in particular put in place a correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations from the reference value or the adjustment path towards it. This mechanism shall be defined at national level, on the basis of commonly agreed principles. It shall include the obligation of the Contracting Parties to present a programme to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. It shall fully respect responsibilities of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall be introduced in national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature. The Contracting Parties shall in particular put in place at national level and on the basis of commonly agreed principles, a correction mechanism to be triggered automatically in the event of significant deviations from the reference value or the adjustment path towards it, as specified under the law of the Union. It shall include the obligation of the Contracting Parties to <u>implement</u> a programme to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. It shall fully respect responsibilities of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties within one year of the entry into force of the stry into the presence of the under the strength of the strength strength of the strength of the strength of the strength strength strength strength strength of the strength	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be respected throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism mentioned level the correction mechanism functions to be proposed by the European Commission, boncerning in particular the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken and the role and independence of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring the observance of the rules. This mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be hully respected grind admerging to throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism mentioned in paragraph 1.e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, concerning in particular the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken, <b>Biso in the coard of the and common content statutions</b> responsible at national level for monitoring the observance of the nules. This mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments.	2. The rules mentioned under paragraph 1 shall take effect in the national law of the Contracting Parties at the latest one year after the entry into force of this Treaty through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes. The Contracting Parties shall put in place at national level the correction mechanism mentioned in paragraph 1.e) on the basis of common principles to be proposed by the European Commission, concerning in particular the nature, the size and the time-frame of the corrective action to be undertaken, also in the case of exceptional circumstances, and the role and independence of the institutions responsible at national level for monitoring the observance of the rules. This mechanism shall fully respect the prerogatives of national Parliaments.
3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol No 12 shall apply. In addition, the following definitions shall apply: "annual structural deficit of the general government" means the annual cyclically- adjusted deficit net of one-off and temporary measures; "exceptional economic circumstances" means an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned, which has a major impact on the financial position of the government.	<ol> <li>For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol No 12 shall apply. In addition, "annual structural deficit of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically- adjusted deficit net of one-off and temporary measures.</li> <li>[supprime]</li> </ol>	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) <u>on the</u> <u>excessive deficit procedure annexed to the</u> <u>European Union Treaties</u> shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically- adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures.	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically- adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. "Exceptional circumstances" refer to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic downtum as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided <b>that the</b> temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically- adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. "Exceptional circumstances" refer to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic downtum as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.	3. For the purposes of this Article, definitions set out in Article 2 of Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the European Union Treaties shall apply. In addition, "annual structural balance of the general government" refers to the annual cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures. "Exceptional circumstances" refer to the case of an unusual event outside the control of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the financial position of the general government or to periods of severe economic downtum as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, provided that the temporary deviation of the Contracting Party concerned does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.
Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4	Article 4
When the ratio of their government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the Contracting Parties undertake to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the Contracting Parties shallreduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, <b>hs provided for in</b> <b>Article 2</b> (fa) of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1177/2011	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article1 of Protocol (No 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/87 of 7 July 1997 <b>Inspecting pheeting the</b> <b>implementation of the excessive deficit</b> <b>procedure</b> , as a smended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 <b>of 8 November 2011</b> .	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/87 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011.	When the ratio of their general government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 % reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol (No 12), the Contracting Parties shall reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/87 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011. The brasch of the debt criterion will be decided according to the debt criterion will be decided according to the functioning of the European Union.
Article 5 The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme with binding value including a detailed description of the structural reforms necessary to ensure an effectively durable correction of their excessive deficits. Such programmes shall be submitted to the European Commission and the Council.	The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms necessary to ensure an effectively durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in the law of the Union. They shall be submitted to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement. The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the	Article 5 1. The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in the law of the Union. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	Article 5 1. The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in <u>European Union Iaw</u> . Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	Article 5 The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in European Union law. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact.	Article 5 1. The Contracting Parties that are subject to an excessive deficit procedure under the European Union Treaties shall put in place a budgetary and economic partnership programme including a detailed description of the structural reforms which must be put in place and implemented to ensure an effective and durable correction of their excessive deficits. The content and format of these programmes shall be defined in European Union law. Their submission to the European Commission and the Council for endorsement and their monitoring will take place within the context of the existing surveillance procedures of the Stability and
	Council	<ol> <li>The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the</li> </ol>	The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the	Growth Pact. 2. The implementation of the programme, and the yearly budgetary plans consistent with it, will be monitored by the Commission and by the Council
		Council.	Council.	Council.	Council.
Article 6	Article 6		Council. Article 6	Council. Article 6	Article 6
becccalafrotarpCootina 3.000° Ar Wodva12tabe Ar Tretrovatede	e introduced in national binding provisions of a oristitutional or equivalent nature. The correction mechanism to be triggered utomatically in the event of significant deviations on the reference value or the adjustment path wards it. This mechanisms to be triggered utomatically in the event of significant deviations on the reference value or the adjustment path wards it. This mechanisms to be triggered or the adjustment path original level, on the basis of commonly agreed inciples. It shall include the obligation of the fortracting Parties to present a programme to orrect the deviations over a defined period of me. It shall fully respect responsibilities of ational Parliaments.	e introduced in national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature. The basis of commonly agreed principles, a correction mechanism to be tinggreed automatically in the event of significant deviations on the reference value or the adjustment path inversite, as specified under the basis of commonly agreed principles, a correction mechanism to be to infracting Parties to present a programme to obligation of the Contracting Parties to present a programme to obligation of the Contracting Parties to present and programme to correct the deviations over a defined period of the. It shall include the obligation of the Contracting Parties to present appropriate the top of the Contracting Parties that are subject to an average rate of one twentieth per year as a enchmark.         . For the purposes of this Article, definitions set ut in Article 2 of Protocol No 12 shall apply. In addition, the following definitions shall apply agree and the deviation of the contracting Parties and a level and on the singulate of the financial position of the contracting Parties undertake to reduce it an average rate of one twentieth per year as a enchmark.         rticle 4       When the ratio of their general government debt to gross of messing produced from the structural refers to the average rate of one twentieth per year as a enchmark, as provided form the reference value mentioned under Article 1 of Protocol No 12, the Contracting Parties that are subject to an average rate of one twentieth per year as a enchmark, as provided form the reference value mentioned to the structural reforms foreconstrut the deviation of the constracting	e included in national binding provisions of a mostitudinal or equivalent nature. The correction mechanism to be infigured unbanctably in the event of significant deviational methods in the basis of commonly at national in equivalent nature. The infigured automaticably in the event of significant deviational methods from the reference value or the adjustment has the deviations or exist defined period of an informaticably in the event of significant deviations or methods in this methods in the basis of commonly unbanctably in the event of significant deviations or methods in the present appropriate from the reference value or the adjustment by the present appropriate from the reference value or the basis of principles, a correct on mechanism to a corparime to correct the deviations over a defined period of ational Parliaments.           For the purposes of this Article definitions est of in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly expected to an interference value or the adjustment period boxed in a figure port of the deviations over a defined period of ation. The following definition statis of in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly expected to an interference value or the adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures.           . For the purposes of this Article definitions est out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protoco No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis out in Article 2 of Protococ No 12 shall apply, in difficitly definition statis	In the destination of the strate of the s	The data methods for specific bit specif





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	Article 7	Article 7	Article 7	Article 7	Article 7	Article 7	т
As soon as a Member State is recognised to be in breach of the 3% ceiling by the Commission, there will be automatic consequences unless a qualified majority of euro area Member States is opposed. Steps and sanctions proposed or recommended by the Commission will be adopted unless a qualified majority of the euro area Member States is opposed.	Article 7 While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro undertake to support proposals or recommendations put forward by the European Commission where a Member State whose currency is the euro is recognised by the European Commission to be in breach of the 3 % ceiling in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure, unless a qualified majority shall be defined by analogy with Article 238(3)(a) TFEU and with Article 3 of Protocol N° 36 to the EU Treaties on transitional provisions and without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned.	Article 7 While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro undertake to support the proposals or recommendations put forward by the European Commission where a Member State whose currency is the euro is recognised by the European Commission to be in breach of the deficit or deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure, unless a qualified majority of them is of another view. A qualified majority shall be defined by analogy with Article 238(3)(a) TFEU and with Article 3 of Protocol N° 36 to the EU Treaties on transitional provisions and without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned.	Article 7 While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations <u>submitted</u> by the European Commission where a Member State whose currency is the euro is considered by the European Commission to be in breach of the deficit [mois supprime] criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. <u>This oblication</u> shall not apoly where it is apoarent amount the <u>Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro</u> [FA] that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is of another view.	Article 7 While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the Europ in Union whose currency is whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is <b>Spopsed</b> to the decision proposed or recommended.	Article 7 While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting Pariles whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended.	Article 7 While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro commit to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the European Commission where it considers that a Member State of the European Union whose currency is the euro is in breach of the deficit criterion in the framework of an excessive deficit procedure. This obligation shall not apply where it is established among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro that a qualified majority of them, calculated by analogy with the relevant provisions of the European Union Treaties without taking into account the position of the Contracting Party concerned, is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended.	
	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	Article 8	
We recognise the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to verify the transposition of this rule [Introduction of an automatic correction mechanism] at national level.	Any Contracting Party which considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2) may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by said Court. The implementation of the rules put in place by the Contracting Parties to comply with Article 3(2) will be subject to the review of the national Courts of the Contracting Parties.	Any Contracting Party which considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Title III may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The European Commission may on behalf of Contracting Parties, bring an action for an alleged infingement of Title III before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by said Court. The implementation of the rules put in place by the Contracting Parties to comply with Article 3(2) will be subject to the review of the national Courts of the Contracting Parties.	Any Contracting Party which considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with <u>Article</u> 3(2) may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union or Invite the European Commission to issue a report on the matter. In the latter case, if the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, confirms non compliance in its report, the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice by the Contracting Parties [FA]. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by said Court. [Demière phrase supprimée]	1. The European Commission is invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that a Contracting Party and Party has a contracting Party and Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2). If the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Party as a failed to comply with Article 3(2). The matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Party considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3 (2). It may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice all be brinding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with Parties in the procedure.	<ol> <li>The European Commission is invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that a Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Partyes, imof supprime) Where a Contracting Party considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3 (2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice. Shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court.</li> </ol>	1. The European Commission is invited to present in due time to the Contracting Parties a report on the provisions adopted by each of them in compliance with Article 3(2). If the European Commission, after having given the Contracting Party concerned the opportunity to submit its observations, concludes in its report that a Contracting Parth has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the matter will be brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union by one or more of the Contracting Parties. Where a Contracting Party considers, independently of the Commission's report, that another Contracting Party has failed to comply with Article 3 (2), it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In both cases, the judgment of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the parties in the procedure, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court.	-
				2. If, on the basis of its own assessment or of an assessment by the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice. If the Court of Justice contracting Party concerned has not compiled with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0,1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism [FA]	2. If, on the basis of its own assessment or of an assessment by the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice <b>and</b> request the imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the Commission in the framework of Article 280 of the Treaty on the Hunching of the European Union. If the Court finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0, 1% of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed <b>in a Contracting Party</b> whose currency is the european Stability Mechanism. If other Cases, payments shall be made to the general budget of the European Union. 3. This Article constitutes a special agreement between the Contracting Party on the	2. If, on the basis of its own assessment or of an assessment by the European Commission, a Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice and the indexent of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and the indexent of the Court finds that the Contracting Party consider the Court finds that the Contracting Party considered by the Commission in the framework of Article 280 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. If the Court finds that the Contracting Party concerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0.1 % of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism. In other cases, payments shall be made to the general budget of the European Union.	
	TITLE IV ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE	TITLE IV ECONOMIC <u>COORDINATION</u>	TITLE IV ECONOMIC <u>POLICY</u> COORDINATION <u>AND</u> CONVERGENCE	Functioning of the European Union (FA) TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	Functioning of the European Union TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	Functioning of the European Union TITLE IV ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION AND CONVERGENCE	
	Article 9	Article 9	Article 9	Article 9	Article 9	Article 9	
	Without prejudice to the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness and improving the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union. To this aim, they will take all necessary actions, including through the Euro Plus Pact.	Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Eurotioning of the European Union, the Contracting Partles undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. In this context, particular attention shall be paid to all developments which, if allowed to persist, might threaten stability, competitiveness and future growth and job greation, To this aim, they will take all necessary actions, including through the Euro Plus Pact.	Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards a <u>Common</u> economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. [Phrase supprimée] To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area, as mentioned in the Euro Plus Pact.	Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability [FA]	Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability.	Building upon the economic policy coordination as defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Contracting Parties undertake to work jointly towards an economic policy fostering the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union and economic growth through enhanced convergence and competitiveness. To that end, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary actions and measures in all the domains which are essential to the good functioning of the euro area in pursuit of the objectives of fostering competitiveness, promoting employment, contributing further to the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability.	
	Article 10	Article 10	Article 10	Article 10	Article 10	Article 10	
We agree to make more active use of enhanced cooperation on matters which are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	While fully respecting the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to the enhanced cooperation on matters that are	In accordance with the procedural requirements of the Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in article 136 TFEU and to	In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty	In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties undertake to make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty	In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties will make recourse, whenever appropriate and necessary, to measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty on the	In accordance with the requirements of the European Union Treaties, the Contracting Parties stand ready to make active use, whenever appropriate and necessary, of measures specific to those Member States whose currency is the euro as provided for in Article 136 of the Treaty	



**Commentaire [f10]:** Formulation ambigue car rien n'indique qu'il faille procéder à un vote pour constater l'opposition de la majorité qualifiée. Cela semble relever de l'appréciation souveraine du présidence de séance.

Commentaire [f18]: La formule demeure floue, puisque la forme passive employée ne permet pas de savoir si cette « invitation à agir » est faite par les auteurs du traité ou relève d'une décision préalable des Etats signataires. La liaison avec la version du 10 janvier invite à une lecture restrictive de la compétence (liée) de la Commission. Cependant, une interprétation fondée sur la nécessité de garantir l'application efficace des règles justifierait que la Commission dispose d'un mandat général pour agir. Considérant spécifique sur la mise en œuvre par la Commission des articles 121, 126 et 136 dans le préambule appuie cette interprétation.

**Commentaire [f11]:** Formulation ambigue. Il semble que ce soit à la communauté des Etats signataires de porter l'affaire devant la Cour. Il faut penser que la saisine émane soit du pays qui exerce la présidence de séance, soit par un mandataire. En fait, cette formulation n'exclut pas que la Commission agisse au nom des Etats membres, comme le prévoyait la version du 5 janvier.

**Commentaire [f19]:** Dispositif innovant à la jonction entre l'article 260 TFUE et l'article 126, par. 11 et règlement (CE) n° 1467/97. La question est alors celle de la combinaison de cet article avec le système de sanction prévu par l'article 126, par. 11. A priori, la mise en œuvre de cet article excluera de fait celle de l'article du traité FUE. La question est alors de savoir si le refus du Conseil de prononcer des sanctions dans le cadre de l'article 126 TFUE empêchera le prononcé de sanction par cette disposition. Dans la mesure où le conflit peut être porté par un seu Etat, une telle possibilité est ouverte.

**Commentaire [f20]:** Précision évidente mais qui vient contrebalancer la mention de l'article 260 TFUE dans le préambule. Par cette référence, il est clairement rappelé que ce traité ne relève pas de l'ordre juridique communautaire, même s'il lui emprunte les règles procédurales et de nombreuses règles matérielles.

**Commentaire [f21]:** La liste des objectifs est plus fournie que celle indiquée à l'article 1, par. 1 du traité, cf. ajout du renforcemeent de la stabilité financière.

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	essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	the enhanced cooperation on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	on the Functioning of the European Union and to the enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [FA] on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	on the Functioning of the European Union and to the enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	Functioning of the European Union and use the enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	on the Functioning of the European Union and of enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on matters that are essential for the smooth functioning of the euro area, without undermining the internal market.	
	Article 11	Article 11	Article 11	Article 11	Article 11	Article 11	
We are committed to working towards a common economic policy. A procedure will be established to ensure that all major economic policy reforms planned by euro area Member States will be discussed and coordinated at the level of the euro area, with a view to benchmarking best practices.	With a view to benchmarking best practices, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed and coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of othe European Union as required by the law of the Union.	With a view to benchmarking best practices, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed <b>exants</b> and, <b>where</b> <b>appropriate</b> , coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by the law of the Union.	With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a common economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by the law of the Union.	With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by European Union law.	With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by European Union law.	With a view to benchmarking best practices and working towards a more closely coordinated economic policy, the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated among themselves. This coordination shall involve the institutions of the European Union as required by European Union law.	
	Article 12	[devenu l'article 13]	(voir article 13)				
	Representatives of the Committees in charge of economy and finance within the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of the relevant Committee of the European Parliament.	Representatives of the competent Committees within the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of the relevant Committee of the European Parliament.					
	TITLE V EURO SUMMIT MEETINGS	TITLE V GOVERNANCE	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA (FA)	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA	TITLE V GOVERNANCE OF THE EURO AREA	
	Article 13 [renuméroté article 12]	Article 12	Article 12	Article 12	Article 12	Article 12	
	<ol> <li>The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro, (hereinafter "the euro area Heads of State or Government") and the president of the European Commission shall meet informally in Euro</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro, (hereinafter "the euro area Heads of State or Government"), the president of the European Commission, the president of the Euro Group</li> </ol>	1. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission (mots supprimés) [FA]. The	<ol> <li>The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission. The President of the European</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission. The President of the European</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro shall meet informally in Euro Summit meetings, together with the President of the European Commission. The President of the European</li> </ol>	
	Summit meetings. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such	and the Commissioner responsible for Economic and Monetary Affairs [FA] shall meet informally in	President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings. The	Central Bank shall be invited to take part in the meetings. The President of the Euro Summit	Central Bank shall be invited to take part in the meetings. The President of the Euro Summit	Central Bank shall be invited to take part in the meetings. The President of the Euro Summit	
	meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the euro area Heads of State or Government by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.	Euro Summit meetings. The President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to take part in such meetings. The President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the euro area Heads of State or Government by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.	President of the Euro Summit shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.	shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.	shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.	shall be appointed by the Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro by simple majority at the same time the European Council elects its President and for the same term of office.	
In particular, regular Euro Summits will be held at least twice a year.	<ol> <li>Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities those Member States share with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities those Member States share with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities those Member States share with regard to the single currency, other issues concerning the</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities which the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro (FA) share with regard to the single</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities which the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro share with regard to the single currency.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Euro Summit meetings shall take place, when necessary, and at least twice a year, to discuss questions related to the specific responsibilities which the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro share with regard to the single currency,</li> </ol>	
	governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	currency, other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and in particular strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies and for improved competitiveness and increased convergence in the euro area.	other issues concerning the governance of the euro area and the rules that apply to it, and [mots supprimes] strategic orientations for the conduct of economic policies [mots supprimes] to increase convergence in the euro area.	
	3. Euro Summit meetings shall be prepared by the President of the Euro Summit, in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission, and by the Euro Group. The follow- up to the meetings shall be ensured in the same manner.					3. The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties, other than those whose currency is the euro, who have ratified this Treaty, shall participate in discussions of Euro Summit meetings concerning competitiveness for the Contracting Parties, the modification of the global architecture of the euro area and the fundamental rules that will apoly to it in the future, as well as, when appropriate and at least once a vear, in discussions on specific issues of implementation and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union.	
	4. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. The President will also inform the European Parliament of the outcome of the Euro Summit meetings.	3. Euro Summit meetings shall be prepared by the President of the Euro Summit, in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission, and by the Euro Group. The follow- up to the meetings shall be ensured in the same manner.	3. Euro Summit meetings shall be prepared by the President of the Euro Summit, in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission, and by the Euro Group. The follow- up to the meetings shall be ensured in the same manner.	3. <u>The President of the Euro Summit shall ensure</u> the preparation and continuity of Euro Summit <u>meetings</u> , in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission. The Euro Group shall contribute to the preparation and follow up of the Euro Summit meetings and its president may be invited to attend the Euro Summit meetings for that purposa [FA].	3. The President of the Euro Summit shall ensure the preparation and continuity of Euro Summit meetings, in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission. <u>The body charged</u> with the preparation and follow up of the Euro Summit meetings shall be the Euro Group and its president may be invited to attend the Euro Summit meetings for that purpose.	4. The President of the Euro Summit shall ensure the preparation and continuity of Euro Summit meetings, in close cooperation with the President of the European Commission. The body charged with the preparation and follow up of the Euro Summit meetings shall be the Euro Group and its president may be invited to attend the Euro Summit meetings for that purpose.	
				4. The President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summit.(FA)	4. The President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summit.	5. The President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summit.	
		4. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit meetings. The President will also inform the European Parliament of the	4. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union [FA] closely informed of the preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit	5. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit	5. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit	6. The President of the Euro Summit shall keep the Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro and the other Member States of the European Union closely informed of the preparation and outcome of the Euro Summit	
		outcome of the Euro Summit meetings.	meetings. The President will also inform the European Parliament of the outcome of the Euro Summit meetings.	meetings. [Phrase déplacée à l'article 12, par. 4]	meetings.	meetings.	





**Commentaire [f13]:** Précision visant à limiter les fonctions des sommets Zone euro aux seuls aspects de la zone.

Commentaire [f14]: Selon cette formulation, le « sommet de la zone euro » parait comme réserver un statut de membre de droit aux chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement. Le président de la Commission paraît un membre invité. Le président de l'Eurogroupe et le commissaire en charge des affaires économique et monétaire sont écartés – sans que rien n'empêche qu'ils soient invités de temps à autres. A l'inverse, le président de la BCE est invité à chaque réunion. Les chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement dont le pays est signataire de l'accord sans partager la monnaie unique ne participent pas à ces sommets

**Commentaire [f4]:** Formulation qui reproduit celle de l'article 15, par. 3, TUE, pour la dépasser car elle indique la qualité du commissaire chargé d'accompagner le président de la Commission.

Commentaire [f22]: Formulation plus précise qui réduit le champ des discussions aux préoccupation des Etats membres de la zone euro. La formulation du 10 janvier retenait l'interêt des Etats membres à l'euro, ce qui pouvait justifier la revendication des Etats membres hors zone euro, signataires du traité, et engagés dans l'adoption de la monnaie unique, d'être présents à ces réunions au sommet de la zone euro.

**Commentaire [f23]:** Le Président de l'Eurogroupe, dont la présence au sommet de la zone euro avait été supprimé dans la version du 10 janvier, voit ses fonctions renforcées dans la version du 19 janvier.

**Commentaire [f24]:** Introduction d'un dispositif similaire en sa 2<sup>e</sup> partie à l'article 4, 3<sup>e</sup> alinéa, TUE. L'invitation du Président du PE est en revanche une innovation qui institutionnalise une pratique ancienne au Conseil européen.

**Commentaire [f15]:** La distinction opérée entre les Etats membres signataires et non membres de la zone euro d'une part, et les non signataires et non membres d'autre part, emporte-telle une différence dans les modalités de la communication et dans le contenu de l'information transmise ?

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				6. In order to discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of this Treaty, the President of the Euro Summit will invite, when appropriate and at least once a year, the Heads of State or Government of Contracting Parties whose currency is not the euro who have ratified this Treaty and have declared their intention to be bound by some of its provisions in accordance with Article 14(5) to a meeting of the Euro	6. In order to discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of this Treaty, the President of the Euro Summit will invite, when appropriate and at least once a year, to a meeting of the Euro Summit the Heads of State or Government of Contracting Parties, other than those whose currency is the euro, who have ratified this Treaty. [FA]		
				Summit.			
		Article 13	Article 13	Article 13	Article 13	Article 13	
		Representatives of the competent Committees within the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of the relevant Committee of the European Parliament.	Representatives of (eléments supprimés) the Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will be invited to meet regularly to discuss in particular the conduct of economic and budgetary policies, in close association with representatives of (eléments supprimés) the European Parliament.	As foreseen in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contractino Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of the chairs of the budget committees of the national Parliaments and the chairs of the relevant committees of the European Parliament.	As foreseen in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the national Parliaments and representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.	As foreseen in Title II of Protocol (No 1) on the role of atformal Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parlies will together determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the relevant committees of the national Parliaments and representatives of the relevant committees of the European Parliament in order to discuss budgetary policies and other issues covered by this Treaty.	
	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS	TITLE VI General and final provisions	
	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	Article 14	
	<ol> <li>This Agreement shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.</li> </ol>	1. This Treaty shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union.	
	<ol> <li>This Agreement shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the ninth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>This Treaty shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the <u>fifteenth</u> instrument of ratification by a <u>Contracting Party whose currency is the euro</u>.</li> </ol>	2. This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that [twelve] Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the [twelfth] instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	2. This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	2. This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	2. This Treaty shall enter into force on 1 January 2013, provided that twelve Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier.	
	3. This Agreement shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	3. This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	3. This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	3. This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	3. This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	3. This Treaty shall apply as from the day of entry into force amongst the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro and which have ratified it. It shall apply to the other Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the first day of the month following the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification.	
	4. By derogation to Paragraph 3, Title V of this Agreement shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement.	4. By derogation to Paragraph 3, Title V of this Treaty shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of the <u>Treaty</u> .	<ol> <li>By derogation to paragraph 3, Title V shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>By derogation to paragraph 3, Article 12 shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>By derogation to paragraph 3, Article 12 shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>By derogation to paragraph 3, Article 12 shall apply to all Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro as from the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.</li> </ol>	
	5. This Agreement shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No. 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Agreement [FA].	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parlies with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	5. This Treaty shall apply to the Contracting Parties with a derogation as defined in Article 139(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or with an exemption as defined in Protocol No 16 on certain provisions related to Denmark annexed to the European Union Treaties, which have ratified it, as from the day when the decision abrogating that derogation or exemption takes effect, unless the Contracting Party concerned declares its intention to be bound at an earlier date by all or part of the provisions in Titles III and IV of this Treaty.	
			Article 15	Article 15	Article 15	Article 15	
			This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties upon application that any, such Member State may file with the Depositary. The Contracting parties shall approve the application by common agreement. Following such approval, the applicant Member State shall accede upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof. [FA]	This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties upon application that any such Member State may file with the Depositary. The Contracting parties shall approve the application by common agreement. Following such approval, the applicant Member State shall accede upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof.	This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties. (supprime) Accession shall be effective upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof.	This Treaty shall be open to accession by Member States of the European Union other than the Contracting Parties. Accession shall be effective upon the deposit of the instruments of accession with the Depositary, who shall notify the other Contracting Parties thereof.	
			Article 16	Article 16	Article 16	Article 16	
The objective remains to incorporate these provisions into the treatles of the Union as soon as possible. The Heads of State or Government of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Sweden indicated the possibility to take part in this process after consulting their Parliaments where appropriate.		6 Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, an initiative shall be launched, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	Within five years at most following the entry into force of this Treaty, on the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union.	
				Done at Brussels on the of in the year two thousand and twelve in a single original whose Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,	Done at Brussels on the of in the year two thousand and twelve in a single original whose Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,	Done at Brussels on the of in the year two thousand and twelve in a single original whose Bulgarian, [supprimé], Danish, Dutch, English,	





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