

Rachèle Raus, Egon Bahr and the concept of a 'European peace order' (1963–1970)

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Last updated: 05/07/2016



Egon Bahr and the concept of a ‘European peace order’ (1963–70)

by Rachèle Raus, doctoral student at University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Egon Bahr is often compared to Henry Kissinger. Unlike Kissinger, however, he tends to be overlooked by historians, especially outside Germany. In the same way, although a great many historians and journalists have focused on Willy Brandt’s career, very few writers have concerned themselves with Bahr’s political and private action. ⁽¹⁾

After the Second World War, Egon Bahr started working as a reporter in Berlin for the *Berliner Zeitung* and the *Allgemeine Zeitung*. Between 1948 and 1950, he was the *Tagesspiegel* correspondent in Hamburg and then Bonn, before joining RIAS (Broadcasting in the American Sector) in 1950. In 1960, Willy Brandt appointed him Head of the Press and Information Office for Berlin. When Brandt became Foreign Minister in 1966, Bahr was appointed head of Policy Planning at the Foreign Ministry, and in 1969, when the small coalition ⁽²⁾ was formed, he became State Secretary to the Chancellery under Brandt.

From the beginning of the 1960s, Bahr was Brandt’s closest assistant. He was one of the politicians who exerted ongoing influence behind the scenes on the course of German and European politics, advising on political strategy and weaving diplomatic networks. As part of the Brandt team, he drafted the policy for the normalisation of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the Eastern European countries. He was often presented as the brains behind the Ostpolitik and, during the Moscow Treaty talks of August 1970, he conducted the negotiations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. During the discussions leading up to the signature of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin on 3 September 1971, Bahr, together with Henry Kissinger, devised a system of ‘back-channels’ through which the whole course of the negotiations was secretly steered, behind the backs of the Foreign Ministers of the countries involved. Bahr’s inclination for secrecy and behind-the-scenes diplomacy earned him the nickname of ‘Tricky Egon’.

For more than 15 years Brandt transmitted and officially represented Bahr’s political ideas. In 1992 Richard von Weizsäcker ⁽³⁾ said of the Brandt-Bahr duo that he thought the only way either could flourish was through the talents of the other. ⁽⁴⁾ To Brandt’s acute sense of German politics and his power of conviction, Bahr added his talents as a political thinker. Behind Brandt’s speeches lay the political influence of his adviser, who did his best, from Berlin, to influence the course of German policy by acting to alter the Federal Republic’s order of priorities.

It was as an adviser and planner of West German foreign policy that Bahr framed the concepts of a ‘European peace order’ and the corresponding ‘security system’, pursuing an idea that had taken shape in the mid-1950s. Bahr called for a European policy for the West and a national policy for the East. ⁽⁵⁾ His conception of German policy, driven directly by Germany’s national interests, explains his somewhat ambiguous attitude to the policy of European integration.

Bahr strove to involve the FRG in reducing tension in Europe, in the same way as the US President John F. Kennedy, with his 1963 peace strategy, and France’s General de Gaulle, who had also pursued a policy of détente towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Having gained acceptance for the idea that Germany could only be reunited through continuing détente, he devised a plan of action to ensure that Germany played a part in international and European politics. Germany must have its say on decisions that primarily affected it. Bahr worked to bring about the necessary conditions to re-establish trust throughout the continent of Europe — conditions essential to reunification of the two Germans.

He therefore worked out the concept of a European system of peace and security, striking a balance between defending national interests and Western security, with the consolidation of peace and the reunification of the two Germans in a single state as the primary objectives. In 1969 this led to the idea of concluding bilateral agreements on renunciation of force — as in the Moscow Treaty — which were to become the lynchpins of the new Ostpolitik and the basis for East–West détente in Europe.

Deutschlandpolitik central to Bahr’s political thinking

In 2005 Bahr said that he had always been interested in finding a policy to solve the German question. ⁽⁶⁾ He maintained that he had not become a Social Democrat to organise the banking system on socialist lines but because he thought that unlike Kurt Schumacher, Konrad Adenauer was not devoting enough effort to German policy. Before analysing Bahr's German policy, we need to review some of the basic ideas that helped crystallise his thinking.

Brandt, the SPD and Europeanising the German question

From the 1950s onwards the quest for a solution to the German question became one of Bahr's priorities. Like his fellow countrymen, he had to accept that the two halves of Germany were well and truly separated and integrated into two opposing defence systems. When Adenauer rejected Stalin's note of March 1952, proposing reunification in exchange for German neutrality, it exacerbated the feeling of powerlessness in the face of the division of the nation, fuelling fears of having missed an opportunity for reunification.

This explains why Chancellor Adenauer's decision to make the Federal Republic a champion of European integration was often seen as against German interests. Unlike Adenauer, who saw the incorporation of the FRG into a European organisation as the only way of recovering German sovereignty, the majority of Social Democrats thought that any involvement by the FRG in European integration went against their desire for reunification. Schumacher, the main representative of the Social Democrats and opponent of the Christian Democratic Chancellor, was a staunch defender of the German cause and reunification. He actively opposed the foreign powers occupying Germany and rejected any German involvement in the building of post-war Europe.

Brandt, following the lead of the Social Democratic Mayor of Berlin, Ernst Reuter, nevertheless pursued a German policy of integration with the West, believing there was no real alternative to such a course. During his years in exile he had worked out his political ideas for the future of Europe, and the links between Germany's prospects and European integration. In 1950 Brandt came out in favour of the Council of Europe and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), maintaining that it was pointless to wait for an ideal combination of circumstances, or at any rate conditions more in keeping with the expectations of Germany's Social Democrats. The 'existing realities' should be taken as the starting point so that they could subsequently be turned into something else. ⁽⁷⁾ Brandt's thoughts on a European order for peace hinged on ideas of co-existence and transformation. ⁽⁸⁾ He saw no contradiction between the FRG becoming an integral part of the West and the desire for reunification. He campaigned for an approach that linked the German question with its European context and undertook to frame a concept that would lay the foundations of a European peace order. ⁽⁹⁾ Brandt imagined a united Germany as part of a federal Europe.

In 1964, when Brandt became General Secretary of West Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), he adjusted the party's foreign policy guidelines, bringing them closer to Adenauer's ideas. At the Bad Godesberg party conference in 1959, the SPD officially moved away from Marxist doctrine and accepted the occupation of Germany by the victorious powers in the Second World War. But with his European policy Brandt aimed to do more than unify just the Western world. The Federal Republic, he said, has a 'share of the responsibility for the building of the whole of Europe at the same time as a personal interest in bringing that about'. ⁽¹⁰⁾ According to Brandt, European integration must reach beyond the free half of Europe and encompass not just the Scandinavian and northern European countries, including Britain, but also the eastern European countries under Soviet domination. He saw European integration policy as a preparatory stage which should gradually bring the two halves of Europe closer, while creating, if possible, conditions conducive to solving the German question.

Bahr — a national answer to the German question and the problem of Europe

From the early 1960s onwards, building on Brandt's political ideas, Bahr further developed his earlier thoughts on the state of the German nation and its role in European integration. Since Bahr was often described as a German nationalist, his compatriots saw his arguments in support of closer ties with East Germany as a policy of renunciation. Similarly, his desire for normalisation of relations between the FRG

and the Soviet Union was condemned abroad as a policy of German expansion towards the East. Fears of a second Rapallo ⁽¹¹⁾ surfaced in many Western capitals. Bahr's love of secret dealings fuelled these feelings of distrust and personal hostility.

But hasty, superficial interpretation cannot do justice to Bahr's ideas on the German nation. He had an emotional relationship with the nation and, far from being a nationalist, he saw himself primarily as a German patriot. ⁽¹²⁾ He ascribed his patriotism to a personal sense of belonging to a country and a people. Bahr 'felt' German, and that patriotic feeling was not confined within the borders of the Federal Republic. The whole of his *Deutschlandpolitik* was rooted in his yearning for national unity and his political action sought to create the conditions conducive to reunification of the German state. As a Social Democrat, there could be no peace and freedom in Europe as long as the German nation was divided. So Bahr regarded the process of uniting the German nation as an integral part of an inevitable historical process and thought it was the responsibility of every German to help end the division of their country.

It was as a reunited nation that Bahr saw Germany assuming its place in Europe. In striving to take the heat out of the concept of the nation, he sought to reconcile both European countries and his compatriots with the German nation. He campaigned for his country to regain its old position and to end the discrimination it suffered in Europe.

Bahr's perception of the part nations were to play in Europe was very close to that of General de Gaulle, whom he greatly admired. The age of the nation-states was not over, and it was in such terms that Bahr viewed Germany's membership of the European Community. Unlike Brandt, Bahr shared de Gaulle's ideas on Europe. The arguments they used were not identical but they were prompted by a similar rationale. Building a European Community was seen as contrary to consolidating détente between East and West. Moreover, a supranational Europe, as envisaged by the Six, might very well disrupt the emergence of national values and impede the process of reunification. Bahr was consequently not against European integration 'in principle' but he did set priorities for Germany. Specifically, the first thing to be done was to bring about the reunification of Germany.

Brandt and Bahr thus differed most fundamentally on the question of European integration. According to Bahr this process clashed with Germany's national interests. The unification of Europe, he argued, was only compatible with German reunification if it applied to Europe as a whole (*Gesamteuropa*) and was not just confined to western Europe.

Détente as a prerequisite for reunification

The belief in 'change through rapprochement' takes shape

In July 1963 Bahr delivered his famous speech on 'change through rapprochement' (*Wandel durch Annäherung*) to the Tutzing Evangelical Academy. This speech, often seen as a way of testing the water, highlights certain passages from a speech delivered by Brandt on the same day and in the same place, particularly the parts on inter-German policy. Referring several times to the speech Kennedy gave at American University, Washington DC, on 10 June 1963, Bahr expanded on the US President's idea of a 'strategy of peace', arguing that there could be no prospect of reunification without détente between the two opposing blocs.

Bahr's idea that the status quo would first have to be accepted, so that it could be transcended at a later stage, thus goes back to 1963. This approach coincided with Brandt's belief that the point of departure had to be existing realities. Bahr thought the German problem was an integral part of the East–West conflict and had to be resolved with the agreement of the two superpowers, in the context of a general relaxation of tension. There could be no solution to the German question without the agreement of Moscow, as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) could not be transformed without the help of the Soviet Union. Only by accepting the status quo in Europe would it be possible to negotiate and reach agreements with the eastern European countries with a view to changing the regimes there. The principle of *Wandel durch Annäherung* was the West German extension of the Kennedy administration's efforts to promote détente.

This was a fundamental departure from the political ideas which had previously prevailed in Germany and which stipulated that any step towards détente must be preceded by a Soviet move in favour of German reunification. The notion of change through rapprochement, originally conceived as a means of achieving German reunification, paved the way for a policy of normalising relations between the FRG and eastern European countries from the mid-1960s onwards. It served as the template for the drafting of Brandt's 'new Ostpolitik', which took account of the existing realities. Reunification now became part of a long historical process based on the consolidation of East–West détente.

From this theory of change through rapprochement, Bahr derived the 'policy of small steps' (*Politik der kleinen Schritte*), which was an attempt to improve living conditions for the people of 'the other Germany' through humanitarian initiatives, or by expanding economic and trade relations. Convinced that the nation was more powerful than ideology and would outlive it, ⁽¹³⁾ he did all he could to prevent Germans losing their sense of belonging to one and the same nation. Bahr was therefore critical of the 'policy of movement' pursued by the Christian Democrat government which, he maintained, favoured rapprochement with eastern European countries while isolating the GDR. He believed that this approach was against the interests of the Federal Republic. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The first set of rules on travel passes, concluded at the end of 1963, was a direct application of the policy of small steps. German reunification was no longer seen as attainable simply by annexation of the GDR; it would require political and military détente and the adoption of measures to achieve rapprochement with East Germany.

Establishing security for Germany and in the face of Germany

The idea of change through rapprochement, the ambivalent foundation for the policy of greater openness towards the East, was the basis for the thinking Bahr developed as early as the mid-1950s about a system for establishing order and peace in Europe. Looking beyond attempts to bring East and West Germans closer together and the assumption that East Germans were in favour of reunification, Bahr believed that reunification could not be achieved without Moscow's consent. It could only happen if Moscow could be made to agree to a strong Germany of 70 million people in the centre of Europe. It was therefore vital that the Soviet Union should no longer feel there was any 'militaristic' or 'imperialist' threat from the FRG.

In an unpublished manuscript from 1965, *Was nun?*, ⁽¹⁵⁾ Bahr first described the establishment of a European security system, in detail and by stages, which would reassure the Soviet Union as to the FRG's intentions and, in the long term, bring about a loosening of the ties between the Soviet Union and the Walter Ulbricht regime (in the GDR). Bahr further developed Fritz Erler's work on 'security for Germany and security in the face of Germany' (*Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland*) and combined it with his own thoughts.

To safeguard the security of a reunified Germany, Bahr envisaged a series of bilateral treaties and security guarantees which were to lead to a comprehensive system of collective security. This model, which would later be applied in several European countries, specified that all the partners of a reunified Germany would, in agreement with it, guarantee Germany's frontiers as agreed in a peace treaty and undertake to use all available military means to defend those frontiers. The second feature of the system involved persuading all the signatories to the peace treaty with Germany — the four victorious powers and the other adversaries of Nazi Germany — to sign a treaty in which they undertook to provide mutual assistance in the event of aggression by Germany. ⁽¹⁶⁾

Bahr was convinced that each country was motivated by the need to protect its own security interests, so he thought that the FRG must give security guarantees not just to the Soviet Union and the eastern European countries but also to the countries of western Europe. It was therefore vital that a reunified Germany should belong to neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) nor the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union stood to gain by agreeing to German reunification, since NATO would lose a central component of its defensive system and Germany would relinquish its offensive capacity for good.

In *Was nun?* Bahr came out categorically against the policy of European integration which, he said, would impede opportunities for East–West détente and therefore stand in the way of any reunification of Germany. He nevertheless took care not to upset the balance of forces to the detriment of the West or to provoke the neutralisation of Germany in central Europe. The prospect of German reunification must not upset the balance of forces between East and West.

In the second part of his plan, Bahr described the eight stages leading to the reunification of Germany as a state. Realising that his plan was utopian and could only be seen as a model, he quoted Albert Camus in his introduction: ‘All grand schemes spring from something ridiculous.’ Bahr did not claim to have found a miraculous solution to the German question, but he did think he had found a way of creating the right conditions in Europe for transcending it.

The main difficulty in the way of realising this plan was the criticism levelled at Bahr after his Tutzung speech, which put an end to any hopes of publishing *Was nun?*. From the summer of 1963 onwards Brandt’s adviser was severely criticised, especially by SDP members, such as Herbert Wehner, who were afraid of a turnabout in the party’s German policy. After the major policy change at the beginning of the 1960s, the Social Democrats were keen to avoid another clash with the CDU–CSU government over settlement of the German problem. Brandt advised against publishing the manuscript, for fear of being associated with the views of his closest adviser. Furthermore he did not fully subscribe to Bahr’s policy of not incorporating Germany into the Europe of the Six, dissolving the military alliances and re-appraising the status of the GDR. In the last analysis, Brandt concluded, German public opinion in the early 1960s was not ready to agree to such a major change in national policy.

From the defence of European security to the new West German Ostpolitik

Only once the Social Democrats had been elected to form the federal government and Brandt had been appointed Foreign Minister was Bahr, now head of the Foreign Ministry Policy Planning unit, at liberty to start rethinking the *Deutschlandpolitik* with a view to altering West Germany’s traditional foreign policy stance, which had until that time been entirely dictated by Christian Democratic thinking. Continuing the policy launched by Gerhard Schröder, his predecessor as Foreign Minister, Brandt and Bahr took the principle of change through rapprochement a step further and laid the groundwork on which, from 1969 onwards, they were to build the new Ostpolitik. The Great Coalition (1966–69) should therefore be seen as an interim period, ultimately leading to a complete change in West Germany’s foreign policy priorities.

Bahr’s study of European security: 27 June 1968

As the policy of normalising relations with the Soviet Union must not hamper effective cooperation between the FRG and the West, Brandt and his staff began the quest for a European security order that would bring Germany reconciliation with its neighbours, West and East, and in the long term achieve reunification of Germany. The problem of security in Europe was a key concern for the SPD leader, who realised that a system of European security ⁽¹⁷⁾ was a prerequisite for lasting peace.

Two possible approaches could be envisaged in the mid–1960s. The first meant continuing with two systems of alliances which would gradually converge. The second involved the abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the establishment of a new order. Brandt was more inclined towards the first option and favoured gradual evolution of existing structures. In view of his ideas on Europe, Bahr was clearly more in favour of the second model.

In 1968 Bahr wrote a study on European security. It was to be his most controversial analysis, particularly after the press published it unexpectedly in 1973. The defence of Germany’s interests was an absolute priority, he wrote, the ultimate aim being to move on from the status quo in Europe by establishing a new order for peace. To bring this about, Bahr proposed three different models, all of them designed to lead to the disarmament of the centre of Europe, presented as a prerequisite for reunification.

Model (A) retained the two systems of alliances and set out, through disarmament measures, to achieve as

high a level of détente as possible. In model (B), the alliances were also retained, but they were interconnected by institutional bodies overseeing jointly agreed disarmament measures. These institutions could develop into a body at a higher level than the alliances, on the lines of a standing conference on European security. Model (C) provided for the replacement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact by a security system among equal European states whose existence was guaranteed by the two superpowers, but without them joining the system itself.

The study bore the imprint of its author and tended, of course, to favour the third model, (C), despite its being the least likely to be implemented. According to the author, model (B), which cemented the status quo in Europe, should be avoided at all costs. This made model (A) appear the most achievable of the three, and it seems closest to Brandt's political approach, which involved gradually moving on from the status quo. Brandt did, in fact, speak on a number of occasions of his graduated approach to a security system and cautiously talked about replacing the existing military alliances in stages.⁽¹⁸⁾ Although Bahr's study suggested that model (A) was the only plausible one at that stage, it recommended doing everything possible to prevent model (A) slipping towards model (B).

Towards the end of the 1960s, however, the SPD leaders were not the only ones to be thinking about moving on from the systems of military alliances. In 1967 France's Foreign Policy Research Centre, a think tank close to the Foreign Ministry, published a paper entitled 'Models for European security', which proposed defining 'rational, political means of changing the current situation in Europe in the direction which both West and East appear to want: that of détente, rapprochement, and cooperation.'⁽¹⁹⁾ The three approaches outlined in the study were very close to those set out by Bahr in his system of European Security.

Bahr's 1968 study was intended for internal use by Brandt's team. Its indiscreet publication in September 1973 triggered lively debate in Germany and Europe. In 1973 there were widespread fears among most of West Germany's neighbours and allies of the establishment of a 'neutralist' FRG in the centre of Europe. They were equally suspicious of the ulterior motives of West Germany's leaders, especially the two men who had hatched the new Ostpolitik. The context in 1973 had changed. In 1968 it was not taken for granted that US troops would stay in Europe. In the same way, with the many crises NATO had endured, it was plausible to envisage the age of the military alliances coming to an end.

Although there was no short-term prospect of putting an end to the systems of military alliances, Bahr nevertheless mapped out the stages leading to a European order for peace and security. Initially he planned to establish a system of bilateral agreements on the renunciation of force, accompanied by simultaneous troop reductions in Europe and the establishment of a collective security system. On 1 October 1969, in a memorandum on the new federal government's foreign policy, Bahr wrote that 'notwithstanding the continuity of the alliance systems, there is nothing to prevent concluding agreements which maintain the present system at a fairly low level and may be seen as the forerunners of a new European order.'⁽²⁰⁾

'The agreement on the renunciation of force', the foundations for Ostpolitik and détente

The shock caused by the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops during the night of 20 August 1968, spelling the failure of de Gaulle's policy of détente in the East, made West Germany's leaders realise that any improvement in relations with the Soviet bloc required Moscow's consent. Building on the principle of change through rapprochement, which had led to shelving the Hallstein doctrine, resuming diplomatic relations with Romania in 1967, and a preliminary rapprochement with the GDR, Chancellor Brandt's team began developing closer relations with the Soviet Union from the end of 1969 onwards.

Negotiations between Andrei Gromyko and the German ambassador in Moscow, Helmut Allardt, for the agreement on the renunciation of force started in late 1969. Shortly afterwards, at the beginning of 1970, Bahr was sent to Moscow to take over the negotiations with Gromyko, as these were proving vital to West Germany's whole Ostpolitik and the consolidation of détente in Europe. In July 1970, after more than 50 hours of secret negotiations between Gromyko and Bahr, the two sides agreed on the 'Bahr paper', which served as the basis for discussions between Moscow and Bonn on the renunciation of force agreement. The 10 points in the paper contained the main articles of the Moscow Treaty: mutual determination to contribute

to peace and détente, renunciation of force, respect for the territorial integrity of all European states within their existing borders, which were declared inviolable (including the Oder-Neisse line and the border between the two German states), and the development of economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation. The Bahr paper also contained references to the unity of the German nation and the problem of the status of Berlin which were to be inserted subsequently, by separate letters, when the Moscow Treaty was ratified.

When the text was leaked it raised widespread fears both among the opposition in the FRG and in Western capitals. The secrecy of the talks between Bahr and Gromyko inevitably aroused mistrust. However the feat did not escape the notice of public opinion at home and abroad. A Social Democratic diplomat, working in tandem with the Chancellor, had managed to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on the renunciation of force, gaining acceptance for the status quo in Europe and implicit recognition of the second German state. The foreign press paid tribute to Brandt's Ostpolitik and western diplomats did their best to placate West Germany's CDU Opposition to secure swift ratification of the treaty by the Bundestag.

The Moscow Treaty of 12 August 1970 was the first in a series of agreements with the countries of eastern Europe, all of which were drafted along the same lines. This was the cornerstone of Brandt's Ostpolitik, establishing détente in Europe on a lasting basis. West Germany's policy towards the East was an undeniable factor in East-West détente. Following a bilateral phase between the FRG and the eastern European capitals, the Ostpolitik opened the way for a phase of multilateral negotiations by enabling conferences to be held on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR) and on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), culminating, in 1975, in the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act — the pinnacle of the first phase of détente.

The part played by Bahr as the source of inspiration for Ostpolitik was, as a consequence, fundamental to establishing and consolidating détente. Thanks to the concepts he devised in the 1950s and 1960s, it was possible to change West Germany's foreign policy practice without ever losing sight of the ultimate aim of German reunification. In his memoirs, Bahr writes that he never thought he had found a miraculous solution to the German problem, but that what mattered to him was that he had taken a small step in the right direction.

Notes:

(1) See the bibliography in the annex.

(2) The small coalition was formed between the CDU-CSU and the SPD following the general election of 1966. The coalition lasted four years, until the next general election in 1969.

(3) Richard von Weizsäcker was a member of the Bundestag and vice-president of the Christian Democrat parliamentary group from 1969 to 1981, Mayor of West Berlin from 1981 to 1984 and President of the FRG from 1984 to 1994.

(4) A. Vogtmeier, *Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung*, Bonn, J.H.W. Dietz Verlag, 1996, p. 60.

(5) E. Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit*, Munich, Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996, pp. 65–75.

(6) Conversation with Egon Bahr conducted by Stefan Aust and Frank Schirrmacher, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 April 2005, No 100, p. 41.

(7) A. Wilkens, 'Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr et la naissance du concept d'un "ordre de paix européen" (1963–69)', in G. Bossuat (ed.), *Inventer l'Europe. Histoire nouvelle des groupes d'influence et des acteurs de l'unité européenne*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2003, pp. 273–284.

(8) H. Haftendorn, 'Transformation und Stabilität', in H. Möller, M. Vaisse (ed.), *Willy Brandt und Frankreich. Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Munich, Oldenbourg, 2005, pp. 1–21.

(9) K. D. Bracher, W. Jäger, W. Link, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Republik im Wandel (1969-1974). Die Ära Brandt*, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1986, p. 169.

(10) 'Eine europäische Friedensordnung', speech delivered before the steering committee of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Düsseldorf, 30 November 1967, and reproduced in W. Brandt, *Frieden. Reden und Schriften des Friedensnobelpreisträgers 1971*, Bonn, Verlag Neue Gesellschaft, 1971, pp. 57–72.

(11) The Treaty of Rapallo was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union on 16 April 1922 during the Genoa Conference. It enabled the two signatories to break out of their enforced isolation following the First World War and the Communist revolution. It was in keeping with German and Soviet interests and provided for economic cooperation through a most-favoured-nation clause. Both parties waived their claims to war reparations. The atmosphere of mystery which surrounded the drafting and signing of the agreement was to become a running sore for Western statesmen.

(12) A. Fogtmeier, *op.cit.*, p. 335.

(13) S. Fuchs, *Dreiecksverhältnisse sind immer kompliziert. Kissinger, Bahr und die Ostpolitik*, Hamburg, EVA (Europäische

Verlagsanstalt), 1999.

(14) E. Bahr, *Zu meiner Zeit*, Munich, Karl Blessing Verlag, 1996, p. 181.

(15) E. Bahr, 'Was nun?' (unpublished manuscript), AdsD, Ord.465, in A. Fogtmeier, *Egon Bahr und die deutsche Frage. Zur Entwicklung der sozialdemokratischen Ost- und Deutschlandpolitik vom Kriegsende bis zur Vereinigung*, Bonn, J.H.W. Dietz Verlag, 1996, pp. 80–95.

(16) E. Bahr, *Sicherheit für und vor Deutschland*, Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1991, p. 21.

(17) K. D. Bracher, W. Jäger, W. Link, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

(18) Interview with Deutschlandfunk on 2 July 1967, in W. Brandt, *Aussenpolitik-Deutschlandpolitik-Europapolitik. Grundsätzliche Erklärungen des ersten Jahres im Auswärtigen Amt*, Berlin, Berlin Verlag, (2nd ed.), 1970, pp. 80–89, in A. Wilkens, 'Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr et la naissance du concept d'un "ordre de paix européen" (1963–1969)', *art. cit.*

(19) 'Modèles de sécurité européenne', in *Politique étrangère*, No 32, Paris, 1967, pp. 519–541.

(20) Bracher, Jäger, Link, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland...*, p. 173.

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