

Carlo Sforza, Five years at Palazzo Chigi


Caption: In his memoirs, Count Carlo Sforza, former Italian Foreign Minister, describes the turbulent debates in the Italian Chamber of Deputies which were prompted in July 1950 by the Korean War.

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Speech in the Chamber of Deputies on 11 July 1950

... I now come to the problem of Korea. Let me assure you from the outset that my main duty is to be accurate, objective and well documented. As Italy's Minister for Foreign Affairs, I cannot but feel that the overriding consideration in this matter is the restoration of peace. I have no desire to indulge in facile polemics and will be content to let the facts and documents speak for themselves.

Those who accuse America of aggression — and all the free states of the world of active or passive complicity in that aggression — forget, or pretend to forget, the historical and political events leading to the present situation in Korea. What were those events? The intention of the victorious powers was to create a united Korea, as it had been for thousands of years when the country was independent and free from the cruelty of Japanese occupation.

In September 1945, however, immediately after the surrender of Japan, American troops coming from the south and Russian troops coming from the north met at the 38th parallel. To the misfortune of the poor Koreans, that arbitrary line became the frontier between the two zones of Korea. North of the 38th parallel an administration modelled on the most rigid and universally familiar totalitarian model was quickly established.

Its basic features are a single party (albeit disguised under various names), a press strictly controlled by the occupation authorities, and a formidable secret police. South of the parallel, 16 or more parties were formed, many of which vied with each other in violent mutual criticism in the columns of news sheets without ...

In view of the difficulty of reuniting the two parts of Korea, the United States proposed at one stage that at least an economic union should be established between them. The Soviet Union categorically refused. On 29 August 1947 Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett proposed convening a conference of the United States, Britain, China and the Soviet Union to try and solve the Korean problem. Again the Soviets refused. The American Government then decided to refer the whole Korean question to the United Nations General Assembly. This was done on 17 December 1946. The Soviet Government protested vigorously, insisting that only the powers involved had the right to discuss the issue. A UN Commission had been appointed in November that year with a mandate to prepare for elections in the whole of Korea, but the Soviet Union refused to allow the Commission to carry out its task in the North. The elections were therefore held where it was possible for them to be held, but a third of the 200 seats in the Constituent Assembly were reserved for North Korea pending the possibility of free elections there too. In September 1948, the Soviet Union proposed simultaneous withdrawal from both zones. It should be noted, however, that a Communist regime was already firmly established in the North, where all opposition had been crushed, while in South Korea a mediocre and feeble democratic regime was taking its first hesitant steps.

The US Government replied that the problem of the withdrawal of American troops was part of the wider issue of Korean unity and independence, which was now a matter for the United Nations.

On 12 December 1948, the UN General Assembly officially recognised that 'the Government of the Republic of Korea, having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside, is the only Government of Korea'. The resolution was adopted by 48 votes to 6, with one abstention.

The United States recognised the new State immediately, and some 30 countries followed its example. The withdrawal of American troops then began and was completed on 20 June 1949.

The Communist speakers began here by claiming, as dictated by their party, that the South Koreans attacked the North. But I refuse to believe that the Italian people, with its traditional good sense and experience of human history, can be taken in by such a preposterous inversion of the truth. The succession of events has proved, as Mr Antigono Donati honestly recognised in a speech not devoid of some sense of reality, that the

military forces of South Korea were vastly inferior to those of the North. Can anyone possibly believe that any government could have been mad enough to launch a premeditated attack that was not only repelled in the space of a few hours but turned into a headlong retreat that is still unchecked; that a government separated by the sea from its allies, who are in Japan but have only a minimum of military forces available there, would be mad enough to attack a hostile rival regime created in the likeness of a powerful neighbour that is now the most heavily armed government in the whole of Europe, Asia and perhaps the world?

Two more facts suffice to prove that the poor South Koreans did not attack their angelic neighbours to the north. If the attack really came from the South, why didn't the Communist government in the North stop at the 38th parallel? The alleged attack by the South Koreans belongs to the long series of hostile attacks that begin in our literature with Phaedrus's fable of the wolf and the lamb, and lead on to the legend of tiny Serbia's threat to the powerful Austrian monarchy in 1914 and unarmed Poland's attack on Nazi Germany in 1939. Whenever a treacherous attack like that on South Korea has taken place, it has always been accompanied by the myth of a prior powerful attack on the aggressor. This time there was also Hitler's added refinement of attacking on Saturday because there are fewer newspapers on Sunday and fewer important people on duty.

And I repeat: if one is really to believe in an attack by the South, why didn't the North Koreans, with their huge military superiority, stop at the 38th parallel as soon as the UN called for a ceasefire? Clearly, North Korea was counting on the lightning success of its criminal attack and a repetition of the passive acquiescence of timid governments that greeted both Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and the Soviet repetition of the same coup de force against Prague in 1948. (*Strong reactions on the far left*).

Rushing to the defence of their preferred government, the Communist speakers have offered, as overriding proof of its innocence, the fact that two weeks ago North Korea proposed to the South that a joint parliament be convened in Seoul in August to unite the Korean people in a single body free from foreign influence. Those speakers have forgotten one detail, however: the offer from the North posed one simple and innocent condition, namely that 'national traitors and political criminals' could not be elected and the UN Commission in Seoul could not monitor the elections in any way.

As far as 'national traitors and political criminals' are concerned, you are well aware that, according to the custom of the Communists, a carefully constructed list of alleged criminals and traitors (two of us, De Gasperi and myself, have been called political criminals and traitors for days on end in this very Chamber) cannot fail to include anyone who opposes them.

What is the legal position in Korea at the present time? A government recognised as the legal and sole government of the country it is effectively administering is suffering premeditated aggression, recognised and condemned as such by a UN Commission composed of impartial observers present at the scene.

If the principles on which the UN is based — to which all subscribe, at least on paper — are to have any meaning, and if peace and collective security are not to become terms of derision, the UN obviously had the right and duty to intervene.

I shall read you the UN documents in a moment: as you will see, they are crystal clear.

It is insinuated that the United States acted first, on its own initiative. That is not true. It acted legally under the Security Council's first resolution. Moreover, Article 51 of the UN Charter states that until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security, nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

Those are the words of the Charter itself.

So who began the intervention?

It was on the basis of a right conferred, as I say, by a specific Article of the UN Charter, and pursuant to a

decision of the Security Council, that President Truman ordered his air and sea forces to give protection and support to the military forces of South Korea. The same day, the Security Council met again and, having noted that its previous call for a ceasefire and withdrawal of the attacking forces had not been obeyed, confirmed that ‘urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security’ and recommended that ‘the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack’.

It has been claimed that the decision taken by the Security Council on 27 June was invalid because the votes of two permanent members of the Security Council were lacking. As we know, however, the Soviet Union voluntarily withdrew from the Security Council. In doing so, it did indeed warn that it would not recognise the validity of any decision taken in its absence, but if that position is accepted, we should also have to accept that the will of a single large state that is a member of the Security Council is sufficient to paralyse the whole United Nations Organisation and render it completely impotent.

As to the second permanent member that did not vote for the decision of 27 June, namely Communist China, I would point out that many states have not yet recognised Mao Tse-tung’s government, which has not yet been admitted to the United Nations. If natural law were sufficient to gain membership of the UN, then any other state, including Italy, would perhaps have a greater entitlement than Mao Tse-tung! But, quite obviously, an international body can be governed only by positive law. A state becomes a member when its admission has been approved in accordance with the prescribed constitutional procedure. And literal compliance with Article 27 — if that Article were to mean that each major decision required a positive vote in favour by every permanent member — would eventually paralyse the Security Council. In fact, it has been established by precedent at the UN that a Security Council decision is not invalidated by the abstention of a permanent member (and voluntary absence is clearly equivalent to abstention).

There are various precedents, all pointing in the same direction. Let me quote just one. At its sitting of 29 April 1947 the Security Council adopted, by ten votes in favour and one abstention, a resolution on Spain that required the qualified majority stipulated in Article 27. The state that abstained was the Soviet Union, and its representative, Mr Andrei Gromyko, declared that it was abstaining in order not to breach unanimity. Which means that the other day there was unanimity on Korea, since the Soviet Union was absent voluntarily. (*Applause*).

What follows from all of this is clear. As President Truman stated, the United States is conducting, at the explicit request of the United Nations, an international policy action aimed at repelling an aggression duly recognised and condemned as such on the basis of irreproachable and incontrovertible testimony. I would go so far as to say — please, mark my words — that to take another view could be very dangerous for all of us. For the time being the conflict is confined to the North Koreans, who are the aggressors, and the South Koreans, who are the victims of aggression. (*Interruptions. Interjections.*).

The United States and the other countries that have put their forces at the disposal of the UN ... (*Interruptions from the far left*).

SPEAKER. — Will honourable members please not interrupt!

SFORZA. — The United States and the other countries that have placed their forces at the UN’s disposal are acting solely on behalf of the UN. To try to identify an American political interest (*interruption from the far left*) behind the defence of the South Koreans would lead to the dangerous conclusion that a great power may be pursuing its own aims and ambitions behind the North Koreans too. But that is precisely what we want to and must avoid saying, since it would cast the huge shadow ...

Giuliano PAJETTA — You said it in the government communiqué!

SFORZA. — ... of a far more threatening conflict over the Korean incident.

Italy is not part of the UN, and we all know why. But I would venture to say that its glorious past makes it

eternally part of the concert of mankind that unites free nations in the defence of peace and security.
(*Applause*).

For that reason the Italian Government has expressed its approval and its hope that the Security Council's decision will help to restore peace.

Italy has a duty to be prudent, and it will be extremely prudent. Moreover, we are not in the UN, although we possess all the requisites for membership. But there is prudence and prudence: there is prudence in the cause of justice, and the prudence of the ostrich burying its head in the sand.

The declaration that we have decided to make can only raise the standing of Italy and the Italians in the eyes of the world.(*Applause from the centre*).

Regarding Mr Guglielmo Giannini's — how shall I put it? — curious and interesting declaration, (*Interjections*) he asked me to spell out the reasons that induced us to make our declaration of friendly solidarity. I shall do so immediately.

First: because Italy, secure within the limits imposed by the Atlantic Pact, was in a position, without taking on new obligations, to express its opinion in favour of an action aimed at achieving peace.

Second: because a similar attempt at aggression could one day take place close to us and, if that day ever comes, it will be invaluable for us to have expressed our feelings frankly and immediately, in a disinterested fashion. It would be criminal not to have done so, because one day — God forbid! — Trieste could become another Korea.

Somebody asked (and I confess I am loath to reply to such people): 'What do we stand to gain by it?'

When issues arise that involve the dignity and prestige of a great country like Italy, the fact that it lives up to its historic mission in itself means that it has risen in the esteem of the world. That is what it gains. Such things are not measured by the standards of a pawnbroker.

As Mr Antonio Cifaldi rightly said in his excellent speech: you ask when you are negotiating, not when it's a matter of saving the Fatherland. That would be to abase ourselves.

The Opposition has endeavoured to confuse matters by dragging the Atlantic Pact into the argument. In attempting to establish a relationship between the Atlantic Pact and the events in Korea, it seeks to demonstrate that, by virtue of the Pact, Italy risks being drawn into a quarrel not of its own concern. Moreover, to demonstrate their great expertise in diplomatic affairs to the innocent or the ignorant, some opposition speakers have dragged in Article 5 of the Pact.

Let me, for once, follow them in this display of expertise, pointing out simply that the Atlantic Pact remains Italy's most solid political and military safeguard against aggression, as Mr Giuseppe Cappi put it brilliantly in his speech this morning. Note that if no aggression takes place, as is to be hoped, there will be no need for the provisions of the Atlantic Pact to become operative, and that, if they were one day to become operative, it would only be because aggression had taken place. So, rather than condemning pacts drawn up to discourage or avert aggression, I would invite peace-lovers —not the same thing as the so-called 'partisans of peace' — to condemn the aggression that has recently occurred. They would thus be performing their real duty, not pursuing a fiction, as many are doing.

Here, moreover (even the most obvious things are always worth repeating), is how Article 5 of the Atlantic Pact stipulates the limits of the joint responsibility of the Contracting Parties. Let me read it out: 'The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary ... to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.'

And the following Article (Article 6) confirms the very strict limits on the joint responsibility assumed by the signatories of the Atlantic Pact, since it stipulates that: 'For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America,' or 'on the Algerian Department of France ...' France's Algerian Department has been an integral part of France for many decades and, here too, the position was stated very clearly so as to rule out any future enlargement.

Remember also that Article 5 is not automatic, as was fully explained by the Government in this Chamber when we acceded to the Pact. The fact that a majority of the members of the Alliance have recently intervened does not mean the non-automaticity clause has been superseded. We have clearly established that there has to be a perfect balance of forces between the United Army and the individual national armies, meaning that the former must not undermine the latter, but rather support them — which is what is happening. But the involvement of the majority of the Atlantic Alliance will give the Alliance, and above all the countries of Europe most exposed to attack, the supreme advantage (stressed by all parties at the last conference in London) of a better and more effective guarantee of the integrity of their national territory.

The fact that the Atlantic Pact does not apply at all to the Pacific area, and therefore gives us no right to intervene in the present conflict in Korea, does not mean that we who are party to that alliance can ignore the clear threat to peace that has occurred. Quite the opposite. I want to make one point in this respect, which gives reason to hope for peace and security. The idea of a new international moral order, based not only on treaties but on the feelings of the peoples of the world, has developed to such a degree in the West that the attack on a democratic state has aroused the unanimous indignation of all free peoples, whether members of the UN or not.

I am talking about a feeling that transcends the formal commitments of the UN Charter and other treaties. It was in deference to that feeling, which is shared by the thinking part of the Italian people, that the Government expressed its own solidarity with the UN decisions.

I said at the beginning I would produce documents to prove that the distinction between the aggressors and their victims is clear and indisputable. Mr Giuseppe Berti, Mr Giusto Tolloy and other Communist speakers expressed ideas that were subsequently reiterated by Mr Palmiro Togliatti. I accordingly feel that I need only respond, for the most part, to Mr Togliatti's speech. But I would like to make one remark about what Mr Berti said. His speech contained a revelation: 'Pacciardi said to the Republican Congress: "War is imminent." So he knew Korea was about to be attacked!' (*Laughter and interjections from the centre*). Then Mr Berti added: 'Sforza said: "Great plans are being made." So he also knew an attack on Korea was in the offing.'

I have here the text of my speech in which those two comments are supposed to have been made, and I see that Randolfo Pacciardi never said anything like 'war is imminent'. All he said was: 'The future is uncertain; there may be storms ahead.' So the poor chap knew nothing at all. (*Interjections from the centre*). The same applies to what I am alleged to have said — but let it go. I think it must be the fault of the weather: a case of sunstroke, perhaps.

Mr Berti also said the UN Commission's first telegram stated that South Korea had invaded the North. Let him read the telegram again and he will see how wrong he is.

Mr Togliatti, I am afraid, repeated Mr Berti's error word for word. Let me quote Sunday's *Unità*, which reports Mr Togliatti as saying: 'Let us begin with the first news we received of the conflict, contained in a communiqué from a United Nations Commission, which speaks of an attack by the South on the North, and only later of an attack by the North on the South. It is a fact that the communiqué has not been denied. Nor will you deny it this time either.'

I'm sorry, Mr Togliatti, but I am obliged to deny it. Let us begin by recalling that the first news of the conflict came from North Korean state radio in Pyongyang, which on 24 June 1950 broadcast a declaration

proclaiming a state of war with the Republic in the South.

That was the first news of the conflict. And in the proclamation there was no reference to an alleged attack by the South, which was only invented later, when the Security Council machinery had already been set in motion. That is the fact that cannot be denied! At first the North Korean regime thought it could spare the world the grotesque farce of an alleged attack by the South. We are happy to give North Korea credit for its good intentions in this respect. Now I come to the alleged first communiqué from the UN Commission which, Mr Berti is certain, spoke of an attack by the South, while only the second communiqué spoke of an attack by the North. I have already said that is a fabrication! Prior to the UN Commission's communiqué of 25 June, which was taken as the basis for the Security Council's decisions, there was a lesser known telegram from the Commission dated 24 June, i.e. the morning of the very day on which the conflict began at nine o'clock in the evening. Although, in the cold light of objectivity, that telegram does not flatter the foresight of the military commanders in the South or the UN observers, it indisputably documents the situation on the frontier a few hours before the attack. This is what it said:

'General situation along the parallel. The main impression reported by our observers, following inspections on the ground, is that the South Korean army is organised solely for defence. This impression is based mainly on the following observations:

- (1) The South Korean army is deployed in depth in all sectors; on the southern side the parallel is guarded by troops in small formations, located in isolated forward posts, and by mobile patrols. No troop concentrations or assault formations are visible at any point.
- (2) At various points the North Korean forces are in effective possession of salients on the southern side of the parallel and, in a least one case, occupation of these salients is very recent. There is no proof that the South Korean forces have taken any steps to repel North Korean forces from these salients or that they are preparing to do so.
- (3) Part of the Southern forces are actively engaged in rounding up guerrilla bands that have infiltrated mountainous areas in the South. It has been established that these bands are in possession of sapper equipment and are more heavily armed than on previous occasions.
- (4) With regard to the equipment of the South Korean forces, the absence of armoured troops, air support and heavy artillery makes any military initiative impossible.
- (5) The South Korean army does not appear to have any military or other convoys. In particular, there is no sign of any movement of supplies, munitions, fuel or lubricants to the forward areas. In general, there is little traffic on the roads and, apart from a convoy of four trucks transporting a company from Kankung to the east to join a detachment deployed against the guerrillas, no transport concentrations were encountered anywhere.
- (6) In general, the attitude of the South Korean commands is one of vigilant defence. The orders they have received do not go beyond withdrawal to predetermined positions in the event of attack.
- (7) There is nothing to show that the South Korean army has carried out any major reconnaissance in the North, nor is there any agitation or activity in divisional or regimental HQs to suggest preparation for hostilities. The UN observers were freely admitted to all sectors of the various HQs, including the Operations Centre.
- (8) The observers looked particularly into information regarding the situation north of the parallel. In some sectors it was reported that civilians had recently been evacuated four to eight kilometres northwards from areas close to the parallel. Another report received in the night of 22 June pointed to increased military activity in the vicinity of Ongjin. However, no reports are attached of any activity on the part of the North Korean forces such as to indicate an imminent change in the overall situation.'

I think that is enough. But let me now read you the key passages from the UN Commission's report the following day, which is the one on which Mr Berti bases his certainties: 'Reports of an invasion by South Korean forces beyond the parallel were declared utterly unfounded by the President and Foreign Minister of South Korea ... The President gave his full agreement to the Commission issuing a call for a ceasefire ... The Commission wishes to draw the Secretary General's attention to the serious situation that is developing and assuming the proportions of a war that can put international peace and security at risk. I propose that the Secretary General examine the possibility of referring the matter to the Security Council.'

Giovanni SERBANDINI. — And the next day?

SFORZA. — The next day, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie made the following statement: 'The Commission's report to me, as well as information I have received from other sources, indicates that North Korean forces have embarked on military operations. Those operations are in direct violation of the General Assembly Resolution, adopted by 48 votes to 6 with one abstention, and of the principles of the United Nations Charter.'

'The present situation is a serious threat to international peace.'

Honourable Members, you are acquainted with the Security Council Resolution, so there is no point in my reading it out to you. But I can give you the text of a telegram dated 26 June, which has up to now been disregarded, from the UN Commission in Korea to the UN Secretary General. This is what it said: 'The Commission met at 10 o'clock this morning to consider the latest reports on the hostilities and the results of direct observations carried out along the 38th parallel by the Commission's military observers.'

'On the basis of this evidence the Commission reached the following conclusions:

'First: the North Korean regime is conducting offensive operations in execution of a carefully prepared plan, the object of which is to secure control over the whole of Korea;

'Second: the South Korean forces were deployed in entirely defensive positions in all sectors of the parallel;

'Third: the South Korean troops were taken completely by surprise, having had no reason to suppose, from the information available to them, that an invasion from the North was imminent.'

Gentlemen, I think that is enough. But since there has been much talk of the internal situation in South Korea, let me tell Mr Togliatti he has been misinformed as to what the Foreign Affairs Committee said in the Senate. He was told (at least, so I understand) that I had described the situation in South Korea in alarmist terms. As Foreign Minister, I was able to speak only of what had been reported to me. Knowing the South Koreans had certain reasons for dissatisfaction with their government, I attributed them to lack of foresight and psychological judgement on the part of those in government. The main complaint — and the only one I mentioned explicitly — was that the government of South Korea — owing, perhaps, to the difficulties of the situation — had retained the services of many Korean police agents who had worked for the Japanese invaders in that capacity.

I cited this as proof of a lack of psychological judgement on the part of the government, and as one of the reasons for popular discontent. But more than that I did not know or say.

Giuseppe Di VITTORIO — You cannot do otherwise when you suppress all democratic freedoms. (*Interruptions. Interjections. Protests from the centre.*)

SFORZA. — But when you consider that South Korea is poor in the extreme, while North Korea possesses all the country's natural riches, and that the Japanese were in absolute control of South Korea for over 30 years, it is excusable that the South Korean authorities should also make use of criminal elements.

In any case, that is what I said, and nothing else.

VOICE FROM THE FAR LEFT. — The Japanese were in the North too.

Di VITTORIO. — Don't apologise for telling a bit of the truth.

SFORZA. — I said in the Senate, and I repeat here, that faced with these tragic events, we did not have the right to give governments prizes for good behaviour. Our only duty was to determine who the aggressor was — and that was clear to us.

But since the Communists have been trying to turn this Chamber into a jury that can declare one government good and another bad, I am bound to say that Mr Togliatti has frequently been misled by his informants, American or otherwise. In any case, I am confident in what I say here, since I have the information from our own agents, who are much more credible than any newspaper cuttings. Let me give you an example:

Mr Togliatti claimed that the North Korean regime did not hold elections only in the North but also encouraged South Koreans to vote. He alleges the latter did so on a large scale, albeit secretly; that, as a result, the North Korean People's Assembly is composed of 360 southern and 167 northern deputies, and that there are an equal number of North and South Koreans in the government. He also claims the North Korean government comprises not one but many parties, and is not made up of Communists.

The truth of the matter is that the elections in the North were conducted like all elections in so-called progressive countries. In defiance of the General Assembly's decision, UN observers were never allowed to enter the North. (*Interjections from the centre and right.*)

No opposition was allowed, and the 360 deputies elected were all on a single list drawn up by the authorities.

Guido RUSSO PEREZ. — Must have been quite a list! (*Interjections from the centre and the right.*)

SFORZA. — The only candidates elected in North Korea were those on the single list drawn up by the government. And do you know how that list was voted? In each polling station there were two ballot boxes: a box for votes in favour of the government, and a differently coloured box for votes against. Next to the ballot boxes were groups of uniformed and plain-clothes policemen, noting how people voted. (*Protests on the far left.*)

In contrast, the elections held in poor South Korea in June 1950 were entirely free, since they were monitored by UN observers. The ballot was completely secret.

Di VITTORIO. — How many people were arrested?

SFORZA. — The resulting South Korean Assembly is composed of ten different parties and an even larger number of independents, i.e. people hostile to the government, which is the ultimate proof of whether the elections were free or not.

As regards the regime in the North, this is how it was described in a report from the UN Commission in 1949: 'The regime in the North is the creation of the military occupant, governing under powers directly transferred from the government. The government itself has never given citizens an opportunity to verify its right to govern through a free ballot monitored by international observers.'

Another example: Mr Togliatti claimed there had been no land reform or redistribution in the South, not even of Japanese land, and that production figures were falling.

That statement is entirely unfounded. Ninety per cent of the land owned by Japanese has been distributed to peasants and landless labourers. The number of labourers has dropped from 70 % to 40 % of the workforce.

Another reform that is to take effect this summer will apply to land owned by rich Koreans; it will further reduce the number of agricultural labourers from 40 % to 10 % of the total workforce.

South Korean rice production, which averaged two million metric tons in the period 1940–44, rose to two and a half million in 1948–49, yielding annual exports of over a hundred thousand tons. In North Korea, on the other hand, rice production fell from 850 to 790 thousand tonnes in 1948.

While land reform in the South has enabled peasants and labourers to become landowners, the reform carried out in the North gave workers only temporary ownership, and there is no indication that it will be transformed into permanent, and above all individual, title deeds. If it is the kolkhoz that awaits them, the Communists have much to look forward to.

Yet another example: Mr Togliatti claimed South Korean industrial production was falling, while the opposite was true in the fortunate North. Specifically, he said steel production had fallen to zero from a pre-war figure of 75 thousand tonnes.

Those statements are incorrect. From 1946 to 1949 industrial production in the South rose from 100 to 350 tonnes. Mr Togliatti informed us that it had risen from 100 to 371 tonnes in the North over the same period; so the difference is minimal. It is incorrect to say that pre-war steel production was 75 thousand tonnes. It was considerably lower. However, in 1949, it was not zero but 10 thousand tonnes. Not much, to be sure, but industrial activity continued. Moreover, the reason for the drop in production was not only that all the coal mines are in the North, but above all that the blast furnaces in the South are electric, and in May 1948 North Korea deliberately cut off the supply of electrical power, which comes exclusively from the North.

Di VITTORIO. — I'd like to know who owns the power stations in South Korea ...

SFORZA. — Mr Togliatti said all his information comes from American sources. I'm willing to accept that. But South Korea is devoid of government action, perhaps a country whose people live in a state of semi-anarchy, where the opposition is free to say whatever it likes and any criticism is possible. Journalists and representatives from all countries have as much freedom of movement as in western Europe, and they all get a hearing. And, as we all know, forecasts of doom make much better news than restrained middle-of-the-road reporting.

So it is quite natural that, alongside a great deal of consensus, the press should contain severe criticism by opposition elements and foreign observers who, according to their political lights, find much to criticise — as they do in western Europe — in the actions of governments. But the situation is not as Mr Togliatti has gathered from his newspaper cuttings. Korea may be a long way off, but we have honest and reliable observers in the Far East who are convinced that the situation with respect to North and South Korea is essentially no different from that of Germany.

[...]

SFORZA. — Despite all that is wrong with the world of today, and the obvious shortcomings of the Council of Europe — which, as Mr Paolo Treves has shown in this Chamber, can nevertheless be extremely useful, if only as a venue for mutual understanding, when it meets in Strasbourg in August — we are proud to be counted among those who have striven to have war condemned as a crime. We are convinced that the only lasting social gains are those to be made in the long but ultimately rewarding struggle for peace.

The world is getting smaller. Our hearts go out to the thousands of Korean men and women who have been murdered, burned and raped.

We hope with all our heart that this new wave of Hitlerian barbarity will recede, and that the world will again be free for all men of good will. *(Loud applause from the centre and right.)*