

European Parliament resolution on the CSCE (9 October 1990)

Caption: On 9 October 1990, with a view to the Paris Summit to be held on 19, 20 and 21 November, the European Parliament adopts a resolution on participation by the Twelve in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), better known as Helsinki II.

Source: Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). 12.11.1990, No C 284. [s.l.]. "Resolution on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki II Conference) (9 October 1990)", auteur:European Parliament , p. 36-41.

Copyright: All rights of reproduction, public communication, adaptation, distribution or dissemination via Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries.

The documents available on this Web site are the exclusive property of their authors or right holders.

Requests for authorisation are to be addressed to the authors or right holders concerned.

Further information may be obtained by referring to the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site.

URL: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/european_parliament_resolution_on_the_csce_9_october_1990-en-4233a1df-9e4f-4b3c-b8d5-8b41a83d72b3.html

Last updated: 03/07/2015

European Parliament resolution on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki II Conference) (9 October 1990)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gorla (B3-759/89) calling on the Council to take steps for the full and active involvement of the Community in the Helsinki II Conference,
 - having regard to all its resolutions on security in Western Europe and the agreements on disarmament,
 - having regard to the resolutions adopted between 1968 and 1986 on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
 - having regard to its resolution of 17 June 1987 on the implementation of the Helsinki Agreement and the role of the European Parliament in the CSCE process ⁽¹⁾,
 - having regard to its resolutions on recent developments in Central and Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany,
 - having regard to its resolutions on the Community's relations with the COMECON countries,
 - having regard to the interim report of the Political Affairs Committee on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki II) (A3-226/90).
- A. having regard to the declarations of the summit meetings of Madrid, Rhodes, Strasbourg and Dublin on the progress of negotiations on disarmament and the CSCE,
- B. noting the decisions taken — within the framework of the CSCE — during the conferences in Vienna (CFE and CSBM), London (information), Paris and Copenhagen (the human dimension) and Bonn (economic cooperation) and the positions adopted at the Warsaw Pact summit which immediately preceded it,
- C. recalling the positions of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Scotland on 7 and 8 June 1990,
- D. welcoming the proposal put forward by two Member States for a conference on security and cooperation dealing with the Mediterranean,

Notes that:

I. Results of the Helsinki Final Act

1. The Helsinki Final Act contributed, particularly through the decisions of the bodies of the CSCE, to stabilizing the climate of peace and cooperation in Europe and securing respect for human rights, despite the fact that it was a political text and not an international treaty;
2. Although for at least ten years after the signature of the Helsinki Final Act, Communist governments ignored its human rights provisions, there has been a great improvement since 1985 and now the countries participating in the CSCE, with certain exceptions, have promoted the ten basic principles of the Final Act;
3. Despite the progress made in the important area of human rights, it has been acknowledged that their continued violation jeopardizes democracy, peace and cooperation; the situation in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria gives particular cause for concern in this respect;
4. The majority of countries participating in the CSCE have respected the principles of territorial integrity,

frontiers and the sovereign equality of states;

5. Unfortunately, circumstances have arisen in which the above principles have been violated by the use of force, and the fifth principle of the Final Act on the peaceful solution of differences has been ignored;

6. In the fifteen years since the signing of the Final Act, considerable progress has been made on cooperation in numerous sectors; although it has failed to reverse Europe's division into two politically, economically and militarily opposed blocs, that division fortunately seems to be disappearing;

7. The principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which does not constitute an international treaty but a political text, have failed to prevent the flaring up and/or persistence of regional conflicts, especially in the Mediterranean area;

8. In conclusion, the principles of the Final Act have helped open up the way to major changes in Europe and provide a framework for cooperation which, though not yet effective in the Mediterranean region for example, nevertheless forms a basis on which it is now both possible and necessary to make significant further progress;

II. The changes in Europe

9. The changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall have brought an end to the division of Europe and set the final seal on the Yalta Agreements;

10. The end of the division of Europe, the collapse of the Yalta system and the continued progress towards democratic pluralism in many European states paves the way for a peaceful and united Europe based on democracy and human rights and creates the conditions for cooperation in environmental, economic, scientific, cultural and security matters;

11. The changes in Europe offer particular opportunities in the field of security policy; the decades of military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact must be replaced by a process of ongoing cooperation;

12. This altered situation in Europe requires an assessment to be made of the usefulness of numerous international treaties, organizations and initiatives, for example NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, EFTA, the European Communities, the Helsinki agreements, the United Nations; their 'traditional' tasks, largely conceived during the Yalta era, can be reconsidered, altered, renewed or restructured; in time some organizations could even be dismantled and other international institutions could take on new tasks; this assessment must lead to the establishment of democratic structures with roles which do not overlap and where each, in its field, promotes peace;

13. The serious economic problems facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe threaten progress towards both democratization and peace;

14. The unification of Germany is justifiably welcomed as the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new construction of Europe;

15. The political, economic and defence issues arising from the unification of Germany are tied up completely with European security and cooperation;

III. Helsinki II

16. The countries of Europe and the USA have already agreed that the CSCE is the appropriate framework for planning the new Europe and establishing a new order of peace which will cover all the countries

participating in the CSCE and the sensitive region of the Mediterranean; with a view to resolving existing problems and preventing future crises in the sensitive Mediterranean region, particular account should be taken of the Spanish proposal for a special conference and the conclusions of the meeting of the CSCE Member States in Majorca;

17. The new CSCE summit conference — Helsinki II — must solve all the problems connected with security and cooperation and its decisions should take the form of an international treaty;

18. The context in which the conference should take place should be determined by the following points:

- the decisions and agreements of the CSCE (Bonn Conference on economic cooperation, Copenhagen Conference on the human dimension, Majorca meeting on the Mediterranean dimension, agreements on conventional arms limitation),
- the decisions of the European summit meetings and, in particular, the decisions of the special Dublin Conference,
- President Mitterrand's proposals on a pan-European confederation and President Gorbachev's proposals on a common European home,
- the Belgian Government's proposal on the creation of a European Defence Council,
- Prime Minister Mazowiecki's proposal on a European Cooperation Council which would include the USA, Canada and the Soviet Union and the related proposal of Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister Havel on the creation of a European Security Commission,
- the decisions of the special European Council meeting in Dublin,
- the proposals that have been or may be made by the European Parliament or the various national parliaments on this subject;

19. The basic aims of the conference shall include:

- extending the circle of signatory states to include Albania at least and, possibly, other countries of the Mediterranean region that were excluded previously,
- formulating a pan-European security system based on cooperation in the political, cultural, environmental and economic spheres and mutual trust,
- establishing new principles that are recognized and accepted by all parties and setting up some organization such as a CSCE Security Council to promote these principles and monitor compliance with them;

20. In this context, a suitable procedure should be sought for the reshaping of the defence treaties and a pan-European body convened to implement security policy throughout Europe as a whole, involving all the countries participating in the CSCE;

21. The latest developments in the Persian Gulf show that, though military confrontation has abated in Europe, new security policy issues will arise not only inside Europe but also beyond its confines, and the European countries should take a united stand in response to such challenges;

22. The grave crisis in the Persian Gulf caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced a common response from the Community's Member States for the first time and confirms the general observation that the projected pan-European security system cannot guarantee peace in Europe if peace in the Mediterranean and the Middle East is not guaranteed at the same time; the Helsinki II European security process must,

therefore, be given greater impetus;

23. Any decisions and agreements at the 4 + 2 conference concerning the position of a united Germany in the existing defence system must be made with a European security system in view;

24. The current situation of tension in the Mediterranean arising from various sources requires a forum for discussion, bringing together the various parties, such as a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM);

25. In tandem with the Helsinki II Conference, swifter action is needed and new initiatives must be taken with regard to disarmament, the banning of chemical weapons, controlling the production and sale of weapons, the structure of the armed forces and determining the future of foreign military dispositions; naturally, negotiations should be intensified to achieve a drastic reduction in conventional, nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons with mutual and collective verification;

26. The conference should determine the procedure and mechanisms for intervening in any border disputes so as to avoid dangerous conflicts developing;

27. In the same spirit, it would be advisable to determine the procedure for intervening in complicated situations at the external borders of the territory covered by the collective security system;

28. In order to achieve this goal, intervention procedures must be established with a view to the peaceful settlement of differences and the avoidance of armed conflict;

29. It is also necessary to establish a framework for the sale and export of weapons to third countries and to create an effective monitoring system to prevent the sale of weapons, military equipment and advanced technology which could be used for military purposes in countries which violate international law and fail to implement UN decisions and in countries which are at war;

30. It is clear that a collective security system will not be able to operate unless existing differences are resolved and peace is established in areas where disputes and conflicts exist because of violent interventions, as is still the case in various parts of Europe;

31. In view of the unanimous agreement that security and peace in Europe will be based on cooperation rather than militarization, Helsinki II must tackle the following basic issues:

(a) the recognition and inviolability of current borders, respect for the sovereign equality of states and territorial integrity,

(b) the definition of the substance of and the procedures for practising the right to self-determination of those entitled to exercise that right,

(c) the definition of the rights and obligations of minorities within states, within the framework of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act on respect for the unity and territorial integrity of states,

(d) the institution of pluralist democracy with free elections and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities as a prerequisite for a country's participation in the European edifice,

(e) human rights must be given a new dimension to meet the social and economic requirements of individuals (equal opportunities for men and women, the right to a healthy environment, the right to work, the right to welfare, the right to education, etc.),

(f) the environment belongs to all mankind and its protection is an obligation for us all; consequently, measures are required whose implementation by all the countries of the CSCE is mandatory,

(g) organized crime, particularly that linked to the drugs trade, and terrorism threaten social peace and create further interstate disputes; regulations that are accepted and implemented jointly must therefore be introduced to combat these evils;

32. It is self-evident that the balanced development of all European countries and the closing of the gap between rich and poor countries can be achieved through economic cooperation and solidarity;

33. To this end, attention should be given to the creation of a Solidarity Fund which could also assist the poorer countries of the Third World. This fund could be financed from the resources saved as a result of reductions in armaments;

IV. Institutions and bodies of Helsinki II

34. To implement and monitor the decisions of the Conference, permanent arrangements and bodies with a fixed seat must be set up, in particular:

- (a) a permanent secretariat,
- (b) a committee of permanent representatives,
- (c) a council of foreign ministers,
- (d) regular summit meetings.

All these bodies could operate within the framework of a European Security Council which, on the basis of the experience of the United Nations, should acquire the possibility of swift and effective intervention;

35. Decisions in any form of intervention must be taken collectively and always with the aim of maintaining peace and averting the use of force;

36. Supranational bodies set up to implement and monitor the decisions of Helsinki II should be given broader scope through the convocation of a parliamentary assembly, so that the whole new European edifice has firm democratic foundations; the Council of Europe could constitute the basis for such a parliamentary assembly;

37. Respect for human rights must be a statutory requirement of states taking part in Helsinki II processes and decisions; this calls for the strengthening of the role and effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights;

V. The Community's role

38. The European Community can and must play a decisive role in Helsinki II in shaping the new structure of Europe;

39. The European Community is at present the only stable and dynamic supranational organization of states with a political and economic dimension;

40. To serve as the central focus of the new Europe, the Community must display a united front throughout both the CSCE and Helsinki II process;

41. This aim must be achieved at the EC countries' forthcoming intergovernmental conference by accelerating the movement towards political integration, economic and monetary union and the adoption of a common foreign policy and a common policy on security;

42. The pursuit of a common foreign policy is inextricably linked with the pursuit of a security and defence policy; the Treaty of Rome should not hamper the granting of full powers in security and defence matters to

the European union; the Western European Union should not be 'revitalized' in the process but should, rather, be integrated into the European Union;

43. The united front presented by the Community during these processes must be based on firm democratic foundations and this presupposes constant cooperation on the part of the Council and the Commission with the European Parliament and the national parliaments;

44. The European Parliament must play a consistent and clearly defined role in the Helsinki II process:

- (a) The European Parliament should be represented at the 35-nation summit by its President and a small delegation of Members,
- (b) European Parliament observers should be present at all CSCE meetings, as was the case at the Copenhagen Conference; to that end, the European Parliament should set up a temporary EP/CSCE delegation, appointed by the Political Affairs Committee, for the duration of CSCE II,
- (c) The Council Presidency should keep the European Parliament regularly briefed on the positions of the Twelve at the various CSCE conferences;

45. The Conference of the Parliaments of the European Community to be held in Rome at the end of November 1990 must make provision for national parliaments to participate in the abovementioned processes and in the processes leading to the integration of the European Community;

Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers of the Member States meeting in EPC and the governments and parliaments of all the countries participating in the CSCE.

(1) OJ No C 190, 20.7.1987, p.67.