

# Parliamentary debates in the Italian Senate concerning ratification of the Paris agreements (Rome, 15 March 1952)


**Caption:** On 15 March 1952, the Senate of the Italian Republic adopts the government bill ratifying the Treaty of Paris of 18 April 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

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Saturday, 15 March 1952

**In the Chair: President Enrico De Nicola**

**President.** On the agenda is the continuation of the debate on the bill on the: ‘ratification and implementation of the following international agreements signed in Paris on 18 April 1951: (a) Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and annexes; (b) Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities; (c) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice; (d) Protocol on Relations with the Council of Europe; (e) Convention on the Transitional Provisions.’

The next speaker is the rapporteur for the Government.

**Stefano Jacini, Rapporteur for the Government.** Mr President, Senators, I think that all sides of the House will acknowledge that this has been a broad and honest debate. It may perhaps, without exaggeration, be described as a solemn debate, given the moment at which it is being held. Even those among us who have voiced regret that the public has not been sufficiently informed (Senators Giuseppe Casadei and Guido Molinelli, I think) should reconsider, because the press too has accorded this debate its proper importance. Those who would have wished to hear the Minister of Labour and the Minister for Trade speak in the debate will have seen that both have expounded their reasoning in full in the discussion. Consequently, we have all the background. We have expressed all our concerns here. Mine have not been entirely dispelled, and I would not have accepted this task without trying to overcome them for myself, before bringing them before the House. The fact is that while the ideal of a European confederation may be a matter of faith, a kind of religious belief you can cling to even against hope, it is clear that opinions may differ when we are talking about the ways of achieving that structure, and we must engage in cool-headed discussion, however fervent our personal beliefs.

I have followed every word of the debate from the first day, so please forgive me if I cannot reflect that in my answer. On the main technical issues, I must refer you to what has been said by the committee and various Members of the Senate.

I shall try to cover the political issues, but as regards the different lengths of report of the 3rd and 5th committees, I must make a point regarding which I count above all on our President’s great wisdom. I have been criticised for being brief and I have been told that the discussion in our committee was also brief. I do not believe that to be so, but if it is the case, then I am delighted: at least it means that honourable Members have the opportunity of saying something new in the plenary session. Our colleagues in the finance committee meantime have had the pleasure of hearing all the arguments already voiced in committee retailed once again in the Chamber, with a fresh coat of paint. I find myself wondering whether this does not reflect a misconception of what our committees should be doing. In my humble opinion, they should, among other things, be responsible for doing the spadework, tackling an array of initial problems, so that only essential issues are referred to the Chamber. If the House had to debate afresh all that has already been discussed in committee, there would be little point in having committees.

That is not, of course, a subject that is relevant to what I should be referring to the Senate, so I just make the point for honourable Members to reflect on and to our President for further discussion.

What did we not touch on in our discussion! We talked of China, the Vatican and Catholicism. We studied the family trees of all of the steel-owning dynasties. Even Senator Girolamo Li Causi was heard to wax eloquent in favour of crises — something no one would ever have thought possible, given his past history. But what lies behind so radical a change? And that is exactly what it was. Senator Giovanni Roveda has recounted to us his youthful memories of railing against the parasitical iron and steel industry, against the leeches. We all remember the infamous Ferri-Bettolo affair: those debates were the stuff of our youth. Now the roles have been reversed: the defence is being mounted from where the attack should have begun and vice versa. The reality is very simple. Honourable Members on the far Left, put your hands on your hearts

and tell us: if Russia, rather than the Western powers, were proposing to us the agreement we are considering today, with the same limitations, would you not consider to be fine and positive everything you now condemn as foul and dangerous? Take note that Russia and its satellites control 330 million tonnes of coal and 27 million tonnes of steel. It could, therefore, whenever it chooses, trample the Italian steel industry as an elephant tramples a gnat. So why will you not accept from one side what you would have accepted from the other? We have a clear conflict of ideologies here.

I thought about that when listening to the learned technical exposés from that side of the House, and I asked myself whether, were our roles reversed, those same arguments might not be used to underpin the opposite view.

And the same applies to the infamous German threat. No one is denying the risk of German belligerence; it always has been and probably always will be with us. But I fail to see why we should be more suspicious of a Germany that has been defeated and rescued, like it or not, by democratic institutions and individuals than was Stalin of Hitler's fully armed Germany at the height of its powers. The fact is that recent documentation — and I have an interesting summary of it here — has revealed that we need to some extent to correct what you have repeatedly told us here in the Chamber about the purely 'tactical and instrumental' nature of the 1939 Soviet-German non-aggression pact. That line cannot be maintained; the truth is very different. This was a genuinely aggressive alliance with a clearly defined twofold objective. It was designed both to prevent Germany from entering the Ukraine and to make it possible to gain a stranglehold on Poland, thus recreating, in different form, two centuries on, the infamous union between Frederick the Great and Catherine the Great. That union cast a lasting shadow of infamy over them both, even though both were in many ways admirable figures.

*Voice from the Left.* It was not long after Munich.

**Jacini, Rapporteur for the Government.** But it is a fact that the pact was entered into with a Germany ten times stronger than it is now. So I see no problem in reaching agreement with Germany, particularly in this instance. After all, the effect of the agreement is to coordinate the operation of the two major coal and iron ore fields and thereby eliminate what has for years — and indeed centuries — been the main cause of friction between the two nations. It is therefore in the common interest and the interest of both states to eliminate or diminish the possibilities of conflict. Consequently we can welcome an agreement that has elicited a variety of responses in Germany, but there too has largely been understood for what it is, namely a peace accord.

I also ascribe the attitude of the far Left towards workers employed in the mining companies to the radical shift I mentioned a few moments ago. Of course, the 90 000 steel workers, 10 000 coal miners and the 30 000 workers employed in subsidiary industries are a significant number, and we should be concerned about them. But then there are the anticipated advantages to hundreds of thousands of workers employed in the heavy engineering industries: advantages that have been acclaimed, it seems to me, and are unquestionable. Furthermore, no one has shown that these agreements will destroy the iron and steel industries of the smaller countries. This is all based on the preconception I mentioned earlier. If, from the outset, you assume that our partners in the agreement are acting in bad faith, if you assume the agreements are being concluded for the sole purpose of damaging the Italian steel industry (of so little impact, moreover, on the national budget), then, plainly, every word can be distorted, deprived of its true meaning and a sinister construction placed on it. But while the liberalisation of markets will secure a positive advantage for the huge numbers employed in the engineering industry, there is nothing to prove that the far smaller number of workers employed in the iron and steel industry will inevitably be harmed.

As Senators Giulio Bergmann and Teresio Guglielmone have rightly pointed out, the pool is based on solidarity and market security in the face of those who would like to disrupt it. What interest would our associates have in that? Do you know when that interest could arise, in circumstances best avoided? On the day we opt not to be part of the pool. We could then be at risk, because the forces we are called on to integrate by acceding to the Plan could turn against us.

A number of senators from the Opposition benches, including, if I am not mistaken, Senator Mosé Ricci, have complained that this agreement was reached without a prior general debate on the future federative system for Europe. My response, relying on Senator Michele Giua's knowledge of chemistry, is that when a fluid mass is crystallising, it does not matter at what point the process of crystallisation begins to appear, provided it happens. Actually, I think one reason for the agreement's vitality is this apparent disorder. Experience teaches us that only abstract agreements on paper, only doctrinal and theoretical agreements, start with a preamble and then follow on with every individual part logically set out, in a pre-established sequence; in real life that does not happen. Everything is done as and when necessary. One process begins in one place, another elsewhere. In this instance, circumstances have prompted us to begin by pooling coal and steel, but we could have begun with transport or, say, culture. It does not matter; what matters is that we should start properly somewhere and that the machine should get under way and not grind to a halt. But if today we refuse to ratify the agreement, then the machine will come to an abrupt halt and go into reverse. As a result, all future negotiations will be seriously jeopardised, because there will no longer be any reason to look favourably on pooling defence or agriculture, or whatever else, if we have refused to agree to the first pool proposed to us.

Senator Casadei has put a direct question to me. He asked me whether we would join the representatives of the Opposition in the Assembly of the Schuman Plan, and in other future Assemblies. As you see, Senator Casadei, I have not turned down your invitation, I openly accept it. And I have to tell you that I have reflected on that subject. As far as I am concerned — and I do not know what the Government's attitude will be — I can tell you that, as a rule, I am always for minority representation, because I think it helps the dialectic progress of the work of the majority. In Strasbourg itself, there are some countries — and let me mention the United Kingdom on the one hand, and Germany on the other — that considered it appropriate to have their delegations include members of both Government and Opposition parties. I should add that, in the case of the United Kingdom, in terms of numbers and the views they hold, there is so little difference between the two groups that when there was a change of government and the Conservatives took office and Labour went into Opposition, we in Strasbourg barely noticed it. The only difference was this: the more Europeanist line that the Conservatives were backing was supported by Labour and vice versa. I had anticipated that and, moreover, mentioned it to one of them, who fully agreed with me.

But there is one fact we should not forget, Senator Casadei. The Opposition parties we are talking about fully accept the basis and need for the Strasbourg Assembly. In short, they are fully participating in the democratic game being played out there, for the purposes of cooperating and building Europe. Now you yourself, Senator Casadei, have told the House that if tomorrow you were called upon to cooperate, yours would be a very different approach. Admittedly, you would to some extent be compromised by the mere fact that you were sitting in that Assembly. However, were you to take, let us not say a critical approach — after all, it is the role of the Opposition to criticise — but an obstructionist, anti-constructive approach, the existence and operation of an institution which has only just seen the light of day and is still very vulnerable would be at risk, and that could represent a threat for the whole Assembly.

Take care, you say: ours is a different approach as regards the Italian Parliament. Very well then: you have accepted the Constitution we have drawn up, albeit subject to certain doctrinal reservations. You are involved here, formally speaking at least, in the interaction of constitutional forces (*Comments from the Left*). That is an interesting admission, a positive fact. I wonder then whether we should not wait until we are resilient enough to withstand an onslaught that could have disastrous implications.

Senator Emilio Lussu has commended me for not including praise for the negotiators in the report. I took it out simply because I thought that in future discussions it could be useful for our representatives to be able to say that the Italian Parliament did not at all express satisfaction at the results obtained. In reality, however, I have to say that personally — and I think I speak for most members of the committee here — we have truly admired the fight our negotiators mounted and the progress achieved. The result is that the Plan now being proposed to us is very different from the original Plan.

And I should say here to Senator Mosé Ricci — who says that Italians always seem to take on the role of supplicants, asking for the recognition of rights they already possess, and do not know how to take a proud

stance — that I do not believe that to be true. We have seen the dreadful outcome of the *Matamoras* approach, founded solely on motives of prestige. A positive attitude based on reality and a sense of proportion seems to me to be infinitely more helpful to our cause. Permit me, as a long-time enthusiast for historical subjects, to point out to Senator Ricci that the example he cites is not the most appropriate. He spoke of Plombières, and Cavour's attitude in those circumstances. As far as we know, he was certainly not inspired by extreme pride. He actually took a flexible approach, designed to achieve specific results, which might require major sacrifices. And you know what dreadful sacrifice was agreed to in relation to the Sardinian monarchy at the Plombières conference. No doubt had the result of a similar conference been presented to us here today, people would say that the negotiator had betrayed his country's interests. He did it for a great purpose, and history is grateful to him for it. But we cannot claim that his attitude was forged from the kind of pride not reflected in our current approach — I would venture to claim the contrary.

A word now about the objection relating to constitutionality. It has an unmistakably political undertone which no doubt escaped Senator Pasquale Jannaccone when he lent it his own erudite support. This is an extremely important issue. It affects not only this agreement but any future supranational initiative. Here again, I am expressing my personal view, which I assume to be that of the committee. The committee did not, however, discuss the matter *ex professo*, because the Opposition did not think fit to raise it specifically in committee. In my view, the ratification we are debating falls perfectly within the terms of reference of the usual constitutional bodies and certainly meets the terms of Article 11 of the Constitution. As you know, that article makes the limitations of sovereignty required for a legal system that allows for peace and justice among nations subject to the principle of reciprocity with the other states. That reciprocity seems to me to have been fully delivered and guaranteed by the last three paragraphs of Article 9 of the Treaty, regardless of the number of citizens of each state required to take part in the High Authority — incidentally, that number has yet to be determined. In no way is the High Authority exclusive and despotic and able to quash the other organs for which provision is made, as some have said. It is limited both by the other institutions the Treaty provides for and by its composition. That it why it is relatively unimportant whether Italy has one or two representatives, because the High Authority can never be unanimously united against just one member. Were a negotiator liable to find himself in a minority, he could always play on the lack of unanimity among his colleagues. You have only to look at the composition of the High Authority to understand how difficult it is to achieve that kind of unanimity. Consequently, a representative of ours who fears he is going to be in a minority will be able to avail himself of the lack of agreement among the others, in so far as he needs to for his own ends.

But officially and, I hope, in reality, these representatives must above all represent themselves and the common interest rather than the countries they come from. Failing that, we shall be back in the usual run of international organisations and we shall not achieve the kind of supranational organisation we want to set up.

Generally speaking, it seems to us that the abandonment of sovereignty, which so shocks some Members, is inherent in any measure of this kind. I said yesterday, during an interruption, that if we want to achieve a federal Europe, we shall have to have the courage to begin shedding part of our sovereignty. It matters little whether we do this in relation to pooling coal or transport. What counts is that we should move on from a nationalistic to a supranational concept.

In that sense, I completely agree with what a number of Members have said, Senator Bergmann in particular. The organisation of the pool requires a partial abandonment of sovereignty, and you on the Left should be the last to criticise us for it, because it is nothing other than the partial realisation of the ideal you have always gloried in defending. Why these ideals should suddenly be deprecated, why — among Herzen, Mazzini and Flandin — it should be the authority of Flandin that is specifically cited by the extreme Left is something I fail to comprehend. Senator Raffaele Sanna Randaccio rightly remarked that, from that point of view as well, a refusal on our part to ratify this agreement would be disastrous for Italy. It would set us at a disadvantage in relation to all the institutions and initiatives on which we might embark in the future. We would thus lose the diplomatic advantage we obtained by taking a position in the vanguard at international gatherings, thanks to the decisive attitude of our Prime Minister. Mark it well, this appears to me to be most characteristic where the activities of our Prime Minister abroad are concerned, and in my opinion this is



admirable. He has made a point of stressing that, in relation to international and supranational negotiations, Italy does not fit in with what has already been decided; it is clearly in the vanguard and at the forefront of the initiative. If today, we reject the Treaty, that position will be eternally compromised, not just for now, but forever. And with what benefit for Italy, I leave to your imagination.

A number of Opposition speakers and also a few on the Government side have rightly objected to the proliferation of bodies that are going to be set up in this way. Senator Antonio Azara was right when he said: too many courts! I have to assure him that the same concern was constantly voiced at the latest meetings of the joint committee and the presidency, as well as the standing committee of the Strasbourg Consultative Assembly. You know why it has not so far been possible to bring those new-style bodies together over there. There are two basic reasons. The first lies in the differing powers of the different Assemblies. As you know, the Strasbourg Assembly is purely consultative, whereas the Assembly that is to be set up under the Schuman Plan or the one that could soon be set up soon under the defence Plan, while not legislative assemblies, as I may perhaps have said rather exaggeratedly, are in any event largely deliberative. There are clearly practical problems involved in incorporating deliberative bodies into a Consultative Assembly. The other reason — and we should not try to hide it — is that countries that are not going to accede to the Schuman Plan are members of the Consultative Assembly. They would therefore have powers without making any contribution. Those are the objections which have held up the unification process we need. We feel the need for it so strongly that I have no doubt that, sooner or later, it will be achieved. Actually, it is in itself an important sign that not only Mr Schuman with his Plan but also the President-in-Office of the OEEC and the Ministers who were meeting to discuss defence issues all travelled to Strasbourg, in body or in spirit, and placed their initiative under the auspices of that international Assembly. That is advance recognition of what will subsequently be the true role of the Assembly. We can only hope that it will come to fruition as soon as possible.

I have noted a number of what might be described as technical points. I would like to explain them to the House, though I am aware that they are of minor importance compared with the points raised in the debate. But, as I have said, in regard to technical issues, I would refer particularly to what the committee on finance and the budget has said, as well as the different speakers. I would say to Senator Federico Ricci that he puts himself in a somewhat contradictory position by, on the one hand, complaining that customs barriers have recently been set in place between states and, on the other, claiming that it is better for us to produce all we need at home, whatever the cost.

**Federico Ricci** . I did not complain about the setting up of customs barriers.

**Jacini**, *Rapporteur for the Government*. Then I am still less happy about what you said, because it reflects a more reactionary stance. In fact, it is hard to imagine a more reactionary stance than that of someone who does not today complain about customs barriers being erected. As far as I am concerned, that confirms the need to tear them down and I am not therefore persuaded by your ‘whatever the cost’.

To Senator Giovanni Roveda, who took the opportunity afforded by this debate to accuse the Government of having misspent public monies on the ground that, instead of subsidies, its aim ought to have been the implementation of integral programmes, I would say that this is an important issue but not relevant to this debate. The time to discuss it, if at all, would be when adopting the industry budget. Here we are dealing with the possible consequences of the situation as it stands. It is undeniable that this Treaty is not designed to sacrifice the iron and steel industries for the benefit of others. The sole aim of the Treaty is to cut production costs, thereby improving supplies of raw materials for all undertakings.

Senator Vinicio Ziino was right to point out that the Treaty does not create a private trust designed to increase the profits of the industry, but concentrates the industries in order to achieve the lowest production costs, and, in pooling coal and steel, to replace industrial profit with social objectives.

I have no particular knowledge of scrap, but I have failed to understand, from the many speeches given here in the debate, why the proposed Treaty would damage that market, in other words our sources of supply. In fact, in the event of economic problems, the Treaty guarantees us a quota, commensurate with our needs, of

the ferrous scrap available to the European Community. Without the Treaty, that quota would definitely not be available. In normal circumstances, we shall always be able to purchase outside the pool market as well to supplement the national reserves which, for the reasons already explained by the committee on finance and the budget, are intended to bring forward the replacement of the solid fuel plants with liquid fuel plants. I shall not dwell on that point, as I should like others better informed than I to respond on these issues.

But I should like to say one thing about the workforce because, and I hope Senator Roveda will not mind, I have a little knowledge on this subject. For 20 years, I was responsible for emigration issues and the matter is therefore not at all unfamiliar to me. In the past, I visited the iron fields of Lorraine, the coal mines of Westphalia and the Ruhr, and studied in detail the conditions of our workers at that period. The position was certainly not good, in fact it was definitely worse than today. We should make a clear distinction between the two types of work. In relation to iron, Italian workers are particularly skilled, because this work is closely related to the mountain tunnels in which we are experts. The Italian workforce knows all about drilling, and in my days in Meurthe-et-Moselle and a few other centres the Italian workforce had almost completely replaced local and other foreign workers.

But when I visited the coalfields, I saw that Italian workers tried to keep the surface work for themselves, because extracting coal in underground passages, using outdated tools like pick axes, was alien to their temperament and damaging to their health. But I think that the situation has changed a good deal. It is certainly not enviable. But it is certainly no worse or better as a result of the Schuman Plan. In any case, the Schuman Plan will give our workers a right of citizenship, liberalise the movement of workers and thus give our workers the kind of stability they have not previously enjoyed. They have lacked stability in their country of immigration. I do not see the harm in that. I think it a significant advantage if our workers are placed on an absolutely equal footing with local workers.

I therefore believe that emigration, while not the panacea many think it is — though I am not among them — is a vital element in our economic life, given the size of the Italian workforce. In any event the current circumstances of Italian emigrants can only be improved as a result of the Plan.

I am rapidly coming to a conclusion. Someone said: you do not enter an agreement that lasts for half a century. That is true. Furthermore, had we to take literally this idea of the Treaty not being open to amendment, then clearly the comments made on it in or outside this House or in other Parliaments would be pointless because, in its current form, the Treaty can be ratified or rejected but not amended. Why then all the recommendations and why are not just the Italian Government but the governments of all the other countries tending to take note of them, consider and discuss them and take account of them? Because once it is implemented, the need to amend the Treaty is bound to become apparent, and these changes could be made by common accord as provided for in the Treaty itself. And so everything we say in this House and everything we may say later, depending on how the Treaty develops, could be extremely useful, because it could enable us to gear the operation of the Treaty more closely to the reality of the situation.

I would add that it will be fairly straightforward to introduce changes in implementation if we are inside the pool but not if we are outside. If we stay outside, we shall of course always come up against this fundamental objection: why did you not join us? But if we are within the confines of the Plan, in full union with the other states, we can, of course, work together more effectively to prepare what will then be regarded as the definitive text.

Furthermore, and what I am going to say may appear naïve, but it is my firm belief: the Treaty, as it says itself, is open to everyone, without exception. And I think it would be a great day for the whole world when all can accede with equal rights and the same contributions. I do not think this is something to criticise; it something to be strongly desired. We should not in any event do anything to prevent it or make it impossible in the long term.

Senators, here I conclude the few humble comments that your words, to which I have listened very carefully, have prompted. Let me end with one thought. It may be, and Senator Sanna Randaccio said this yesterday, that our children will feel that here today, as Goethe said of the battle of Valmy, a 'new era in history' has

begun; these modest beginnings may spark a major change in world history. We all have to shoulder our own responsibility, so that no one, to quote Manzoni, one day telling it to his son, will sigh 'I was not there'. Manzoni adds: 'forever grieved he who ... on that day the sacred victorious banner did not salute'. We do not as yet have a woven banner, and so, for the time being, we shall respect and retain the flags of the individual countries. But this banner is already beginning to flutter in our hearts and we hope that soon it will fly above the national flags, proclaiming, in itself and in the ideals it embodies, the noblest of the ideals they represent. In expressing that hope, I conclude my few comments, and recommend to the Senate that it adopt this legislative text. (*Loud Applause from the Centre and the Right. Many congratulations.*)

[...]

**Ottavio Pastore**, *Rapporteur for the Opposition*. Different in form. But the socialist United States of Europe come from a different tradition: from the liberal, democratic and national tradition. And that is not your tradition; it is the antithesis of your tradition. These are the two currents that have always clashed, especially in Italy.

But I do not think it appropriate to discuss this at length here, even though we need to understand the innermost thoughts of our adversaries.

Let us leave these general political questions on one side, and look at the real issues. The Schuman Plan raises three fundamental questions. They are the iron and steel industry, the coal industry and the chemicals industry. I am not going to repeat here what other colleagues, including Senators Ricci and Jannaccone, have said with greater authority. But inevitably, while endeavouring to summarise the issues as rapidly as possible, we have to ask what, in the final analysis, the states acceding to the pool actually have in common. Not raw materials, because ferrous scrap is largely precluded; not iron ore because Algeria has been excluded through the expedient of the Santa Margherita accords. We are no better off for iron ore than we were before, even before the accords. We would very probably be just as well off without them — especially since England will continue to receive iron ore from Algeria in much larger quantities than we do, and it did not need special agreements or to be part of the Schuman Plan.

There is nothing 'common' in this community for us. The only thing we have in common is our internal market. In a sense that is our only asset because it is the only resource we have with which to start negotiations and obtain something in return. That is being pooled with the rest. We liberally open up our internal market; we abandon all forms of customs protection and all the authority of our Government and Parliament over the development of Italian industry. We are entrusting the development of our industry to a foreign authority. But the others are being careful not to make their goods available to us on a proper, equal footing, that is to say the raw materials, the coal, the ferrous scrap and iron ore.

That is my basic criticism of this Treaty. The argument in favour most often put forward is the benefit it should have for the engineering industry. Senator Cesare Merzagora even managed to elicit applause from the Government benches by extolling those advantages. But just a few minutes later, the very calm and confident words of Senator Jannaccone were more than enough to burst the balloon of Senator Merzagora's enthusiasm and that of his friends. Is it true that our engineering industry will be guaranteed iron and steel products? Senator Jannaccone clearly pointed out that the Treaty refers to low prices; but what does it mean by low prices? What is the significance of that expression? Low compared to what? It does not even refer to minimum prices in relation to cost prices, though to go and establish real cost prices in a big modern plant would be a major undertaking. Even that is a very vague formula, difficult to pin down. Each company puts together its cost prices as it sees fit; but if only the Treaty had at least established that iron and steel products should be sold at minimum cost prices. It has done no such thing. It refers to low prices, but how are those low prices determined? The day the monopolistic German iron and steel companies decide to increase prices, we will know what its low prices are. We have no guarantee. The Treaty formula allows some price speculation and makes it possible to fix prices in whatever way the various producers deem appropriate.

The other very important point to make is that the iron and steel industry is closely linked to the engineering industry. It is therefore absurd to believe that the German iron and steel industry is prepared to grant special



conditions to our engineering industry, when we often have the same interests. The truth is that, even in relation to supplies of iron and steel products, we shall have to accept the conditions the monopoly imposes on us. The difference being that before, since there was no monopoly, we could manoeuvre between the different companies. In point of fact, in Italy now, iron and steel products are sold at higher prices than in the producer countries. But it has happened in past decades that German iron and steel products were sold at lower prices than in Germany. In future, however, prices will be fixed by the cartel, which will look first and foremost to the interests of its own industry. I cannot believe that the Ruhr magnates, the successors of Krupp, are fired by the Europeanist spirit and prepared to sell their products on favourable terms.

In conclusion, what advantages do we gain from the Plan? Does it guarantee us raw materials? No, because in addition to everything else, there is a clause providing that in the event of shortages on the raw materials market the High Authority will make raw materials available according to circumstances and economic considerations. And so, if there is a shortage of raw materials on the international market, the High Authority will make them available primarily to the German and French industries which are the closest and most dominant.

Do we have guaranteed prices? No, we are guaranteed only that our market will be open to the foreign monopoly.

Moving on to coke plants, I waited in vain for someone to mention that we have quite a few in Italy, and they employ many thousands of workers. It seems to me that the issue was not of interest, and the belief is that if they close it will be no bad thing because it will benefit the European Community.

Nor has there been any response to the question raised by Senator Michele Giua, a serious question. He pointed out that by distilling coal, you get 65 % coke, but also 30-35 % by-products, which are perhaps more important than coke because they provide the basis of the chemical industry. So why, when dealing with the question of coal and steel, did our negotiators not tackle the question of supplies of by-products of coal distillation to our chemical industries? Coal is not only used in steel foundries; it is also distilled to provide the basis for the whole of the chemicals industry. That element of the negotiations was totally neglected by our negotiators. The German industries will continue to distil coal and invade our market with their products, but the Schuman Plan totally leaves out of account the by-products the Italian chemicals industry needs. We are thus calling into question our very own chemicals industry, because if we have to close down the coke plants, we shall not have the by-products of coal distillation.

The fact that there was a failure to include the by-products in the Schuman Plan is evidence of the lack of rigour with which the negotiations were conducted. It shows that we accepted all the conditions imposed on us because *a priori* the Government had declared that Italy should accede to the Schuman Plan whatever happened, whatever the cost.

Those then are the basic reasons why we believe that the Schuman Plan will be damaging to Italy's interests. We believe that a country like Italy should have an iron and steel industry. We believe that industry should not provide excessive profits to the bosses. We believe that the iron and steel industry should be modernised as soon as possible, but we believe that this should and could be done at a national level and we should not so easily, so lightly, risk its destruction. I heard Senator Merzagora say that there will have to be victims in our iron and steel industry. I believe that the Government could have acted very differently: it could have nationalised the iron and steel industry as proposed by the Italian free traders, by Luigi Einaudi (I do not know whether Senator Jannaccone was of that opinion at that time). In point of fact, the Italian free traders fought for a long time against the iron and steel industry because of the protectionism it enjoyed, but they have now reached the following conclusion. Italy needs an iron and steel industry but, to prevent it from becoming a source of lavish profits for the private sector, it should be nationalised. That could have been one of the solutions the Italian Government considered. Instead, it is calmly suggesting to us that we dismantle this plant, transform that one into something else — but we know neither how nor when.

[...]

**Pastore, Rapporteur for the Opposition.** Italy has always manufactured arms. The arms we used to win the 1915 war were manufactured in Italy; the arms and guns used to win on the Piave were manufactured in Italy; they did not pour in from abroad. And that is what I want to draw attention to. It is very strange that the Italian leadership does not understand all that. It was the basic precept of the Italian leadership, of all previous Italian governments. They made many mistakes, which we opposed, but they solved the problem of ensuring that Italy had a minimum of Italian weapons. Those governments conducted unjust wars that were disastrous for Italy, but that is another question. The fact remains that if we want to secure the defence of Italy we need a minimum of arms and a minimum of arms produced in Italy, because only that minimum level of production can guarantee the independence and autonomy of the army and thus the independence and autonomy of our country. I am well aware that as far as you (*looking towards the Centre benches*) are concerned, the fundamental issue is to wage war in a specific direction, so this problem does not arise. If you want to wage that war, you can be sure of obtaining arms from your allies or bosses, and therefore the question of ensuring that Italy has the arms it needs to mount an autonomous defence no longer arises. That is why it is clear that you are no longer providing a national leadership for Italy. (*Approval from the Left.*)

Today meanwhile, after so much discussion, we are here trying to find remedies, trying to see how the damage to our iron and steel industry and our economy, as expected and accepted in the Schuman Plan, can be avoided or remedied. We have a report from the 5th committee that lists the measures that should be taken. We have Senator Enrico Falck's item on the agenda, and he too is calling for very risky and uncertain measures. But is it possible to take the kind of measures hoped for? Many are clearly incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. If we ratify the Treaty, many of them cannot be adopted because they would be in breach of the Treaty. And if the Treaty is ratified, the High Authority will certainly wield sufficient power to prevent us violating it for our own benefit. That is why we thought Senator Jannaccone's proposed postponement a good idea. It would have allowed the Government to re-open the negotiations. This Treaty, which ought to have been ratified in six months, has not been ratified. That is a more than good enough reason why the Government, having listened to all the objections voiced in the country, from all kinds of workers and industrialists, should have taken the initiative of re-opening the discussions and asking for the most damaging provisions to be amended. It did not want to do that. Not because it did not recognise that those provisions are damaging to the interests of the national economy, but for reasons of government prestige.

Once this Schuman Plan has been ratified, what can be done? The Treaty excludes the possibility of withdrawal. When Senator Falck said we would need to ensure that, after a transitional period, it should be possible to review the Treaty and perhaps withdraw from it, he was suggesting a condition that is already ruled out by the Treaty itself — after ratification that will not be a possibility.

And so what will happen if the Schuman Plan is not ratified? This is basically one of your fundamental points. Let us consider whether we really need it. At this point, Italian policy is determined by the belief that there is no other way out, no alternative. We knocked on the doors of the Atlantic Alliance when they did not want us; we had to insist. And, instead of being rewarded for acceding, they are making us pay for the privilege. Consequently, we are in a permanent state of need. None of our problems is being solved, and we continue to accept all the conditions laid down by the Allies because we cannot do otherwise. Why is there such suspicion of the strengths, the potential and the capabilities of the Italian nation and people? Why should we accept the oppressive conditions of the Treaty? Why have we no choice but to accept? What would happen if we did not accede to the Schuman Plan? Perhaps, in a period of economic growth might not the German iron and steel industry find it profitable to sell its products on our market? But it has always done so, it has always sold here. Why then should our accession to the Schuman Plan prevent the German iron and steel industry from selling its products to us? Perhaps the German iron and steel industry is not free to sell its products to all countries, including countries outside the Schuman Plan? What would we lose if we were not among the countries acceding to the Schuman Plan? We have always had minerals from Algeria, and the Santa Margherita accords do not provide an absolute guarantee. Why should the French Government adopt such a harsh and hostile attitude, one that might result in the breakdown of relations between the two countries, by refusing us Algerian iron ore? What would actually happen if we did not become part of the Schuman Plan? Nothing would happen, absolutely nothing. The only thing that would happen is that we should continue to be free to manage our own industry, within the national and international limits that have

existed and will continue to exist. And our Government would continue to be free to decide on the fate and development of the national iron and steel industry. The Atlantic Alliance would not collapse, because it is plain that Italy's accession to the Schuman Plan is not an absolute prerequisite for the existence of the Atlantic Alliance.

Why then the rush to accede? In the face of the very few, almost non-existent, advantages, in the face of so much harm and danger, why should we rush to approve the Treaty?

[...]

The economic and customs union between France and Italy has come to nothing; the liberalisation of trade has come to nothing. Everywhere we are seeing an increase and not a reduction in customs duties. According to an article I saw in *Il Globo*, the agricultural pool is set to come to nothing because many of the nations have not joined and are opposed to it. And yet the agricultural pool was one of the international cartels in which we could have had a voice, as producers. But whereas the German industrialists wanted the coal and steel community in order to conquer our internal market, they are little inclined to open their internal market to our agricultural products. They are free traders and Europeanists when it comes to ruining our iron and steel industry, but become fiercely protectionist when it is a matter of opening up their internal market to our fruit and vegetables. It would have been helpful had the Government at least dealt simultaneously with the issue of giving our iron and steel market to foreign industry and opening foreign markets to our fruit and vegetables.

The truth is that you are prepared to approve the Plan solely for political reasons, persuaded that at best it will not confer any advantage on Italian industry or the national economy. You know that the Schuman Plan is a war plan. That is why, even though the European economic union and the liberalisation of trade have failed, the Plan has been allowed to see the light of day.

[...]

The problem is twofold. Is this law compatible with Article 11 of the Constitution? According to Article 11: 'Italy ... agrees to limitations of sovereignty where they are necessary to allow for a legal system of peace and justice between nations, provided the principle of reciprocity is guaranteed.' In my view, the Treaty does not meet those requirements, it does not fulfil the conditions Article 11 requires before Italy can accept limitations on its sovereignty. It does not guarantee our country equal conditions. That is clear. Everything that has been said here by those speakers who have analysed the economic provisions of the Treaty shows that Italy is not on an equal footing. You have only to look at the notorious provisions to the effect that raw materials will be distributed to our disadvantage.

Second question: where Italy agrees to a limitation of its sovereignty, how is that consent to be given? Assuming that a specific treaty is compatible with Article 11 of the Constitution, how should the Italian Government and Parliament ensure that it is given effect? The first of those questions is more of a general political issue, on which it is very easy to engage in polemics. The second is more specific. Is an international treaty sufficient to limit the sovereignty of the Italian people, Parliament and Government? You will say that any international treaty limits national sovereignty. If that were true, it would have been pointless to include Article 11 in the Constitution. That article clearly refers not to the usual kind of international instrument in which agreements and commitments are entered into, and whereby our sovereignty is clearly limited if we are to respect those commitments. Clearly, Article 11 was designed to cover a different case, far more serious than the usual international treaty. It was designed, for instance, for the European federation, a supranational body set up above the Italian state, to which Italian citizens would be subject. And is that issue to be resolved by simply approving an international treaty, like an ordinary law? We are then faced with the question whether ordinary law is sufficient or whether we need to apply the procedure required by constitutional laws.

The provisions of the Treaty we are discussing are in fact contrary not to just one article but to several articles of our Constitution. The provisions of the Treaty are binding not only on the State but on private

individuals; they are binding on industrial enterprises. By ratifying the Schuman Plan, we are accepting that there is a High Authority outside Italy, outside our Government and Parliament, which has the right to decide on the investments and development of our industries, on the distribution of raw materials that matter to us. It has the right to decide to dismantle certain Italian industries, under certain conditions. It has the right to fine our citizens and industrialists and enforce those penalties in Italy without any intervention from the Italian judicial authorities. This is something completely new! Senator Jacini says: we want to build Europe! Well, build Europe, but do so constitutionally, not by violating but by applying the Constitution. You form the majority in the country and Parliament, you are the Government and consider this policy to be right and appropriate to Italy's interests. All well and good, but we are combating it as a minority, and you, as the majority, have the right to take it forward but not by violating constitutional provisions. You accept that by approving the Treaty, Italian citizens will be subject to a foreign power, to foreign courts which can fine Italian private citizens without any intervention on the part of our own courts. You accept an authority above the State and Parliament, and over Italian industry and citizens, an authority that is not provided for under the Constitution. This is a very serious matter. You are changing the Constitution, and you are aware that changes to the Constitution cannot be made using ordinary law — other procedures are provided. If you accept the Treaty by violating the Constitution, you will be creating a very serious precedent. Beware the day the Italian people come to realise that the parties that make up the Government have, in some instances, abolished rights granted by the Constitution and have done so not in accordance with the procedures laid down but using ordinary law, because that is much easier. Beware that day, for on that day the Italian people will be free to reject the new laws and foreign authorities that are not envisaged in our Constitution, in our judicial system, in our political and constitutional system, or that have been introduced into them and into our lives and social systems illegally and unconstitutionally. If you do that, you will be legitimising any revolt on the part of the Italian people. In relation to the Constitution, the question was raised of whether the people had the right to rebel. If I am not mistaken, no such article was included in the Constitution because it was considered too dangerous, too revolutionary. But there is no doubt that if a nation has to face the fact that the Government, the majority parties and Parliament are so openly violating the Constitution, the nation may tolerate it, suffer it for two years, five years or even fifty years, but the time will come when the Italian people will call the Government to account for this clear violation of the Constitution.

This is a very serious issue. According to Senator Jacini, basically these are not legislative bodies, they are largely deliberative bodies. He also said they are bodies on which we are represented. It is not sufficient, it is not enough that the Italian state should be represented on those bodies, whether we are talking about the High Authority or the Court of Justice, because these bodies may have the right to act in relation to Italian citizens in breach of their constitutional rights. At most, our representative will be an accomplice or, at best, may perhaps try to mitigate those measures that are detrimental to Italian citizens. But, in law, none of that counts at all; in law the fact remains plainly and clearly that, under this Treaty, we are accepting the jurisdiction of organs not provided for under our Constitution, over our industry, our industrialists, over all Italian citizens, over the Italian Parliament, outside of and contrary to the rules laid down in our Constitution.

[...]

By accepting that this bill be approved using ordinary procedure and not the procedure for review of the Constitution, and by planning even now to exclude the representatives of the Opposition in the Schuman Plan Assembly, you are committing a huge and very serious violation of the Constitution. You are opening the door to very serious political crises, for which you will bear responsibility. To conclude, I believe my appeal to your intelligence and consciences should not be in vain. I do not want to engage in hyperbole. But let me tell you that the decisions you will be taking today may have serious implications not only for the future of our industry and economy, but for the fate of the whole country. Beware the day that you, the majority, set out on the open road to violation of the Constitution, for on that day you will bear responsibility for all the political crises that could be sparked off in our country as a result. *(Loud applause from the Left. Many words of congratulation.)*

**President.** The next speaker is the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

**Paolo Emilio Taviani**, *Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*. Mr President, Members of the Senate, my task is to respond to the various criticisms of a technical, economic and legal nature made in relation to the basic points of the Treaty. Our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister will conclude the debate.

It has been said many times both in committee and here by many speakers that the Schuman Plan was conceived and born and is now being presented to you as the core of the new Europe. Yesterday Senator Randaccio put it very well when he said that it can be accepted or rejected only within the proper political framework. The individual elements of that framework can be looked at separately. That is my job and, and since I wish to take up as little of your time as possible, I shall summarise rather than analyse many points: please forgive me in advance for the inevitable gaps. I shall try to avoid repeating what has been said in committee and set out in the excellent report of the 5th committee by Senators Angelo Mott and Zefferino Tomè under the expert guidance of Senator Giuseppe Paratore, and also adopted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I shall avoid repeating what has been brilliantly explained by Senators Galletto, Ziino, Bergmann, Guglielmo and Merzagora on the technical, economic, social and legal aspects of the Plan.

My sincere thanks go to all of them, and to Members of the Opposition, including, first and foremost, our eminent colleagues, Senators Ricci Federico, Jannaccone and Giua, because they have all helped to explore and improve our understanding of the issue .

The Opposition rapporteur who addressed the House before me said (and this was anticipated by Senator Casadei in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in relation to one of the conditions under Article 11 of the Constitution) that Italy is not on a completely equal footing. That is absolutely wrong: the High Authority is appointed by the six Governments and each of them has an absolutely equal vote.

To avoid misunderstandings, then, and in response to a number of voices raised in the debate, it is worth stating that there is no agreement on, nor has there even been any diplomatic discussion of, the composition of the High Authority. The fact that it has nine members does not in any way mean that the Italian Government does not have equal rights in voting for the composition of the High Authority. It is hardly necessary to make the point that, in the Assembly, Italy will have the number of representatives proportionate to the size of its population within the Community. The Council will intervene only in limited circumstances, will often vote on the basis of unanimity, and only in certain cases by a qualified or simple majority. Only in those cases does the rule apply that, in order to achieve a majority, at least one country that accounts for more than 20 % of total output must take part. That, Senator Pastore, is not a diminution of equality; it is perfectly logical. It accords with practice in national and international law, namely that, where the whole is made up of several elements, you take account both of population size and of the economic significance of each element represented. And if in future we are able to set up an agricultural pool, though the Government is not, for now, particularly hopeful about this, should not Italy perhaps have greater clout in that pool than some countries with a far smaller agricultural industry? Since we accept that Italy should have 18 members in the Assembly, as compared with four for Luxembourg and ten for Holland and Belgium, and the equality of Luxembourg, Holland and Belgium is not diminished, we have also, in the same spirit, to accept that, in order to form the majority, the four votes in the Council should include one vote from a state that accounts for more than 20 % of output. Failing that, the majority could be formed with less than 25 % of total output.

The authoritative Senator Jannaccone has criticised the right of veto. It is true that in other organisations that principle has caused serious problems, and Italy must be the first to regret that. But what we are dealing with here is not an absolute veto: that right is in fact no longer valid after four rounds of voting. Where it applies, it is to the benefit of all those in the Community who feel more vulnerable. For them, it acts as a guarantee against the countries with higher production levels.

Another much debated point concerns the whole structure of the Plan: its dirigiste implications. This was discussed at length in committee. Senator Michele Giua said, with, in a sense, a rather happy turn of phrase, that the authors of the Plan gave him a lesson in Marxism. Senator Giua, there are good reasons why the French, Belgian and Dutch Socialists have been and are the most fervent supporters of the Plan. Anyway, let me say that nothing happens in vain in the history of political doctrines, and certainly not even socialism has



passed in vain. But it always comes as a shock that whenever we try to meet halfway the requirements emerging from the Socialist *Weltanschauung*, we encounter absolute refusal. I fail to understand how members of the Opposition can be opposed to this kind of dirigisme. Yes, Senator Pastore has explained that there is dirigisme and dirigisme: capitalist dirigisme and the dirigisme of collectivised society. But, so far at least, your approach has been to allow the development of economic relations to move forward, in the conviction that this will promote the triumph of collectivised society. Why, in that case, do you wish to wreck what has until recently always been your own approach? What — how shall I put it? — disparate reasons led you to repudiate the methods of the German Communists when, in the period after the First World War, they opposed the splitting up of the big industrial concerns specifically because they said that this was a pointless attempt to swim against the tide of history? Unfortunately, experience has shown that this was a serious mistake, but one you never wanted to admit. (*Interruption from Senator Pastore.*) I am talking about you, Senator Pastore, not us.

But I do understand the uncertainty of the free traders whom Senator Pastore mentioned, when he said he could not explain why the liberals were in favour. I owe Senator Sanna Randaccio an answer here, since he has asked for clarification on several occasions, but I have to say that the point made by Senator Falck is absolutely right, namely that the initial draft had a stronger free trade element than this one. I am grateful to Senator Guglielmone for his appreciation of the amendments made to the initial draft for the benefit of Italy. However, it is a fact that, structurally, the amendment was less geared to free trade and more dirigiste. I have already explained to the Committee on Foreign Affairs how that happened. To give you a brief résumé, I shall just say that the dirigiste aspect was enhanced because a free trade approach would not have been sufficient to prevent the Plan, designed to be anti-cartel, assuming more covertly cartel-like forms. It is understandable that many capitalist sectors, in all countries, regretted that. I pointed out during an interruption yesterday that all the confederations of industry in all the countries were opposed to the Plan. That explains why the *Comité des Forges* was so radically opposed to the Plan from the time, and only from the time, when, besides adopting the anti-cartel thrust it had from the beginning, it assumed a very clear stance designed to prevent the re-emergence of cartels in any form. I must in fact say that the criticisms and reservations of our Italian Confederation of Industry, Confindustria, were less totalitarian and more balanced than the fierce opposition mounted by foreign associations of producers. They clung tenaciously to their privileges, which have so far remained intact. It is very strange, Senator Giovanni Roveda, Senator Girolamo Li Causi and Senator Luigi Castagno, that this should be what you are complaining about. I know you do not believe that an anti-cartel approach can be maintained; you say that the insidious cartel element will always find a way — but why not try? Let us at least put it to the test. If we are, as you believe and say, currently surrounded by wall-to-wall capitalism, let us try this way of at least partially changing things!

Senator Jannaccone painted a rather gloomy picture of, for instance, the relationship between the *Comité des Forges* and the French member or members of the High Authority. Certainly no one, least of all myself, would venture to predict what will happen in future in relation to similar issues. Furthermore, it is a fact (and Senator Jannaccone is certainly aware of this) that going against the firm opinion of the *Comité des Forges*, against its interest, against its overt and covert action, France has initialled, approved and ratified the Schuman Plan in the Chamber of Deputies. It is not my intention — and in any case I do not have the strength for it — to engage in esoteric polemics with you, Senator Jannaccone, over the definition of a cartel. In the first place, it has been redefined by reference to the etymology of the word ‘pool’, which means the ‘sharing of specific resources’, but is now being used as a synonym of cartel. But precisely in order to avoid any misunderstanding, the word ‘pool’ never appears in the Schuman Plan; the word ‘community’ is always used. Is it just a matter of words? Well, let us look at the substance. It is a fact that so far the most vehement criticism that industrialists in the various countries have made of the Schuman Plan is based on the fact that it reduces the freedom of individual industries to form concentrations, enter into agreements and establish links with foreign competitors. That we are not dealing here with a ‘trust’ is clear from the fact that, in many areas of its activity, the High Authority is subject to the assent of the Council and is monitored, supervised and assessed by an Assembly made up of members that are definitely not there to represent only producers’ interests. The Assembly has the power to force the High Authority to resign. If I may say so, the only thing in Senator Pastore’s speech that was implicitly favourable to the Plan was his reference to the substantial powers of the Assembly. It certainly has strong powers, and I am delighted to hear that comment from a member of the Opposition. If the members of the High Authority represented biased interests, if they

were directly appointed by their governments from which they received instructions, if they did something prohibited under specific rules of the Treaty, it would always be open to the Assembly to force the High Authority to resign. And as far as the expression ‘general competence’ is concerned, Senator Jannaccone, I can only endorse your criticism. Clearly, it is absolutely right: the expression is technically very ambiguous. But let us consider what it means in practice, in spirit, what the article means when it refers to ‘general competence’. It means this: it clarifies and reiterates the already clearly confirmed principle that there should be no links between the High Authority and the interests of the coal and steel sector. That principle is so clearly endorsed that not only are persons with specific interests barred from the High Authority but it is also laid down that, for three years after they leave their post in the High Authority, they may have no involvement in that sector.

As far as the parallel with the Dawes Plan is concerned, it seems to me that the personal examples you, Senator Jannaccone, have quoted confirm that there have in the past been individuals, and you have provided evidence of this yesterday in the examples you gave, capable of setting aside personal interests and bias. They are the people the High Authority under the Schuman Plan needs. It may be true that ethical standards have declined over the past 30 years, but why should we so strongly doubt the possibility of finding honest and capable individuals today? Moreover, if the authors of the Schuman Plan did not devise a new initiative, there is no shame in that, and we should remember that the Dawes Plan was beset by the problems we all know about. The difficulty was not its structure but complex reasons connected with economic policy, and these are not inevitable in the current circumstances.

The fact is that the approach in the Schuman Plan is anti-cartel and based on two fundamentals. The first is already under way, namely the breaking up of the Ruhr cartel. Senator Piero Montagnani, you described this as a farce. Well, it is so far from a farce that it threatened the whole survival of the Plan, as we all know, and as condemned by the press, in the six countries and further afield. It was for that very reason that the negotiations, which had already reached a conclusion, came to a standstill for five months, from November 1950 to March 1951.

The second fundamental underpinning the approach in the Schuman Plan, now that the Ruhr cartel is being broken up, consists in the anti-cartel rules contained in the Treaty.

And that brings us to prices. It is true that the issue of prices is fundamental if we want recognition for the substance and not the form of the structure. On the issue of prices, I should say that just yesterday, when carefully re-reading the record of some Opposition speeches, particularly those of the Communist far left, I realised I could not understand why the Opposition kept insisting that it is the High Authority that will determine prices. Since that is completely incorrect, I wondered on what it was based and remembered that Senator Castagno yesterday quoted Article 3(c). Well you have clearly been referring to the text first circulated — and I must confess that it may be that we are at fault for not having given you a text in Italian — and provided by Confindustria, which was the first to be distributed. It says in Article 3(c) ‘be responsible for the establishment of the lowest prices’ But that is plainly a mistranslation. The text actually says: ‘Veiller à l’établissement des prix ...’, that is to say ‘seek the establishment of the lowest prices ...’ It is not, therefore, the High Authority that determines prices. So let me give you a piece of advice: do not trust the text provided by Confindustria, you will be getting bad advice. (*Laughter from the Centre and the Right.*)

**Castagno.** It all depends how you interpret ‘veiller’.

**Taviani**, *Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.* You have made too detailed an analysis, and shown yourself to be — as I said to you only yesterday — too much of an authority on the problem not to appreciate that there are other articles that are fairly clear, albeit too complex. It is true, as was said yesterday, that here we have not only the legalism and Cartesian clarity of the French of the original text, to which has been added a heaviness of detail typical of the Germans, and many other requirements, including our own demands. (*Interruption from Senator Mancinelli.*) There are 46 million West Germans, and they clearly have the right to live in the new Europe, and when it comes to technical competence, you cannot deny that they have it. In addition, it was necessary to take account of the demands of individual nations,

including Italy.

Now then, these other articles (with which Senator Castagno is very familiar) provide that in extreme circumstances, the High Authority may fix the maximum or minimum prices. Those circumstances are cases of shortage or surplus and are described in the text as cases of 'manifest crisis'. Cases of 'manifest crisis', that is to say shortages or surpluses, are determined on the initiative of the High Authority, with the assent of the Council acting by majority, or on the initiative of a state, in which case the Council has to act unanimously. It is not therefore easy to determine a 'manifest crisis'. I would go so far as to say that it is impossible to do so unless there is a genuine crisis throughout the Community. Only in those circumstances will maximum and minimum prices be fixed. In all other circumstances, there will be freedom of competition and vigilance to avert unfair competition and dual pricing.

That, it seems to me, is to all our advantage. In particular it is to our advantage as Italians and to that of the Dutch: in a word, the marginalised countries. I should like to make our liberal friends understand that if there is anything dirigiste about it, it is there specifically to avoid or prevent any form of monopoly. No special prices apply in regard to one country or another: the basic point is that there should be a single price.

**Castagno.** If there is only one price, there is no freedom of competition.

**Taviani**, *Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*. Plainly, the single price is the result of free competition. Once customs duties have been abolished, it is the market dynamic itself that determines a single price.

Moreover, Articles 64 and 65 unequivocally prohibit all agreements between undertakings and associations of undertakings tending to distort normal competition on the common market. All concentrations are prohibited, not just in relation to iron and steel but also between the iron and steel industry and other undertakings. Prohibited therefore are not only horizontal concentrations but also vertical concentrations. All these provisions are so clearly anti-cartel in nature that — and there is no longer any need for secrecy now — the French delegation was at odds with the French employers for this very reason. Only the Italian and Dutch delegations were immediately in favour of Jean Monnet's approach, the very Jean Monnet who, although not orthodox, nonetheless — and you cannot deny this — declares himself to be and is recognised as a Socialist. The Belgian, Luxembourg and German delegations were quite slow and reluctant to accept that approach.

I do not wish to discuss here whether one doctrine or the other is better. Of course, I have my own views, but I am careful not to assert them in negotiations of this kind. But I do believe that, setting aside my personal views about monopolies and cartels, it was in the interest of Italy — which is in a marginal position in terms of geography and output — that these provisions should be adopted.

Let us move on now to the commercial policy aspect. It has been said that once the Community has been established, there will no longer be any possibility of trading with countries outside it. Senator Jannaccone has already acknowledged that such a possibility does exist. Moreover, you are aware of the Netherlands' line on economic policy. Is it conceivable that the Netherlands would enter the Community without all the necessary guarantees in relation to free trade with countries outside it? Apart from those considerations, there are others that derive from the Treaty. Articles 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75 clearly and unequivocally confirm the right to acquire products covered by the Plan on any market outside the Community. In addition to that general principle, the individual states retain the right to impose restrictive licences. There is thus no question of the High Authority violating those provisions in any way and preventing the Member States from purchasing supplies of coal and steel from, for example, South Africa, the Americas or Australia.

The only conditions the Treaty envisages relate to mutual assistance between the individual states to prevent the third country using dumping or other measures already condemned by the Havana Charter or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article 74, under which the High Authority may make recommendations if supplies from outside the Community are likely to threaten the internal structure of the system, is similar in content. Here again, we are dealing with exceptional provisions that are to be applied

only in cases of manifest crisis.

For example, if at any time we were to experience in the Community a crisis similar to that of 1928, mechanisms would come into play to prevent some of the producers disappearing from the market. The aim would clearly be not to trigger unemployment, as that would be fatal in those circumstances. The other aim would be to prevent the loss of the industries that would be needed when recovery set in. In non-participating countries, those measures might not be taken and so factories in the non-participating countries might find themselves at an advantage as compared with countries which had acceded to the Plan. In that case, and exclusively in that case of manifest crisis and unfair competition from non-participating countries, the High Authority could act to stop or block trade with third countries.

Hitting the mark as always, Senator Ricci — forgive me, I am rather uneasy about engaging in polemics with you because of the inferiority complex I have always had in regard to the ‘mayor’ of my city — has identified a basic problem, indeed the most basic problem, that of monetary unity and thus the equilibrium of the trade balance. The point is relevant, but the problem has already arisen at a political level, between the functionalists and the constitutionalists at the Strasbourg Assembly. It is clear that, if we were to take the logical approach, we would have to begin by setting up the Council, in fact the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, and then move on down to the Assembly and all the individual applications in the economic and political sector. This applies in the political domain, and also in the economic sector. Logically speaking, you are quite right; but if we had to wait to take the logical and not the empirical approach, we would never get as far as moving in the direction of the European Union, never mind achieving it.

That logical approach would first and foremost require major sacrifices at a practical level. The path we are taking is certainly more tortuous, and on occasion, hard to follow. Sometimes, it seems to, or does in fact, collide with certain fundamental principles of political and economic logic. The famous Ricardo’s law of comparative cost, for instance, comes into play only when two economies amalgamate completely and not just in certain sectors. Despite all that, we have supported the Schuman Plan and then the European army, because we believe that this is the only feasible approach.

Moreover, in this particular instance, the monetary sector has already been taken into consideration and has also been analysed in detail in an effort to bring currencies into line to boost trade. The International Monetary Fund was set up for that purpose in the immediate post-war period and, more recently, the European Payments Union has been established. By setting off payments among the 18 countries, it has made different currencies more or less transferable among them. That machinery makes it possible to transfer currencies among the six countries of the Schuman Plan. As regards the development of trade, the position is that there should be no substantial movements within the Community or the kind that would significantly change the existing situation. In the case of Italy more particularly, since we import all our coal and the bulk of our iron ore, there could be variations solely in relation to a small proportion of imports of steel products. That increase in exports will be offset by the increase in exports of engineering products and, in that context, it is not possible to predict any monetary imbalance or identify a specific problem, for the initial period at least.

Furthermore, were there to be monetary implications, it would be very difficult, even without the Schuman Plan, without this sectoral integration, to prevent a disruption to the French currency affecting the Italian or Dutch or Belgian currencies as well.

But let us consider the consequences of the Plan for Italy. If I recollect rightly, it seems to me that here in the Senate when notification of the Schuman Plan arrived, during an industrial policy debate, the Government declared that Italy would fight for three issues: the OEEC-Finsider plans, Algerian minerals and the transitional period. I do not think there is anything to be said about the OEEC-Finsider plans or the transitional period: everyone has agreed on both. They were not provided for in the first text of the Treaty, but are provided for in the final text. It guarantees that Italy will be able to see through its own plans, since they were proposed and drafted before the Treaty was initialled. For the transitional period, we have the guarantee of the whole convention with its many paragraphs: this is something that has been of particular

interest now as in the past not only to Italy but also to Belgium.

The issue that remains is that of Algerian minerals. On that point, Senator Pastore, you belittled all we achieved by saying that we would have obtained the minerals anyway. That is not the point: at Santa Margherita we were given what justice demanded, since France did not intend to include its Algerian provinces in the Plan. A remedy had to be found. As for you, Senator Pastore, you will recall that *Il Paese* of 21 April 1951 mentioned a TASS press notice, according to which 'Italian resistance was overcome following French concessions at Santa Margherita'. According to TASS, therefore, there were concessions at Santa Margherita!

**Pastore.** TASS may have been ill informed. (*Laughter.*)

**Taviani**, *Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.* But on that point it was well informed. I must clarify a point for the Senate. It was said in the Foreign Affairs Committee that, in the first year after ratification of the Schuman Plan, 450 000 tonnes are provided for, rising to 830 000 tonnes after five years. The agreement is renewable and during those five years a further 400 000 tonnes of minerals may be allocated to Italy from Conakry.

It is not true that this is solely a matter of issuing licences — though that in itself would be something. There have been earlier agreements between the French Government and the mine-owners, and there is a diplomatic commitment to supply — it is not platonic and it means something to anyone familiar with the relations between the French Government and the majority of North African mines. That was clear from what Senator Giovanni Battista Bertone said yesterday, when he pointed out, in a recorded interruption, that there was a significant increase in supplies this year, as compared with the previous year, specifically because the mine-owners had to follow the line adopted at Santa Margherita. What Senator Ricci said is also true, that last year there were no plants in Piombino, but how would the owners of the Algerian mines have behaved this year if there had not been that commitment? It is also the case that we have not yet received everything, specifically because (and this morning this was confirmed to our friend Senator Merzagora by an authoritative source in the iron and steel sector) the mechanism of the Schuman Plan has yet to take effect.

Senator Sanna Randaccio asked whether the failure to include Algeria would also apply in relation to the agricultural pool. I must start by making it clear that the Italian Government — both the Foreign Minister and the Minister for Agriculture — have many reservations about this. They have therefore agreed to convene a solely preparatory conference. It is not in fact likely that a mechanism can be applied here similar to the one used in a fairly straightforward sector like the iron and steel sector. In any event — if there were to be an agricultural pool — it is clear that the fundamental principles that apply to the Schuman Plan will have to remain in place, above all the free movement of the workforce.

Senator Meuccio Ruini then alluded to the rumour that industries might spring up in northern Africa. According to sources in Paris and Bonn, the rumour of a possible relocation of German iron and steel industries to North Africa emerged in Bonn from a news agency report in the wake of confusion about issues concerning relations between Bonn and the EDC. Subsequently, that confusion was compounded by news of the Labonne Plan on the Franco-Anglo-Canadian agreement concerning the exploitation of iron mines situated not in North Africa but in Mauritania. In reality, this was completely premature; these are news agency reports. In any event, I can reassure the Senate that we have considered that possibility from the start, from the first day of the negotiations, and we shall be protected against such eventualities once the mechanism of the Schuman Plan enters into force.

Moving on now to the question of prices, it is true that for Italian producers (in relation to steel but not the engineering industry) an ex-works price would be ideal. That has been set in place for the transitional period; after the transitional period, the price is determined using a rather complicated mechanism that represents a compromise between the ex-works price and the delivery price. But dual pricing and the policy of dumping have been completely eliminated. I shall not insist, because here in this House Senator Ziino was very clear on the fact, that it is not possible for a firm, from Luxembourg for example, to set a different price for Naples, Bayonne or Bordeaux. In every part of the Community, the price must be based on a



specific list — there is only one list and it is published.

Again, Senator Ziino has spoken very effectively on ferrous scrap. Moreover, not a great deal was said on that subject. It seems to me that the advantage when we enter the pool as compared with the current situation, is that in the event of manifest crisis, it is provided that the High Authority will allocate quotas. You might object that there is always a crisis in relation to ferrous scrap (and we see that this is so in the daily struggle for licences, even for a few thousand tonnes of ferrous scrap). The situation is chronic and, consequently, the High Authority will be intervening more or less permanently to allocate quotas. It is true that allocation on a quota basis is not by industry but on a national basis. But it is by reference to national need and not the ferrous scrap available to that country. Since Italy is an importing country, it will be at some advantage from that point of view.

Senator Giua also tabled an item on Sulcis. Basically, I can accept it because, if I have understood him aright, Senator Giua is saying that it is not possible to achieve the envisaged project in two years. Above all, Senator Giua, the two years do not run from 1 April 1952, as you appear to think, because in the spring of 1952, if all goes well, all the countries taking part in the Plan may have ratified. Then those ratifications will have to be deposited. There will be the inter-governmental conference for the appointment of the High Authority, and by then we shall in any event be in the autumn of 1952. The period of *démarrage* will then begin, and that is different from the transitional period of three months for coal and six months for steel. Thereafter, the transitional period will come into effect. And so, if all goes well, that will bring us to the spring of 1953. But the two years do not apply to the possibility of aid for the Sulcis mines. They apply to external aid, that is, aid to be supplied by the High Authority. The Plan that was presented provided for updating and modernisation within two years but, since doubts later emerged, it was clearly stated that the possibility of non-external aid applies for the whole period, that is to say for six years, as of the autumn of 1952 (namely, the period of *démarrage* followed by the transitional period).

[...]

**President.** The next speaker is the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

**Alcide De Gasperi**, *Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister ad interim for Italian Africa.* Minister Taviani's robust and comprehensive answer, and I cannot thank him enough for it, above all shows it is untrue that the issue has been rapidly resolved by 'political accession' to a project, to a 'plot' organised by third countries. Nor is it just another act of 'servility'. That is not true. This report could only have been drafted by individuals who analysed the argument in detail over a number of months, gradually overcoming differences of view. It shows there were disagreements in the debate, and we finally reached a decision only as a result of effort on all sides. We should also take account of the work done in the House, in three committees, in three reports and, in particular, of the answer Senator Jacini gave today. And if to all that are added the speeches — some of them very detailed — here in the Senate, it is clear (setting aside the fact that the whole issue will have to be debated again in the Chamber of Deputies) that every effort is being made to take a decision after proper consideration. I must reject the accusation that we have taken a decision on this issue simply on general political grounds.

It should be open to me to reverse that accusation and say the only reason the Opposition is against this proposal is because of its general political view. If the political geography of the proposal were different, I think there would be enthusiasm for the proposal itself despite its current formulation.

Colleagues on the far Right and the far Left should forgive me if I do not enter into detail on their political arguments. The fact is that during their exposés they tried again and again, and this happens in all situations of this nature, to interpret all the considerations relating to a particular proposal — regardless of how specific and technical the proposal is — in terms of a fundamental political thesis, namely that of 'serving' America and detesting or being in conflict with Russia. Senator Casadei spoke of a European plan, one which, he sustains, is in fact no more than a front for 'serving America'. Senator Montagnani based all he had to say on the doctrinal thesis that 'after the two world wars, the economies of the western world are beginning to change, as capitalism undermines the foundations of the capitalist countries. Hence the need for

US imperialism to control not only the economy but also the politics of the various European countries. Europe is therefore faced with various Marshall and Schuman Plans. It is likely that if capitalism cannot resolve the crisis sapping its vital forces, more radical measures such as war and conquest will result.' This is the doctrine of Marxists and Leninists. It is in the texts, it is trotted out every day in *Pravda* and is supposed to provide an explanation. But it is not an explanation. It is a prejudice that discredits all the conclusions reached by our colleagues, or at least some of those on the far Left. As a result, from being Communists they become anti-Community; from being experts on southern Italian issues, they are now focusing particularly on the iron and steel industry. We shall meet at the ballot box to consider the argument you put in defence of the kind of privileges to which so many southern Italians have in the past objected. (*Murmurs of approval from the Centre.*) I say this to excuse to some extent my reaction when I said you had become reactionaries. It is, of course, a word I am borrowing from you. But when you extol this form of regression — and Senator Pastore today tried to explain or at least rationalise it — and you do so in such a way that it becomes an attack on us, we have the right of retaliation and retortion. We have the right to quote to you the doctrines you are now rejecting.

Senator Casadei gave a speech that was undeniably underpinned by a wealth of quotations and documentation. In it he spoke of the Marshall Plan, NATO, the European Union, the weakening of British forces throughout the empire, the Korean War and the war in Asia, as if discussing so many stages on the way to the Schuman Plan, that is to say the revival of major German industries for the purpose of rearming Germany and Europe. But just consider what a view of America's actions that all this reveals!

On that point, Senator Casadei put a certain question to me. This was a question he had also put in committee, on the treaty that he maintains is currently being discussed between the Occupying Powers and Germany, setting the limits, the borders and the eastern frontiers of Germany. The consequence of this treaty for us would be that, having accepted the Alliance by ratifying the Schuman Plan with Germany as well, we should be obliged to defend each other against territorial claims and attack. But I have already answered this in relation to the general argument. In the Atlantic Alliance, as in the EDC, we are defending existing frontiers, not territorial claims. There may be claims, in that we cannot suppress them and they are peaceful claims to be resolved through negotiation. But as far as we are concerned, they most definitely do not represent a military commitment, other than for the defence of the territory actually administered by the states concerned against outside attack.

Moving on to the specific issue, I must repeat what I said in committee, where I think I may have been misunderstood. When, after assimilating all the available information, I have to say that I know nothing about a particular article of a treaty, which the honourable Member assures me exists, I mean that, as far as I am concerned, in the light of all the information I have and the texts I have consulted, that article does not exist. Of course, I have to add that, as you know, the treaty or rather the contract — it is called that to distinguish it from the peace treaty — that is being drawn up with Germany has yet to be finalised. And so I cannot be in possession of that final text. And I doubt whether Senator Casadei can have it, no matter the extraordinary nature of his information. I should also add that in no text or piece of documentation have I come across any such reference. In fact, in the briefings and the general information I have received, I have noted a tendency on the part of the Allies to exclude from that contract the basic reasons for conflicts over frontiers. They are to be kept for the future peace treaty for a variety of reasons, more particularly because this is a treaty that should also include Russia and the satellite states. No need for alarm, then. And it is not true that all the organisations, including the Schuman Plan, are designed to shore up a state of affairs that will then definitely lead to war because of the link with the drafting of a contract that even indirectly would drag us too into war. I do not know why our colleagues on the far Left feel the need to conjure up such grim images and fantasies. I have no idea why they take such a gloomy view and like to be doom-mongers predicting misfortune and calamity ahead.

Moving on to two other questions, I shall answer Senator Casadei, banishing from my thoughts that peremptory, grand inquisitorial tone that is not customary in exchanges between Opposition and Government. In fact, I think those questions could be of interest to many others. The first question is: when the Assembly is appointed, will the Government have all the posts, or will some be reserved for the Opposition? The answer is that Parliament will decide.

But if Senator Casadei repeats what he had to say, including that, if and when the Opposition enters the Assembly, it will do its best to sabotage it and make it impossible for the Assembly to function, then I have to say to him that his words are not simply constructive criticism, they are a torpedo, an attempt at sabotage. (Applause.)

I say the time has come to put an end to this. If we can stop you, you shall not enter!

And I say this, without prejudice to the approach that the Chamber of Deputies may take. This is our criterion: those persons in particular who stand for the kind of government that seeks to impose Socialist principles or is semi-dictatorial, and uses dictatorial methods to implement major plans for renewal, should not be surprised if we square up to the threat and resist it. We are clear on this: we shall resist even outside this House, in the Chamber of Deputies. We shall repeat it to all those who, on one pretext or another, in one form or another, threaten us. Just as Senator Pastore did at the end of his speech, despite his dulcet tones, when he sought to justify in advance possible rebellion on the ground that we would be making a mistake by today voting for the Treaty.

Let us consider the constitutional aspect of the Treaty. I am no lawyer, nor am I a lawyer's son, so I cannot claim any special knowledge. But, during the parallel discussions on the European army, there was much discussion of the problems of the limits within which Parliaments can today approve and ratify treaties requiring the surrender of some elements of sovereignty to a supranational body. What applied to the European army applies *a fortiori* to the Schuman Plan. Anyway, I have always tried to take advice from the strictest and most rigorous constitutionalists. And, in relation to our own position, I have to say, while we in Italy have Article 11 of the Constitution, and France has the same principle, but only in the preamble, not in the body of the text, the smaller states — those with constitutions drawn up between 1930 and 1948 — have no similar provision. Only Germany has an even more extensive provision, because its Basic Law was drawn up with that in mind.

Looking then at the wording of our Article 11, I would say that, according to the experts, although the text permits reciprocal limitations on sovereignty, it also permits the international organisations needed to guarantee that those limitations are correctly applied.

Those organisations must of necessity constitute an international authority, which, as a result of those same limitations, can be supranational. Such organisations are not a source of concern, if you take the Workers International as a point of departure. There you have the concept of a supranational organisation that sanctions obtaining work.

So long as we are dealing with the kind of limitations of sovereignty that leave the bulk of sovereignty in the hands of the individual states, we are within the scope of Article 11. But if we go beyond that, that is to say towards a federal state, then we will need another constitutional provision. That is why, when referring to the committee on the European army, I said that there is a provisional stage during which, in our opinion, Parliament will decide, when the time comes, whether we can operate on the basis of Article 11. But there comes a final and detailed phase when it will be probably be necessary to revise the Constitution. But I think this Treaty clearly falls into the first category.

By ratifying the Treaty, we are resorting to no more than a genuine constitutional implementing provision, and, as such, one that puts into effect, but only in part, what has been laid down by where it states: 'Italy ... agrees to limitations of sovereignty where they are necessary to allow for a legal system of peace and justice between nations, provided the principle of reciprocity is guaranteed.'

Minister Taviani spoke a short time ago about the actual conditions of equality. As far as we are concerned, all we need to know for certain is that we are, in this way, giving life to an international community based on the temporary ceding of the exercise of that authority, or within which the participants are equals.

And so, in essence, it follows that, on the basis of our Constitution, there is no need for revision. The

purpose of revision is to amend the Constitution, not to put it into effect. That is our view, and also the view of many experts consulted. The examples cited by Senator Rizzo cannot dent that view. Nor is it undermined because decisions of the Court are enforceable: enforcement orders are required for judgments of foreign courts but not for international judgments issued by bodies on which we are ourselves represented. Good examples are the International Court of Justice at The Hague and the other international courts. Again, our view is not undermined by the alleged violation of Article 102 which prohibits the introduction of foreign judges: these are international judges. The same applies to the alleged violation of Article 113 which guarantees judicial review of administrative acts: the problem could not arise in relation to any administrative act. Nor is the complaint concerning the ability to impose fines well founded: financial penalties can be authorised on the basis of ordinary ratifying law, as well as by the terms of Article 80 of the Constitution. Finally, the alleged violation of the regulatory powers of the Italian Regions in relation to mines is not persuasive: that regulatory power applies only in the framework of the Constitution in regard to the basic principles established by the laws of the state and the national interest.

Moreover, Minister Taviani alluded to the fact that those states, like the Netherlands and Belgium, that are far more rigid and have no provision to that effect in their constitutions, have already wholly or partly approved this bill in their Parliaments.

I have seen how meticulously the representatives of the little nations defended the text of their constitutions, in relation to the European army. And, as I said earlier, we are dealing with a parallel issue and one with the same basis.

Senator Lussu ended his speech by talking of a ‘sinister plot’ and, having engaged in painstaking research, referred particularly to the precise date of Schuman’s visit to the US Secretary of State’s cabinet, as if Senator Lussu had been in receipt of confidential information from individuals watching over the ‘plot’ between these sinister figures. But there is no mystery about it: the proposal we are discussing was conceived in Europe and has been cultivated in Europe for several reasons of an economic nature. But there is another vital reason for it, and I have personally discussed this with Schuman, who gave the proposal — one technically devised by a Socialist — its political form. That reason is the need to find a way to stop the threat of a revival of German militarism and correct the mistake made in the days of Raymond Poincaré when it was believed that occupying the Ruhr was the answer. That did not work, and the basis of the resurgence of German industry for the Second World War was established.

Why not accept that at least this has been a genuine attempt to avoid giving a free hand to the German ‘magnates’ who have vested interests in iron and steel; why not accept that this is a genuine and reasonable attempt that should be given a chance and not just viewed with suspicion?

America certainly has many other ways of defending itself and expanding its activity. But we are dealing here with an American need which relates above all to defence. And America wants Europe to defend itself, in the interest of its own defence as well. It is clear, even obvious, that this is the case.

You always repeat, and you have said this to me both in the Chamber of Deputies and here in the Senate, that we need to do all we can to prevent the resurgence of German militarism. You therefore declared yourselves in favour of Potsdam. You said it was necessary to destroy everything, get rid of everything, and demobilise completely. And I replied by asking how you, as one who suffered from the constraints and repression inflicted by our own army, tell a people like the Germans that they should give up all forms of military defence for 50 years? You derided that argument, claiming that I was looking for sentimental excuses whereas the reality was grim. And you were still saying all that up to yesterday. Well, now I can tell you this: be careful not to always carry out an order; wait in case that order is countermanded.

Read the latest Russian proposal. I do not wish to evaluate it here. I do not know whether it is an attempt at positioning or a serious proposal. For the first time, the proposal envisages the creation of a German national army for defence. But that is exactly what we want. We need to agree on the size, but the principle is the same. And so it is not true that we have to abide by the Potsdam principle forever — that was the kind of principle you could lay down only in the atmosphere of the immediate post-war period. The Russian

proposals of 11 March, following the very recent Lisbon decisions therefore, which are today discussed in *Unità*, also provide for the creation of a purely defensive German national army. They further provide (and think about what you said about war criminals) for an amnesty for Nazi war criminals. (*Comments from the Left.*) Thirdly, they provide for the abolition of all restrictions on the development of the economy and trade. In fact, it has to be assumed that the removal of all restrictions on production will include war material. And so your own stance has been almost completely undermined. That is why it seems to me that you should adopt the old adage and not carry out orders in case those orders are countermanded.

As far as you are concerned, it has been the same story since 1945, 1946 and 1947: abhorrence of the Marshall Plan and the subsequent plans and abhorrence of NATO. But you always forget one small thing, one incident of major importance in the psychological development of the anti-Communist struggle. You forget what happened in July 1947 in Prague. In July 1947, in Prague, the Czech leadership received from the French and the Americans an invitation to the Paris Conference to take part in the Marshall Plan. The rest of the satellite states also received the invitation, as well as Russia. They voted unanimously in favour of accepting the invitation — the Czech Government was made up of nine Communists, 12 Independents and three Social Democrats. The next day Klement Gottwald left for Moscow, summoned to justify himself to Stalin, who told him that he did not want the Czechs to accept the invitation. The scene was described by those who were present and survived. (*Interruptions from the Left.*) It is one that should not be forgotten. The Kremlin applied pressure and made a few phone calls, with the result that, on 10 July 1947, that is to say three days after the initial decision, the Council of Ministers published this communiqué, and I quote: ‘It has been decided that the states of Central and Eastern Europe, with which Czechoslovakia has close economic and political relations, based on contractual obligations, will not take part in the Paris Conference. In the circumstances, the participation of Czechoslovakia could be interpreted as an affront to its friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and the Government has therefore unanimously decided not to take part in the Conference.’

Remember that. And I ask you to remember it for another reason: because there were nine Communists, twelve non-Communists and three Socialists. What would happen tomorrow if the coalition ministry of fine fellows that Togliatti wants were set up! (*Laughter. Protests from the Left.*) You may ask why I am interested in these things. I am interested in them because I want to retaliate against the claims you make against us. I am interested because what happened in Prague could happen in Rome if we were not sufficiently vigilant. (*Applause from the Centre.*) I also have a sense of gratitude towards those Czech colleagues who sacrificed themselves to set a good example to us and to the whole of Europe. I stress that to show that there are some gaps in history as you tell it. And we have to pick you up on them because, in peremptory manner, you have the audacity to throw one phrase at us: American lackeys! But do you not believe that we have the interests of our country at heart? (*Interruptions from the Left.*) It was the only excuse you could find to oppose the Schuman Plan. I am amazed at this petty, mean-minded, demagogic expedient of claiming that there were three Christian Democrat Ministers there. As if those foreign ministers did not all belong to coalition governments; as if Schuman were the arbiter of the French Government; as if Adenauer did not have Protestants and Liberals in his government; as if ours were not a coalition government. It is the democratic principle that we are defending in Europe. (*Applause from the Centre.*) That is our platform ... (*interruptions and protests from the Left*) and forget your fantasies about Charlemagne and the Middle Ages! (*Interruptions from the Left.*) This is a coalition of democracies founded on the principle of freedom. That is our bastion, that is our platform, that is our struggle. (*Loud and prolonged applause from the Centre and the Right. Loud protests from the Left. Up roar.*)

[...]

**Vote by secret ballot.**

**President.** With those explanations, I declare open the vote by secret ballot on the motion of Senator Bergmann and others.

The following senators took part in the vote:



Adinolfi, Alberganti, Alberti Antonio, Alberti Giuseppe, Aldisio, Allegato, Alunni Pierucci, Angelini  
Cesare, Angelini Nicola, Angiolillo, Armato, Asquini, Azara,

Banfi, Baracco, Bardini, Battista, Bei Adele, Bergamini, Bergmann, Berlinguer, Bertone, Bisori, Bitossi, Bo,  
Boccassi, Bocconi, Boeri, Bolognesi, Borromeo, Bosco, Bosco Lucarelli, Bosi, Braccesi, Braschi, Bruna,  
Buizza,

Cadorna, Caldera, Canevari, Canonica, Cappa, Cappellini, Carelli, Caristia, Caron, Carrara, Casadei, Casati,  
Castagno, Cerica, Cermignani, Cerruti, Cerulli Irelli, Ceschi, Ciampitti, Ciasca, Ciccolungo, Cingolani,  
Colla, Colombi, Conci, Conti, Corbellini, Cornaggia Medici, Cortese,

Damaggio, D'Aragona, De Bosio, De Gasperis, Della Seta, De Luca, Di Giovanni, Di Rocco, Donati,  
D'Onofrio,

Elia,

Fabbri, Falck, Fantoni, Fantuzzi, Farina, Farioli, Fazio, Fedeli, Ferrabino, Ferrari, Filippini, Fiore, Flecchia,  
Focaccia,

Galletto, Gasparotto, Gava, Gavina, Gelmetti, Genco, Gerini, Gervasi, Ghidetti, Ghidini, Giacometti,  
Giardina, Giua, Gortani, Gramegna, Grava, Grieco, Grisolia, Guarienti, Guglielmone,

Italia,

Jacini, Jannaccone, Jannelli, Jannuzzi,

Lamberti, Lanzara, Lanzetta, Lavia, Lazzarino, Lazzaro, Leone, Lepore, Li Causi, Locatelli, Lodato,  
Lorenzi, Lovera, Lucifero, Lussu,

Magli, Magliano, Magrì, Malintoppi, Mancinelli, Mancini, Marani, Marchini Camia, Mariani, Martini,  
Mazzoni, Meacci, Medici, Menghi, Menotti, Mentasti, Merlin Angelina, Merzagora, Miceli Picardi, Milillo,  
Minio, Minoja, Molè Enrico, Molè Salvatore, Molinelli, Momigliano, Monaldi, Montagnana Rita,  
Montagnani, Morandi, Moscatelli, Mott, Musolino,

Negarville,

Ottani,

Page, Palermo, Pallastrelli, Palumbo Giuseppina, Panetti, Paratore, Parri, Pasquini, Pastore, Pazzagli,  
Pellegrini, Pertini, Pezzini, Piemonte, Pietra, Piscitelli, Platone, Priolo, Pucci, Putinati,

Raja, Ravagnan, Reale Eugenio, Restagno, Ricci Federico, Ricci Mosè, Riccio, Ristori, Rizzo Domenico,  
Rizzo Giambattista, Rolfi, Romano Antonio, Romano Domenico, Romita, Roveda, Rubinacci, Ruggeri,  
Ruini, Russo,

Sacco, Saggioro, Salomone, Salvagiani, Salvi, Samek Lodovici, Sanmartino, Sanna Randaccio, Santero,  
Santonastaso, Saponi, Schiavone, Scoccimarro, Secchia, Sinforiani, Spallicci, Spezzano,

Tafari, Talarico, Tambarin, Tamburrano, Tartufoli, Terracini, Tignino, Tissi, Tomasi della Torretta, Tomè,  
Tommasini, Tosatti, Toselli, Troiano, Turco,

Valmarana, Varaldo, Vigiani, Vischia,

Zane, Zannerini, Zelioli and Zotta.

**Closure of the vote.**

**President.** I declare the vote closed.

I ask the Senators acting as tellers to count the votes.

*(The tellers counted the votes.)*

**Outcome of the vote.**

**President.** I declare the outcome of the vote by secret ballot on the motion of Senator Bergmann and others:

Votes cast	245
Majority	123
In favour	148
Against	97

*(The Senate approved the motion.)*

[...]

**President.** We now move to consideration of the individual articles. Please read out Article 1.

**Lepore, Secretary:**

**Article 1**

The President of the Republic is authorised to ratify the following international agreements signed in Paris on 18 April 1951:

- (a) Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and annexes;
- (b) Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities;
- (c) Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice;
- (d) Protocol on Relations with the Council of Europe;
- (e) Convention on the Transitional Provisions.

**President.** No amendments have been tabled on this article.

No one has asked for the floor. I therefore put it to the vote. Those in favour please rise.

*(The article was adopted.)*

Please read out Article 2.

**Lepore, Secretary:**

**Article 2**

The above-mentioned agreements shall be fully and wholly implemented from the date on which they enter into force.

**President.** Senators Pastore, Terracini, Roveda and others have tabled an additional amendment on this article. Please read it out.

**Lepore, Secretary:**

‘The Government shall submit, within three months, a draft constitutional law for the implementation of all aspects of the present law in relations between Italian citizens and the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community.’

[...]

**President.** Those in favour please rise.

*(The article was adopted.)*

[...]

**President.** I now put to the vote the additional article which has been read out. Those in favour please rise.

*(The additional article was not adopted.)*

We now move to Article 3. Please read it out.

**Lepore, Secretary:**

### **Article 3**

This law shall enter into force on the day after its publication in the *Gazzetta Ufficiale*.

**President.** No one has asked for the floor. I therefore put it to the vote. Those in favour please rise.

*(The article was adopted.)*